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A NOTE ON THE TEXTS
fa, This study has been informed by reference to the French orig"
inals of Bergson's chief works, which are listed in chronological or"
der in the bibliograph}T. The book has been prepared, however, with
the nonreader of French in mind, for it focuses on the impact of
Bergson on the English..speaking world and especially on American
writers-an impact felt mainly through translations. These transla ..
tions are listed in the bibliography along with the originals. Bergson
was fortunate in having some very able translators, and all paren..
thetical references are to their work. That work was sometimes over"
seen by the philosopher himself, who made revisions and in some
cases added original material for the English versions. In a few
cases, especially in the chapters on 1:5. Eliot, reference to the orig"
inal editions has been essential.The reader will find appropriate ci..
tations in the notes.
Abbreviations Used
WORKS OF HENRI BERGSON
CE Creative Evolution.
CM The Creative Mind.
1M Introduction to Metaphysics.
xii Abbreviations Used
L Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic.
ME Mind;Energy: Lectures and Essays.
MM Matter and Memory.
TFW Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of
Consciousness.
TS The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.
WORKS OF T.S. ELIOT
ASG
CPP
KE
OPP
SE
TCC
UPUC
After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy.
The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909.. 1950.
Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H.
Bradley.
On Poetry and Poets.
Selected Essays.
To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings.
The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the
Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England.
WORKS OF WILLIAM FAULKNER
AA Absalom, Absalom!
ALD As I Lay Dying.
FLU Faulkner in the University.
LA Light in August.
LIG Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner,
1926.. 1962.
S Sanctuary.
SF The Sound and the Fury.
INTRODUCTION
~ The aim of this book is to revaluate Bergson's philosophy in
relation to American literature. The study does not attempt a com"
prehensive survey of Bergsonian influences on American writers, a
catalogue of which would be voluminous. Rather, it seeks to rein ..
troduce a Bergsonian vocabulary in discussion of American literary
Modernism by showing how Bergson's ideas of openness, contain..
ment, and tension illuminate the theory and practice of several rna"
jor American writers. Some of that Bergsonian vocabulary will be
recognizable. But if I have done my job well, the reader will find a
somewhat unfamiliar Bergson in these pages.
Bergson played an important, perhaps decisive role in the devel..
opment of an expressly umodern" philosophy and literature. And
yet he appears only at the margins of late ..twentieth ..century philos ..
oph~ As Leszek Kolakowski observes, no one seems to follow in
Bergson's footsteps, despite the fact that he was unot just a famous
thinker and writer; in the eyes of Europe's educated public he was
clearly the philosopher, the intellectual spokesman par excellence:'
Both Bergson's tremendous impact and his disappearance from the
scene are highly significant for understanding twentieth century
culture. l
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His disappearance, however, has troubled attempts to under..
stand his impact, as both Daniel Herman and P.A.L Gunter have
noted in recent discussions of Bergson's philosophy. That Bergson
had a special importance for American writers like Fitzgerald, Eliot,
Frost, Cather, Stein, Henry Miller, and Faulkner has long been rec"
ognized, and recent books by Piers Gra~ John Conder, and Sanford
Schwartz discuss Bergson in relation to Eliot, Pound, Faulkner, and
other American writers. Articles on Bergson and Anglo..American
literature have continued to appear.2 If I have a quarrel with this
fine work, it is that it tends uncritically to accept a common view of
Bergson as simply the ~~time"philosopher:' and so it fails to penetrate
to the potent and troublesome dualism of Bergsonian thought. Be..
cause Bergson has not been Hfashionable;' for example, no full ..
length study has systematically explored Bergson's significance for
American writers between the wars. And that is, as Kolakowski
says, significant in itself.
Fashion is fickle. The buzzwords in 1910 were not cCdeconstruc..
tion" and ~~intertextuality:' but Hcreativity" and Uintuition:' Creative
Evolution (1907; trans. 1911) became one of the most widely dis ..
cussed books in Europe and America during the prewar years. Fol..
lowing the war, many criticized sharply Bergsonism's apparent ir..
rationalism and faith in Uprogress"; few wished to be Bergson's
ufollowers:' Pilkington's Bergson and His Influence (1976) has shown a
breadth in Bergson's legacy in French phenomenology and existen..
tialism that many would prefer to ignore, since they still contend
that Bergsonian philosophy is guilty of accepting what Jonathan
Culler calls the Hmyth of the innocence of becoming:' 3 As I shall
sho~ a false issue is raised when deconstructionism rejects Bergson
on the grounds that he ignores the problems of difference and apo..
ria. The immediate need this study hopes to fill, however, is the
lack of a context for certain judgments about American literature.
A recent volume by John Conder provides a good example of
what I mean. Professor Conder argues, in Naturalism in American
Fiction, that Faulkner brings to its final point a tradition of Ameri ..
can Naturalism that relies upon an important split in the self (de..
doublement) described by Bergson: uHence, by way of Bergson,
Faulkner comes into possession of all the component elements of a
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naturalistic vision that logically allies him to [other American] nat..
uralists:'4 Conder shows (and he has followed many other critics
whom I will discuss in chapter six) that it helps to think of Faulk..
ner's characters and themes-of divided selves, of determinism and
freedom-in Bergsonian terms. This is fundamentally true, and
Faulkner's sympathies with Bergson have proved broader and more
helpful than those with American philosophers like Whitehead or
James.
But a question presents itself: Can Faulkner be shown to have
read Bergson deeply? The answer is, apparently not. So further
questions must be asked: Who was Bergson to American writers?
What works of his were widely read, and what did his readers make
of them? Did Bergsonian ideas somehow become dispersed among
American writers in the teens, twenties, and thirties, so that Faulk..
ner's ~CBergsonism" is not unique? My stud)', which began as an
attempt to explain this troubling relationship between Bergson and
Faulkner, thus expanded its task, and I undertook to follow the
history of Bergsonism's dissemination among English"speaking-
particularly American-writers, and to set before the reader a fair
(if necessarily brief) account of Bergson's place in intellectual his ..
tor)', the difference between CCBergsonism" and Bergsonian philos..
ophy itself, and the influence of Bergsonian ideas upon American
writers-especially through the agency of 1:S. Eliot and the South..
ern New Critics. That tells only a part of the story of Bergson in
America, but it is the foundation for understanding Bergson's sig"
nificance for Faulkner, Frost, Henry Miller, and many others.
If anyone consciously set out to transmit Bergsonian thought to
the English"speaking world, it was TE. Hulme, who wrote, in
Speculations, that Bergson had invented cca much better vocabu..
lary" for talking about artistic creation, one that would justify art as
the equal of science in difficulty and importance.5 As Frank Ker..
mode has said, Bergson was ccthe almost inevitable result of the
nineteenth century effort to find room for art amid the encroach..
ments of science:'6 Hulme had seen this and preached Bergson to
Pound and Eliot. He had also translated some of Bergson's work
into English. John Middleton Murr)', too, established Rhythm mag"
azine in 1911 with an eye to promulgating anew sort ofpoetrybased on
4 Bergson, Eliot, tt American Literature
the implications of Bergsonism. But neither Murry nor Hulme was
the most important figure in transmitting Bergson across the Atlan ..
tic. It was 1:S. Eliot, the erstwhile archenemy of evolutionism. He
had been in Paris in 1910 and heard Bergson lecture. He had soon be..
gun to draft a paper on Bergson.
Reading this paper suggested an approach to Eliot different from
that offered through F.H. Bradle)', Babbitt, Nietzsche, or Royce. As
I reconsidered Eliot's work, concentrating on his reviews, essays,
and philosophical notebooks, I came to see how he had, as he said,
been revolutionized b)', reacted against, and then come to terms
with Bergson's most significant ideas. In spite of himself, Eliot had
been profoundly affected by Bergson, and though he is not the only
source for Bergson's presence in the work of other American writ..
ers-Henry Miller and Robert Frost read Creative Evolution them..
selves-he is still the most important single factor in understanding
how Faulkner, for one, came to adopt a Bergsonian vocabulary.
Thus the organization of this study evolved: a review of Bergson's
career, philosoph)', and aesthetics in brief; an exploration of Eliot's
career in relation to his reading of Bergson; a tracing of the disper"
sion of Bergsonian vocabulary and themes among the Southern
New Critics, especially Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, and Rob..
ert Penn Warren; a careful consideration of William Faulkner's style
and some of his major works in relation to Bergson; and a brief
concluding chapter considering Bergson's meaning for other Amer..
ican writers, like Henry Miller, William Carlos Williams, Robert
Frost, and Gertrude Stein.
Bergson spoke to the issue of the twentieth centur)', that man can"
not afford a narrow..minded science: uThe workman's tool is the
continuation of his arm, the tool"equipment of humanity is there..
fore a continuation of its bod~ ... the bod)', now larger, calls for a
bigger soul" (TS, 298..99). Many in England and America in the first
decades of this century not only applauded, but were profoundly
moved by Bergson's valiant attempt to mediate between hostile
camps in philosoph)', physics, and aesthetics. It is time we paused
to reflect upon the fate of this philosophy that moved so many and
ultimately pleased so few. Certainly Bergson remains, as Lewis
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Mumford has said, Has essential for the lrbiological revolution' as ...
Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton were for the mechanical revolu..
tion:'7 Or, one might add, as Saussure for the semiotic revolution.
We have, that is, a well ..developed post..Saussurean criticism of
modern literature. But there are post..Darwinian readings enabled
only by a retracing of Bergson's entry into the vocabulary of Amer..
ican writers and critics. Bergson's entanglement in the fabric of
American literature between the wars thus goes underappreciated.
His aesthetic of Htension:' taken in the broad context of his philos"
oph~ is essential to understanding what many American writers
were consciously or unconsciously about. His vocabulary unlocks
modernist literature, even when it is applied in very different con"
texts. That is perhaps because the lrCmodem" stor~ as recorded by
American writers, was so much the story of human beings trying to
cope with moral issues by material means. This shared vision pro..
duced an art like Eliot's and Faulkner's that is ethical in theme,
nonspeculative in orientation; it challenges moral assumptions, pro..
poses alternate modes of cCknowing:' and eventually turns more and
more openly to direct treatment of that spiritual life after which it
hungers. It doubles back on itself, mastering Hdissociation" through
mimicry.
In the hermetic writings of Stein, the experimentalism of Wil..
Iiams and of Henry Miller, there lies an implicit faith in the poten"
tiality of language to evoke the paradoxical mystery of memory
knowing itself in its own containment and openness. The quest to
renew language in the play of mind, to create a transcendent poetry
that could yet Hcontain itself:' emerges from a Bergsonian heritage,
for it was Bergson who had explained how we erroneously extend
to memory and time Clrthe obligation of containing and being con"
tained" which applies exclusively to objects in space (MM, 193). The
goal of that quest for American writers was a literature of insight,
born in Hdistraction fits:' as Eliot put it in Four Quartets, when for
a moment Hin and out of time" consciousness stirs in the uncon"
scious processes of being; and we recognize that time itself is our
pseudonym.
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Bergson and Bergsonism
Open Bergson and new horizons loom on every page; it is
like the breath of the moming and the song of the birds.
-William James
~ Born in 1859, the year Origin of Species appeared, Bergson
was very much a child of his time. He was first drawn to the sci ..
ences, and in 1879 published an article on a problem in geometry
posed by Pascal. But he found mathematics ~~too absorbing" -that
is, too removed from life-and started reading philosophy. Then,
between 1881 and 1883, something happened to him. In a 1908
letter to William James, Bergson describes his remarkable experi..
ence: nl had remained up to that time wholly imbued with mecha..
nistic theories to which I had been led at an early date by the read..
ing of Herbert Spencer, a philosopher to whom I adhered almost
unreservedly.... It was the analysis of the notion of time, as it en"
ters into mechanics and physics, which overturned all my ideas. I
sa~ to my great astonishment, that scientific time does not endure:' 1
Spencer's evolution analyzed change without reference to "change
itself"-the interpenetration of states characteristic of psychic life
(eM, 10, 13). Without interpenetration, scientific analysis reflects
no more reality than the frames of a moving picture, and leads in ..
evitably to error. One may think, for example, of the illusion of
backward"spinning wheels created by the strobe effect of the motion
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picture camera. Such illusions, like Zeno's Paradox, Bergson la..
beled ~~pseudo"problems:'
Thus, Bergson began his career in reaction against ~~scientific
time:' and embarked on a path involving, as Anthony Pilkington
has noted, the ~~phenomenologicalmode of adhesion to immediate
experience:'2 He prepared the ground for later developments in
French philosoph~ from the religious existentialism of Marcel to
the nonreligious existentialism of Sartre and Merleau..Pont~ who
dislike Bergson's old..fashioned values but agree with him in many
ways. They dislike Bergson because he is so rooted in nineteenth
century thought-because his reaction against science is by no
means rejection. But they agree with him, as Merleau.. Ponty himself
acknowledges, on his ideas about language and experience.3 In
1884, shortly after his realization about duration (duree), Bergson
published a translation of De rerum natura and attached a commen"
tary in which he admired Lucretius's ability to U grasp outright the
two..sided nature of things" and recognize the truth that mankind
seems doomed u to act and not achieve, struggle and not succeed,
and be unwillingly drawn into the vortex of things:' 4 The ingenuity
of Bergson's Vitalism, a philosophy of freedom, owes directly to his
profound awareness of the Uvortex:'
When Bergson returned to Paris in 1888, having taught at Cler"
mont..Ferrand and Angers, he brought with him two doctoral the..
ses: Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit and Essai sur les donnees im..
mediates de la conscience. The first, a study of Aristotle's doctrine
of place, was little noticed.5 The second, translated in Bergson's
own heyday (1910) as Time and Free Will, also attracted little at..
tention, at first. It attacked the umechanicism" of Spencer, an act
which apparently resulted in subsequent charges of irrationalism
leveled at Bergsonism, charges that have continued to trouble Berg..
son's reputation as a scientist.
Of course, Bergson was not the only one concerned to attack
confidence in pure rationality. His conviction that reality ~~tran"
scends intellect" (CE, 46) was a common theme among philoso..
phers as various as Meinong, Whitehead, James, Bradle~ Russell,
and Peirce, all of whom were engaged in dismantling the nine ..
teenth"century concept of the intellect and showing the falseness of
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an unguarded faith in scientific progress.6 But Bergson was differ"
ent in that he sought a u new empiricism" based on consciousness;
some call it simply psycholog~ and Bergson simply a Uliterary phi"
losopher:' but it, and he, are more than that. By directing our atten"
tion to the immaterial world of the mind, Bergson argued, we can
come closer to understanding materiality: biolog~ evolution, even
physics. Bergson proposed a facul~ intuition philosophique, to per"
form the investigative role.
In 1900, after failing twice in attempts to be elected to the Sor"
bonne, he was given a chair at the College de France. Reaction to
his ideas was beginning to be felt. He had already published Ma"
tiere et memoire (1896), a sequel to the Essai sur les donnees, and
in his first years at the Sorbonne he produced three important
books: Le Rire (1900) and Introduction ala metaphysique (1903),
both of which were first serialized, and then L'Evolution creatrice
(1907), his most famous work. By this time, he had become ace"
lebrity synonymous with duree, the rejection of &:&:laboratory time"
and the elevation of intuition over intellect. Then, too, he still
seemed closely connected with that scientistic evolutionism the
foundation of which he had attacked. These contradictory tags have
stuck, as a perusal of virtually any general study of modern literature
discloses.
Bergson and the Zeitgeist
Bergson is properly a symbol of the late nineteenth"century reaction
against what Bertrand Russell called Uthat scientific optimism
which made men believe that the kingdom of heaven was about to
break out on earth:' 7 Broad studies like Hans Meyerhoff's Time in
Literature (1955) and Adam Mendilow's Time and the Novel
(1965) tell this part of the story well-how the Uambitious belief
and pious hope" for a &:~science of history" broke down, and how
the schism between intellectual and spiritual life grew.8 More than
ever, rational approaches were needed; more than ever such ap"
proaches seemed to render life not worth living, for they remained
coldly antithetical to religion, art, culture itself. Bergson's spiritual
approach gave hope to man~ including the Maritains, who found
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in it a reason not to keep their suicide. pact, and who went on to
accomplish a great deal in the same vineyard as Bergson himself.
Bergson promised a ~~new reality:' as J. Hillis Miller has noted-
one buried right in the old one, waiting to be released through the
intuitive responses of trained, sensitive minds.9 Bergson's time..
awareness was a genuinely new one in this sense: that he felt the
need to rescue time. Those like Hulme, Eliot, the Maritains, Kazan..
tzakis, and Joyce were responding equally to his ideas and to his
sense of urgency.
According to Bergson, human time might be reclaimed from the
physicists by philosophers and poets convinced that life is growth
through metamorphosis rather than Uconstruction:' contraries rather
than concatenation. Bergson's philosoph~ with the work of Freud,
Nietzsche, and Einstein, gave a new turn to modern thought, as
Mendilow suggests: a turn inward. 10 The faculty of intuition be..
came more than a mere debate topic. William James sensed imme..
diate kinship with Bergson. And Jung's psychology owes an impor..
tant debt to Bergson, one he openly acknowledged in the twenties,
but effaced in later editions of his work, apparently because of Berg"
son's obvious fall from grace. II Bergson's philosophy had a widen..
ing circle of effects in the work of many writers, including Yeats,
Eliot, Woolf, and Joyce, who had become preoccupied with expe..
riences of a quasi"religious nature, and whose art strove toward a
liberation from the Hnightmare of materialism" and an embrace with
Hthe spiritual life to which art belongs:' as Kandinsky wrote in
1912.12 Like Whitehead and James, Bergson emphasizes that the
moment in some sense creates itself, and therefore gives augury of
something profound and doublesided, something that can know
itself as always more than itself, a creative act surrounded by forces
of repression always deflecting, but never completely stifling that
impetus. It is unsurprising, then, that he has been profitably linked
with many writers in England and America on this point. 13
Such connections have helped, but when there are no bones,
anyone can carve a goose. Dorothy Richardson sums up Bergson's
importance for most criticism of American literature when she says,
UNo doubt Bergson influenced many minds, if only by putting into
words something then dawning on human consciousness: an in..
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creased awareness of the inadequacy of the clock..time as time..
measurer:' 14 That is the view of one who has experienced Bergson..
ism, but not Bergson in his profound entanglement with the
troublesome issues presented by science and psychology in the
years before the war.
By 1907, Bergson's reputation had spread throughout Europe,
to England and America. He had already begun a correspondence
with William James. That winter, Kazantzakis came to Paris to hear
him lecture. Like Hulme, Kazantzakis later translated and wrote
about Bergson. Plainl~ as Andreas Poulakidas has said, the Greek
writer's deep commitment to freedom was shaped by Bergson's "in..
spiration:' 15 Many besides Hulme and Kazantzakis were listening
to Bergson. There were also Piaget and Riechenbach, who share
Bergson's epistemology based on biological imperatives. 16 Like
Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Maritain began his career with an attack
on Bergson's unorthodoxy and irrationalism, but later found himself
in substantial agreement with his old master. 17 Bergson lectured in
Edinburgh and London on a tour in 1911, when Evelyn Underhill,
author of Mysticism and later a reviewer for Eliot's Criterion, heard
him. "I'm still drunk with Bergson:' she wrote afterwards, "who
sharpened one's mind and swept one off one's feet both at once:' 18
Eliot described the Paris of 1910.. 11, when he attended Berg..
son's lectures: "The predominance of Paris was incontestable .
Anatole France and Remy de Gourmont ... Barres ... Peguy .
And over all swung the spider..like figure of Bergson:' 19 He had
gone to Paris, as he told E.J.H. Greene, for no accidental purpose:
"Depuis plusieurs annees, la France representait, surtout ames
yeux, la poesie:'20 France meant poetry to Eliot, and at that time,
Bergson seemed to thread together the diverse and exciting ele..
ments that were France. In 1944, Eliot wrote that one simply
needed to have been there in the lecture hall to know how fervent
was Bergson's following in 1910.. 11.21 Bergson's talent for exciting
people about ideas had been noticeable from the time he had at..
tended the Lycee Condorcet as a youth.22 And though, as even his
critics universally admit, Bergson himself was writing pure philos..
oph~ those coming away from his lectures tended to sound a little
too drunk on Bergson. Eliot was, as Shiv Kumar has explained,
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simply one among many who could say ~~I was certainly very
much under Bergson's influence during the year 1910.. 11 when I
attended his lectures and gave close study to the books he had then
written:' 23
In this period, Bergson was forced to reserve seats at lectures for
his students; journalists, tourists, clerg~ foreign students, and even
ladies of fashion crowded the hall. Each day the philosopher faced
a bewildering logjam of admirers bearing bouquets and gifts,
through which he would have to push his way to the podium, on
one occasion protesting, UBut ... I am not a dancer!" The news"
papers suggested he move his ~~performances" to the Paris Opera.24
A copy of one of his books-cover cracked or not-became a not
unusual household item. In 1910 the Essai of 1889 was translated
into English. In 1911, as it was about to go into its tenth French
printing, L'Evolution creatrice appeared in English, and in this
same year Matiere et memoire and Le Rire were also translated. The
following year, 1912, saw two translations of Introduction ala me..
taphysique: an authorized one by Hulme and an unauthorized by
Littman. Bergson devoted considerable time to working with trans"
lators. The son of a Polish father and an English mother, he knew
English well enough to be greatly frustrated by the difficulties of
translating Creative Evolution. But this seems to have been his only
bad experience. Thankful notes of translators testify to the energy
he put into making his work available to English and American
readers.
Bergson's frustration over Creative Evolution must have stemmed
partly from his realization that his major opus would find a troubled
reception. On the one hand, there were many UBergsonists" who
had not understood much of Bergson at all. Perhaps Thomas
Hanna exaggerates when he says that Uif not actually read by every..
one, [Creative Evolution] was, like the Bible, known by everyone
and quoted by all:' 25 There can be no doubt, however, that by 1912
Bergson had created a genuine stir in the English..speaking world.
Between 1909 and 1911 well over two hundred articles about him
appeared in the British press alone. A similar wave of publicit~
more of it focused on the man than his philosoph~ broke in Amer..
ica. As it became harder to find someone who hadn't heard of Berg..
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son, it became harder for Bergson to get the hearing he wanted for
his book. He had created what 1:5. Eliot later characterized as an
uepidemic of Bergsonisms:'26
The Damnation of Bergson
This notoriety brought out another sort of reader. The Parisian
press had already accused Bergson of seeking personal aggrandize"
ment through grandstanding his philosophy (a truly remarkable
charge to late..twentieth century ways of thinking!). Across the
Channel the view was, in certain quarters, even dimmer. In 1912,
Sir Ray Lankester introduced Modem Science and the Illusions of
Prof Bergson, by Hugh Elliott, to the British public. In his preface,
Lankester decried Bergson's popularity in terms that would be
echoed by many others. He called Bergson's books ~~worthless and
unprofitable matter;' and characterized their author as a uConfu ..
sions..meister ... gifted with an admirable facility of diction
[whose] illusions and perversions should be exposed [by] sober
science:' Bergson's work, Lankester concluded, would remain val ..
uable only for ~~the student of the aberrations and monstrosities of
the mind of man:'27
There were certainly sympathetic treatments of Bergson pub..
lished in English, like Wilm's Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical
Evolution (1914). But a wide stream of virulent anti .. Bergsonism
had made its appearance, and the rhetoric conditioned much of
what was said after World War I. Thomas John Gerrard's Bergson:
An Exposition and Criticism from the Point of View of St. Thomas
Aquinas, for example, concludes with these phrases: uDoes M.
Bergson tell us that by turning away from intelligence and turning
to animal instinct we shall get into touch with life? Pooh! Does he
tell us that by retracing the steps which reason has laboriously cut
out for us we shall attain to the highest life? Pooh! Pooh!"28
George Santayana also used the intemperate rhetoric of anti ..
Bergsonism in his 1912 study; Winds of Doctrine: uI suppose
[Bergson] cannot venture to preach the resurrection of the body to
this weak..kneed generation; he is too modern and plausible for that.
Yet he is too amiable to deny to our dilated nostrils some voluptuous
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whiffs of immortality. [Bergson's thought is] the work of an astute
apologist, a party man, driven to desperate speculation [with] nei ..
ther good sense, nor rigour, nor candour, nor solidit~ It is a brilliant
attempt to confuse the lessons of experience:'29 Santayana's charge
that Bergson ~~flatters" us (merely to make us like him?) is the usual
one. If not the philosopher himself, then certainly his work, must
be condemned because it rejects the operation of ureason:' Such,
for example, is the rationale employed by Wyndham Lewis in his
attacks on Bergson in Time and Western Man. Bertrand Russell
uses the same knife, and twists it, in an article in The Monist of
1912: uThere is no room in this philosophy for the moment of con"
templative insight when, rising above animal life, we become con"
scious of the greater ends that redeem man from the life of the
brutes:' 30
Nor were the attacks on Bergson solely perpetrated by Anglo..
philes like Lewis. Julien Benda's career, spanning six decades, was
simply one long diatribe against Bergson. An inheritor of the scien..
tistic snobbery of late..nineteenth century positivism, Benda was
one of those who, like Santayana and Wyndham Lewis, helped to
define the tough thinking of the New Classicism in opposition to
that of usoft" humanists like Bergson. Beginning with Le Bergson..
isme in 1912, Benda wrote against Bergson in virtually all his
works. These attacks were personal as well as philosophical. Benda
calls Bergson a dand~ a sorcerer, a sophist, a uromantic:' and even
a descendant of the bloodthirsty and vile Belphegorian sect of the
Jews (allusions to Bergson's Jewishness are not infrequent in the
attacks of reactionaries like Lankester and Gerrard). Benda went so
far as to say that he would joyfully have killed Bergson if in that way
his influence could have been stopped.3!
Benda's and Lewis's position is quintessentially reactionary:
They attack Bergson not to propose new concepts of reason and
intellect, but to defend old ones against erosion. As most biogra"
phers note, this virulent long..term aggression had the inevitable re..
suIt that Lewis's and Benda's thought was deeply marked by the
Bergsonism they attacked. Their philosophical position ends in
being what SueEllen Campbell has aptly described as an uequal
opposite" of Bergson.32 Understandably troubled and puzzled by
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attacks, Bergson maintained silence. In Paris, his colleagues at the
Sorbonne rebuked him on the one hand for invoking biology in
speculative writing and on the other for importing mysticism into
science. In 1914, seeing he could not alter public perception, or
speak effectively to the attacks of those like Benda and Hugh EI~
liott, Bergson resigned his teaching position, hoping the furor
would die down.
The war altered everything. As an important public figure, Berg~
son found his support wanted for various causes. He did give some
patriotic speeches for the French government, which appeared to
ally him with the militant nationalists. George Sorel's syndicalists
(who were advocating violent revolution at the time) were incensed
by this "betrayal:' 33 By the end of the war, Bergson was popular
with neither faction, nor was he in any better position with his col~
leagues at the Sorbonne. The Action Fran~aise disliked him as a
Jew. The Catholic Church had placed his works on the Index. In
1937, his career over, Bergson wrote to Ralph Tyler Flewelling-a
former student who had attacked him, then come to· change his
mind-HI have serious doubts about the usefulness of controversy
in philosophy:' 34
Perhaps P.A.Y: Gunter is right that any optimistic or evolutionary
philosophy would have been torpedoed by the crisis of the war. 35
But we know that Bergson's "ideology" was denied a fair hearing in
many quarters-either through oversimplification of his concepts
or through a public revilement not interested in his purely philo~
sophical assertions. Bergsonian thought is explorator)T, and some of
Bergson's key terms, like elan vital and duree reelle, are not clearly
correlated. Yet the charges leveled at him of dilettantism were gen~
uinely absurd. Bertrand Russell accused him of creating an imagi~
nary picture of the world not capable of proof or disproof-but that
is the assessment Russell makes of any philosophy without a posi~
tivist bent. Russell also wrote that in the light of Bergsonism, cCin~
tellect is the misfortune of man, while intuition is seen at its best in
ants, bees, and Bergson:' And he even charged that Bergson did
not understand rudimentary mathematical concepts like cCnum~
ber:' 36 To appreciate the insufficiency of this evaluation, one must
gain an overview of Bergson's philosoph}', particularly its divided
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commitment to the advance of reason and the preservation of a
"ground of being:' the duree reelle.
Bergson described his philosophy as attempting to bring an em"
pirical approach that would "make philosophy capable of an unlim"
ited progress, like science:' 37 This side of Bergson has been ig"
nored. Indeed, few in America know that after the war he
undertook a long essay on Einstein's theory of relativit)T, since that
theory appeared to contradict some of Creative Evolution's conclu"
sions. Duree et simultaneite (1923) committed two unfortunate er"
rors in transcribing some of Einstein's equations, on which critics
gleefully seized. And until recently the book has been considered
an inept attempt to deny the new facts of physics. But the facts of
physics are not quite what they were in the twenties, and Bergson
is now seen as a much more capable scientist and mathematician
than he appeared to his (less than dispassionate) reviewers. Cer"
tainly; Bergson read in the sciences at a depth and with a regularity
that reflected his basic tenet: Philosophy must proceed with a
method that grounds it thoroughly in empirical knowledge.
In 1969, Bergson and the Evolution of Physics appeared under
Gunter's editorship. Gunter shows that Bergson was able to antici"
pate the consequences of certain revolutions in physics, though few
at the time appreciated it: "This is a remarkable achievement, par"
ticularly considering Bergson's reputation as an Cantiscientific' or Clit"
erary' intellect; yet, at the present time, Bergson's interpretation of
the physical sciences remains one of the least discussed, and least
appreciated aspects of his thought:' Gunter credits Bergson with
ccprophetic insights" into particle and astronomical physics, and
sees his philosophy as "the affirmation, not the negation of science:'
suggesting we may yet see Bergson's thought offering further "theo"
retical advances:'38 Since Gunter's anthology appeared, Bergson's
theory that the universe began in a cCvital impulse" has indeed found
support in research and a wider acceptance among scientists. His
insights into particle physics have also been recognized.
According to Milic Capek's Bergson and Modern Physics
(1971), Bergson's thought anticipates cCthe elementary indetermi..
nacy of microphysical processes which limits the applicability of
Laplacean determinism to the physical world:' Modern physics has,
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in other words, discovered that Bergson was right that psychologi..
cal and scientific duration are, in a sense, analogous. And Capek
believes "Bergson's general insights [in his book on relativity] are
far more significant than his occasional errors and vacillations,
which . . . most frequently resulted from [his] not always fully
grasping the implications of his own thought:' Capek recognizes
how critics exaggerated Bergson's philosophy of limited free will
into one of primitive lawlessness: "Instead of opposing the fictitious
indeterminacy of 'free will' to the rigid necessity of the Laplacean
type, [Bergson] proposes the theory of different degrees of free"
dom:'39
Bergson's philosoph~ then, despite what we have been stridently
and incessantly told by many over years, is systematic and capable
of defense against the charge of "anti..reason:' Certainl~ there is a
legitimate question to be asked: What is the precise character of
duree, and can it be rescued from an apparent irrationalism? But
the charge that he was unsystematic, unscientific, and irrational in
his approach to philosophy has been answered in the negative by
every dispassionate critic.40 All found a continuity in the philosoph..
ical thought. Whether we agree with him or not, Bergson made a
system.
Bergsons Philosophy
The vital impulse (elan vital) is the cosmic bang with which every..
thing in Bergson begins. Bergson characterizes it as a free, creative
act. He posits all creation as "merged ... in growth" (CE, 241)
The blast of the vital impulse rolls through all things, drawing out
of itself always the new. The new always appears, in retrospect, to
have been inevitable; it is always actually unpredictable. Like
Whitehead, James, and Royce, Bergson cannot make the present
fully explicable in terms of the past. The only truth is the whole
truth, and this means, for a developing creation, that we are never
sure what is Now until we learn what it later becomes. Toward the
end of his career, Bergson seems to have acknowledged that his vital
impulse must have had a sort of genetically coded end point, con"
ceived by and comprehensible to God alone. In a typically nine..
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teenth"century way, Bergson finds man to be the last word in the
evolution of the universe, the end toward which all has pointed. The
Two Sources of Morality and Religion goes so far as to suggest that
the universe is a machine for "the making of gods:' and that God
undertook Creation in order to "create creators, that He [might]
have, besides Himself, beings worthy of His love" (TS, 306, 243).
The upward thrust of the vital impulse bifurcates immediately,
however; it cannot sweep forward to its target unmitigated in force,
for spent energies create a troubling drag of regression. Bergson
compares the universe to a giant teakettle spraying steam that con"
denses into falling drops of water. He draws the further analogy
to human consciousness struggling against the slump back to sen..
tience, and divides the animate world into the sentient (plants),
instinctive (social insects), and intelligent (vertebrate animals).
Though all these forms stem from the mobility of the original elan
vital, they are only partial expressions of it. And over time, they
must fall individually, even if they collectively rise. Thus, the vital
impulse we experience is a leap to a fall. Though Bergson asserts
that reality is pure mobility, his vision of the universe is fraught with
conflict between this mobility and materiality.
Human consciousness, then, is opposed to materiality, for it is
"action unceasingly creating and enriching itself, whilst matter is
action continually unmaking itself or using itself up" (eM, 23). But
these opposed processes go on simultaneously. So Bergsonian phi..
losophy is strongly monistic, if one thinks of its source in the elan
vital. Yet it is also strongly dualistic, when one thinks of this conflict
between matter and spirit, a conflict on which Bergson had first
focused in his dissertation Time and Free Will, which introduced
the concept of real duration.
Bergson later reflected that Time and Free Will represented the first
application of his "method" on the problem of liberty (eM, 28).
The "method" was philosophical intuition, and it was indeed insep..
arable from his reaction against the narrow positivistic determinism
he attacked in 1889. Intuition reveals how experienced time over"
rules laboratory time, and shows how the "useful" generally usurps
the place of the true in all inquir)7, philosophical or scientific. Here
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Bergson made an ingenious use of Spencer and Darwin in order to
define the functions of intellect and intuition. He also turned the
usual argument about memory on its head; that is, we have a great
deal more forgetting than remembering to explain.
Real duration Bergson defines as that irreversible succession of
heterogeneous states melting into one another and flowing in indi"
visible process which we experience when we return to our life be..
10\\7, our Being/Becoming. It is becoming, as we experience it. To
be conscious of real duration, however, is to lose a sense of one's
individuality in the world (although Bergson will later say that du ..
ree is the ultimate source of true individuality). It is to become
aware of the continual novelty generated by the vital impulse. Such
an overwhelming experience of the heart of life, a revisiting of in ..
stinct long buried, contradicts many of our uuseful" habits. We dis ..
cover that our perception of real duration has been buried for a good
reason: The intuition of duration is nonadaptive. It is a loosening
of the mechanisms our organism has evolved in order to survive.
Intellection, an adaptive response to the vertigo of real duration,
~~rises in revolt" at the ~~absolute originality and unforeseeability" of
the vital impulse (CE, 29). Intellect was evolved in order ~~to limit,
with a view to action, the life of the spirit" (MM, 233). Its object
being survival, not truth, it draws a curtain between us and real
duration, taking U cuttings" or snapshots of the flux: ~~To perceive
means to immobilize" if we are speaking of intellectual life (MM,
275). Intellect's photographic technique makes it possible for us to
hold things still, to plan, learn, to do something with our memories.
Unfortunatel~ a problem arises when we forget that the intellect
permits us only a little consciousness of the transfixing light of ere"
ation's vital spirit; it offers shadows, not realit~ If we forget that
intellect places us necessarily in uthe discontinuous, in the immo..
bile, in the dead:' we lose contact with our fundamental selves (CE,
165). The method by which we control and explain our memories
can thus end by also controlling our present experience, in which
case Uautomatism will cover over freedom" (TFW, 237).
Thus, the dedoublement of self arises-the concept that so in..
trigues Piers Gray in his reading of Eliot and John Conder in his
reading of Faulkner as an extension of American Naturalism. Ac..
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cording to Bergson, we can cope with this doubling or splitting of
the self by returning regularly to our primary experience. When we
look within, we are reminded that the timeline is merely an exter"
iorization of a "cutting:' It is static, and abolishes freedom, for if we
can spread time out in space, all events are co"present. Change by
the laboratory model is merely concatenation, and gives rise to de..
terminism. But intuiting life reminds us that there are four dimen..
sions to this reality. Thus, determinism stems from an error of Ian..
guage leading to pseudoquestions about experience. We can
analyze things with such tools, but not experiences.
Bergson asserts that "freedom is a fact" (TFW, 221). But to
know it as fact one must admit something like philosophical intui ..
tion into the system. Otherwise, how can we avoid the spatializing
language of the intellect, which, potent as it is, cannot "think true
continuit~ real mobilit~ reciprocal penetration-in a word, that
creative evolution which is life" (CE, 162)? In proposing philo..
sophical intuition as a "method:' Bergson seeks not to answer per..
ennial questions about time, but to show they are mistaken (TFW,
74). For this reason, his thought rests on existentialist ground. In
Bergson, modes of perception condition our grasp of reality. Mix a
little cornstarch with water; the mixture hardens and crumbles
when the fingers press it, but flows when let alone. This is the
relationship between our mode of perception and the experience we
describe. We only grasp an important, verifiable aspect of reality
when we let it slip through our fingers. Intuition gives us access to
life's flux, so we can grasp its freedom, its novelty. The intellect
cannot give this access, since it is interested in sameness, not nov"
elt~ in generalities, not experiences. The intellect is interested in
words, and Bergson protests "against the substitution of concepts
for things" (CM, 31, 105). On the other hand, he recognizes that
the intuitive experience must emerge in the world of words. He
carefully defines intuition as "reflection, not feeling:' and describes
intuition as one of two modes affording two essentiallrlrkinds of clar..
ity" in thought (CM, 103, 39). Bergson's intuition is thus different
from Croce's, in that it is directly connected to apprehension,
though it shares with Croce's intuition a cerebral attribute.
In the sense that Bergson's intuition seeks the unique, it is in ..
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tensely personal. It does not participate in what Bergson saw as the
undesirable impersonality of a reductive objectivity. But it is ex"
tremely impersonal in the sense that it has no ulterior motives. In ..
tuition is achieved through one's consciously not attending (TFW,
128). It enters into things and psychological states with detach..
ment, as an Uintellectual sympathy" by which one "places oneself
within an object [of thought] in order to coincide with what is
unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the con"
trar}T, ... reduces the object to elements already known:' Thus by a
sort of philosophical negative capabilit}T, intuition claims to give a
clue to freedom, to make possible action that is more closely allied
to our utrue selves" (1M, 7, 74).
We Uget back into ourselves:' however, by forgetting ourselves.
Thus, Bergsonian intuition is the direct forebear of Poulet's intui..
tion, which he describes as a Uforgetting myself"-even a kind of
uself..alienation:' since the intuiter yields up his identity Uwithout
. . . reservation, without any desire to preserve [his] independence
of judgment. . . . In other words, the kind of comprehension in
question here is not a movement from the unknown to the known,
from the strange to the familiar, from the outside to the inside. It
might rather be called a phenomenon by which mental objects rise
up from the depths of consciousness into the light of recognition:' 41
Poulet's intuition is, like Bergson's, an act of self..forgetting and self..
discovery in one-without contradiction. It restores an alienated
inner life. And this is the sort of value Bergson-and Poulet-find
in art, particularly the experience of reading. When our inner self
has been defended against that social self constantly usurping, we
regain some measure of freedom and wholeness: "The deeper
psychic states, those which are translated as free acts, express and
sum up the whole of our past history" (TFW, 185). Precisely
through relaxing intentionality do we experience freedom, and for
that reason, Bergson says, free acts are exceptional.
Bergsonian intuition is inseparable, then, from Bergson's general
view of life as tension: The Uliving and concrete self" is always striv..
ing to slough off the Ucrust" of rationalization it constantly exterior..
izes (in the name of survival). The self renews itself by an effluence
of primal experience uin which succeeding each other means melt..
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ing into one another and forming an organic whole" (TFW, 167,
128). Intuition enables growth, and growth evolution. Intuition
cannot do without analysis, nor vice versa. Troubled by its own
evolutionary heritage, Bergson's intuition still attempts to affirm it,
for it represents a sort of Darwinian adaptation to a later stage and
higher order of progress than rationalization, which it somehow
(paradoxicall}T, critics say) incorporates.
"For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature,
to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly. Should the same be
said of existence in general?" (CE, 7). Creative Evolution affirms
that it should. Bergson attempts to convince us that freedom is not
«spontaneity:' but a «synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the evolu..
tion which leads to it [is] a reasonable evolution" (MM, 243; my
italics). Creative Evolution argues for this "reasonableness" by
predicating everything on the dialectically opposed forces, the ten..
sion, we have just been discussing. Though life is "endlessly contin..
ued creation" and "pure mobility:' still any "particular manifesta..
tions of life accept this mobility reluctantl)T, and continually lag
behind" (CE, 178, 128). Indeed, real duration always "gnaws and
leaves on them the mark of its tooth" (CE, 46). Thus, we are always
caught between worlds, one of creation, the other of destruction-
at home fully in neither: «The home of matter is space. The home
of life is time" (CE, 16). But we live in both. The reality Bergson
presents us in Creative Evolution is thus a coherence in confusion,
a disorder in evolution, a reality making itself in a reality unmaking
itself (CE, 251).
The dualism commits Bergson to two views of time, and he for"
mulates evolution as a Charge of the Light Brigade:
All organized beings, from the humblest to the highest, from the first
origins of life, to the time in which we are, and in all places as in all
times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement
of matter, and itself indivisible. All the living hold together, and all
yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the
plant, man bestrides animalit~ and the whole of humanit~ in space and
time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind
each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resist..
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ance and to clear away many obstacles, perhaps even death. [CE, 270..
71; my italics]
Bergson's vision, contracting evolution into a timeless rush into
darkness, is thus divided at the heart, his challenge to death a Hper..
haps:' One thinks of the last lines of Virginia Woolf's The ~ves:
H~nd in me too the wave rises.... I strike spurs into my horse.
Against you I will fling myself, unvanquished and unyielding, 0
Death!' The waves broke on the shore:' The cosmic book may con"
elude with a chapter titled HThe Triumph of Life:' but in the here
and now we remain caught, in Eliot's words, ~~in the form of limi..
tation between unbeing and being" (CPP, 122). Bergson's opti..
mism is there, but it has been grossly exaggerated by interpreters-
ironicall}T, most often by apologists. According to the reading of
Herman and Gallagher, Gunter, Havet, and Scharfstein, Bergson
promises only progress through struggle. If we Htake things by
storm" and Hthrust intelligence outside itself by an act of will:' we
will grow; but only if (CE, 193).
Since the Hcreativity" of evolution lies in a dialectic of competing
forces, Bergson is brought to admit both views of time, though he
is supposed simply to have disposed of one. ~~We do not think real
duration, but we live it, because life transcends intellect:' he writes,
and yet, Hwherever anything lives, there is open somewhere a reg ..
ister in which time is being inscribed" (eE, 46, 16; my italics). No
attempt to relate Bergson's philosophy and aesthetics to literature
can be valid that emphasizes his commitment to the elaboration of
the new without recognizing that this novelty exists in a troubled
medium in and out of real duration. Bergson may be seen in this
light to stand not merely on the periphery of Woolf's The ~ves,
but to enter into its very heart. And that is because Bergson's inter..
pretation of experience, like his theory of the self, is double: HEvery
demand for explanation in regard to the problem of freedom comes
back, without our suspecting it, to the following question: ~Can
time be adequately represented by space?' To which we answer:
Yes, if you are dealing with time flown; No, if you speak of time
flowing" (TFW, 221). This Yes and this No are the Yin and Yang
of Bergson's Creative Evolution-his views of psychic life, culture,
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literature, philosoph~ religion. They do not give simple application.
Strangel~ they remind one, in their essence, of an aspect of
Nietzsche: "We are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the fals ..
est opinions . . . are the most indispensable to us; that without a
recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with
the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without
a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man
could not live-that the renunciation of false opinions would be a
renunciation of life, a negation of life" (Beyond Good and Evil, I,
4). The conundrum of a necessary untruth underlies Bergson's
whole philosoph~ not merely his intuition of real duration. This fact
makes his philosophy richly applicable to a consciously "modern"
literature of irony. It is the mind's fictive power, Bergson seems to
sa~ that gathers temps perdu and, by thrusting it "compact and un"
divided into the present:' creates that present.
The Last Years
After his book on Einstein's theo~ Bergson published only one
full ..length study: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. In
1928, when he received the Nobel Prize, rheumatic disease had
already begun to limit his physical activit~ and by 1935 it had
grown so bad that he simply broke off correspondence and left Paris
to live in Tours, at St. Cyr..sur..Seine. He was leaning toward the
Catholic Church, and The Two Sources shows this influence. This
latter part of Bergson's career has remained largely in shado~ for it
does not accord with the standard view of his philosoph~ promoted
by Russell and Santayana, among others, a view that fixes Bergson
pretty much at the level of his pre.. 1890 insight, "to perceive means
to immobilize:' Some, like Jacques Maritain, distinguished finally
a "Bergsonism of Intention" from the popularized Bergsonism.
Maritain had attacked Bergson's philosophy in Bergsonian Philoso..
phy and Thomism in 1913, but in later editions had disassociated
himself from the climate created by the rhetoric of the New Classi..
cists (of which he was, of course, a charter member):
The greater the present vogue for Bergsonism is, the keener will be the
reaction-and the more unjust. For no one should forget that at a par..
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ticularly difficult period Bergson was the only one among the wise ones
of this world victoriously to attack agnosticism, Kantianism, and the
sill~ narrow positivism which reigned unchallenged. In so doing,
whatever he may have said of the intellect, he has served intelligence
and truth. And many who have come out of the darkness of official
atheism owe this to him and to the desire for truth that permeates his
teaching.
Maritain recognized finally in Bergson a nineteenth"century mind
moving toward faith, and he restricts his criticisms of Bergsonism,
in the final analysis, to a quarrel over the place of CCintelligence" and
the meaning of CCintuition"-an area with which, as we shall see,
Eliot was also very much concerned.
Maritain believes Bergson's thought, exploratory in principle,
moves with increasing clarity toward a humbling of philosophy be..
fore the wisdom of the saints and a transcending of his Hown system
of concepts:' Bergson's implicit monism went unrecognized for so
long simply because his thought had been Hutilized by apologists
and theoreticians of dogma:' and thus, Maritain says in a note to
the last edition of Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, it is not
surprising that Bergson's will (dated Feb. 8, 1937) says, HI would
have become a convert [to the Catholic Church], had I not seen in
preparation for years the formidable wave of anti..semitism which is
to break upon the world. I wanted to remain among those who
tomorrow will be persecuted:' 42 Bergson died in January 1941 of
pneumonia contracted from having stood for hours in line with
other Parisian Jews registering with the Nazi government.
Maritain fondly exaggerates Bergson's orthodox~ What first
drew Bergson to Christianity is suggested by a penciled note he
made to himself in 1926: HChristianisme = dissatisfaction, ergo
chambardement, ergo action:'43 Still, we have lost some valuable
connections between Bergson and the literature of the early twen"
tieth century when we forget that he was not only the CCliterary"
philosopher of roman fleuve, but a scientist and ethical thinker
whose career took him a long way from its departure point. I.W.
Alexander places Bergson in the Htime..honored current of non"
speculative Christian thinking that runs from St. Augustine to Pas..
cal:' 44 James Street Fulton has noted that CCBergson's thinking, de..
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spite his criticism of finalism:' eventually considers the elan vital a
manifestation of divine love.45 And Daniel Herman agrees that the
l:l:finality rejected by Bergson is a finality based on utilitarian..
ism.... Such a finality is not a true finality ... since freedom has
been eliminated:' 46
Bergson's teleology is more contradictory than Herman is willing
to admit. But he performs a valuable service in showing that Berg..
son's struggle with the irrational is no embrace. Bergson's l:l:free act"
entails moral responsibili~ andform is as important to him as spirit.
Omission of that fact has allowed many to create an imaginative
picture of Bergson, the thinker for whom science is the enemy of
art, form the enemy of spirit. In his thought, these dualities exist-
and conflict-but finall}T, they dance as partners, and the music
governing them is divine.
TWO
Bergsonian Intuition and
Modernist Aesthetics
I believe in the mutability of reality rather than of truth. If
we could regulate our faculty of intuition by the mobility
of the real, would not this regulating be a stable thing, and
would not the truth-which can only be this very
regulating-participate in this reality?
- Henri Bergson, letter to William James, 1907
~ In an essay on the ustill movement of poetry:' Murray Krieger
suggests that Bergson's vitalism offers no key to the "well wrought"
aspects of modern art, especially not to poetry's archetypal imagery
and symmetrical forms. Though he acknowledges in The New
Apologists for Poetry the Modernist debt to Bergson for a special
concern with freshness and concreteness of language, Krieger none..
theless argues that Bergson cannot earn a form beyond fluidity; his
philosophy thus gives no satisfactory approach to the Byzantine
patterns of much twentieth"century poetry-poetry that seems anx"
ious to become one of the "plastic arts:' 1 This vie~ which makes
Bergson the enemy of uform:' ignores, as I have already argued,
Bergson's dualism. As much as he emphasizes the dynamic and
living, Bergson also recognizes the unavoidabilit}T, indeed the clear
desirabilit}T, of formal rigor in literature. Bergson defines uform" dif..
ferentl}T, however. For him the poem emulates a life ..struggle be..
tween spirit and flesh, consciousness and sentience. He believes
that "the word turns against the idea" (CE, 127). But the word
remains an enemy only as the common coin of everyday necessity:
Words differently employed give better return.
Language wears out over time, losing its value for instruction or
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insight. The poet wishes to melt down the common coin and forge
it new. His object-in Bergson's terms-must be to renew the lin..
guistic system's connectedness to inner life, that self"creating evo"
lution flowing through time. The magic of any linguistic system lies
in its ability to evoke this fundamental reality for us, and when the
poet succeeds in his endeavor, he may be said to have gotten uhold
of the gold coin, instead of the silver or copper change for it" (ME,
195). In such a moment, language's dry bones live again, for they
actually ufurnish consciousness with an immaterial body in which
to incarnate itself" (CE, 265). Language in such a moment is not
the enem~ for it has been reinvested with that characteristic impe..
netrability of the Real. Its mathematics appear mobile, to the con..
sciousness chasing its direction; when consciousness has quick..
ened to its vision, an illusion of stillness descends, as when
speeding vehicles stand abreast. With its dual emphasis on neces ..
sary rigidities of the poet's medium and the pure mobility of expe..
rience, Bergson's philosophy and aesthetic theory give important
and neglected insight into the practice of many English"speaking
writers of this century.
The cause of this neglect is not far to seek: Bergson's hostility to
the canon of positivism, on the one hand, and skepticism on the
other. As Eliot himself noted as early as 1910, the problem with
Bergson is that he always seems bent on occupying a middle
ground. Criticism, in contrast, historically goes to extremes. True,
confusions about what Bergson really said on aesthetic matters led
to the conclusion of Krieger and others; Arthur Szathmary tried in
the thirties with a calm and lucid little book on Bergsonian aesthet..
ics to show that Bergson expected art to present l:l:living moments
in precise ordered forms:' and the artist to express his intuitions in
(what else?) uformal structures:'2 The book's failure to be greatly
noticed seems unsurprising, in retrospect. It stems from a general
opinion that Bergson has a naive view of the potentiality of the
linguistic sign. That opinion is in error.
In the Tractatus Logico.. Philosophicus, Wittgenstein (echoing St.
Augustine) sums up the nature of philosophical discussion: UWhat
can be said at all can be said clearl~ and what we cannot talk about
we must pass over in silence:'3 But, as Augustine asks, are we to
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say nothing of God, who is unot even to be called ~unspeakable:
because to. say even this is to speak of Him"? Augustine notes the
cCcurious contradiction" inherent in such naming, and U yet God,
although nothing worthy of His greatness can be said of Him, has
condescended to accept the worship of men's mouths, and has de..
sired us through the medium of our own words to rejoice in His
praise" (Confessions, I, 6). In a curious, though I think not finally
cCcontradictory" wa~ it must be admitted that language suggests
something beyond its own uprison house" (to use Nietzsche's
phrase). But here we have arrived at the crux of a serious disagree"
ment among scholars and critics of literature.
Clearl~ no criticism in the skeptical tradition will accept, much
less value, an aesthetic theory grounded upon ~cexpression" of any..
thing-even skepticism itself. My view stands in direct opposition
to that element of deconstructionist criticism which leads to a self..
immolating intertextualization of literature. I have in mind such
books as Joseph Kronick's recent American Poetics of History. ~l\n
American poetics of history will . . . be a poetics of reading:' the
book claims, beginning with Emerson himself, who ufinds the
world in a book:' Typically of such studies, this one reduces its
problem, that of uan l\merican' identity" to uone of reading, that is,
of mapping the exchange of tropes between texts:'4 It would be
hard to decide which is the more damaging result, the loss of a
human story in the creation of a literary artifact or the extreme dull..
ness of a dogmatic approach with essentially one critical technique:
umapping" cCinterfaces:'
On the other hand, I cannot agree with Frank Lentricchia that
deconstruction can ~~tell us how we deceive ourselves, but it has no
positive content, no alternative textual work to offer to intellectuals.
It has nothing to say:'5 Certainly it does have something very im..
portant to sa~ and that something stems from the same complex
and dualistic view of language we see in Bergsonian philosophy. I
take it that Bergson would have approved, for example, Paul de
Man's judgment that Shelley's readings of literature are great pre..
cisely because they defy being U generalized into a system:' 6 There
is this strong element in deconstructionist writing, skeptical in tone
but in content (there is genuinely a content) fundamentally part of
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the critique of Rationality authored by Russell, James, Bradley; and,
of course, Bergson.
There is also a second element in deconstructionism that reflects
an unacknowledged heritage of Bergsonism. It is, as W. Wolfgang
Holdheim puts it in The Hermeneutic Mode, the idea that Ugetting
to know is better than knowing, because the process of learning
should never end:'7 This open"endedness is the positive side of a
great realization about linguistic systems explored by Saussure. His
insight that the linguistic sign unites not things and names, but
concepts and sound..images is the point of departure for a criticism
based upon the problematics of reading.8 There is a very big differ"
ence, however, between those who interest themselves, with Saus"
sure, in the structure of this mysterious process itself-the self..
creating agency of language-and those who interest themselves
primarily in the self..consciousness of all linguistic acts, the dedou ..
blement as unbridgable chasm.
The difference is summed up beautifully by Hazard Adams in
his astonishingly rich, challenging, and humane effort to reconcile
the hostile camps, Philosophy of the Literary Symbolic. Paul de
Man appears to make ucommunication of a previous truth or reality
definitive, then [declare] the impossibility of it;' says Adams; he, on
the other hand, takes creation as definitive. De Man, as Adams sees
him, represents ~~a continuation of that profound disillusionment
with language that is one dominant mood of romanticism and per..
haps comes to its logical conclusion in Derrida's reductio ad absur..
dum. Derrida seems to play the role with respect to structuralism
that Berkeley did in the empiricist movement. There comes a time
in each case, however, when someone must kick a stone or recast
the terms of argument. Therefore, I look at another romantic mood
that continually seeks to formulate the full range of the possibilities
of language:'9 Adams has indeed reformulated the terms of the ar"
gument, and in a way that sets him partly in the tradition of Creative
Evolution, since he is determined to see language as Bergson,
Whitehead, and James saw it: as the creation of a new definiteness
that must constantly be recreated, renewed.
There is a cost to Adams's effort, however. In transferring the
issue to an entirely man..made realm, Adams has given up the no"
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tion of the Divine Word, capable of bearing an intuition of vision..
ary experience. That is a crucial decision, and one that separates
Adams-and perhaps our age-from the mood in which The
\«zste Land and The Sound and the Fury were written. Having
countered Derrida's conundrum that language is the site of a para..
doxical absence, Adams has let go of the idea of a general ground
of Being and of a ntranscendental signified:' Bruce Kawin's The
Mind of the Novel suggests that language's value may yet be linked
to a sense of the nineffable" experience. His view preserves an Au..
gustinian tradition of wonder and bafflement at language and mem"
ory: "Great is this force of memor~ 0 my God; a large and bound..
less chamber! Who ever sounded the bottom thereof? Yet is this a
power of mine, and belongs unto my nature; nor do I myself com"
prehend all that I am. Therefore is the mind too strait to contain
itself. And where should that be, which it containeth not of itself?
Is it without it, and not within?" (Confessions, X, 15). Kawin's is
also the view more in direct descent from the Modernist aesthetic
Bergson bequeathed to Hulme and Eliot. 10
TE. Hulme, who observed that art is the nkey to Bergson's
thought:' made Bergson's thought a key to art, becoming a transla..
tor-though not much a popularizer-of Bergson's metaphysics.
Bergson provides, Hulme said in Speculations, a way for ntheory to
be stated accurately:' a way to explain art's importance to culture,
and a nmuch better vocabulary" for talking about the ('indescribable
process of artistic creation:' 11 Whether we prefer to view language's
potential in these terms now-and I have suggested that the option
is by no means closed, as some will have it-we must face the fact
that they were the terms of the pre.. and post..war period. Certainly
Pound commented sarcastically on Hulme's boring him endlessly
with Bergson. But as Frank Kermode wrote some years ago,
Hulme's ideas were far more influential than popular: nHulme
hands over to the English tradition a modernized but essentially
traditional, aesthetic of Symbolism ... the magic Image, or Roman..
tic anti"positivism, and of the excluded artist. We are so accustomed
to regard Hulme as the classicising, anti.. Romantic thinker, that we
tend to ignore [this]:' 12 In the aesthetic theory of Hulme, clearly
Bergson's nintuition" is the most important term.
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In Hulme's intuitive rever}', the artist contacts a realit}', pure du..
ration, which transcends intellect. He has, then, a sense of being
outside of time-and yet of having entered it profoundl}', merging
with a flux in which he sees uthe blending of many ideas which,
when once dissociated, seem to exclude one other as logically con"
tradictory" (TFW, 136). Moreover, intuition seems to distil uenor"
mous periods of an infinitely diluted existence into a few more dif..
ferentiated moments of intenser life, and in this summing up a very
long history" (MM, 275). Intuition then may give almost prophetic
powers (TFW, 198). It certainly bestows on the artist of Hulme's
imagining a privileged vie~ a primary position.
According to Bergson and Hulme the artist begins with the
~~humming of life's depths" (eM, 176). He combats the visceral
reaction of the mind to flux. But for Bergson-and this is the point
of confusion for the critics of Bergsonian ~~formlessness"-the
depths that defy analysis are not without logic. Consciousness flows
like a sheet of water in uan unbroken stream of images which pass
from one into another:' but this Uinterpenetration of images does
not come about by chance. It obeys laws ... which hold the same
relation to imagination that logic does to thought" (L, 41 .. 2). With
Kant, Bergson opposes to practical logic the science of the form of
thinking ('~die Wissenschaft von der blossen Form des Denkens
iiberhaupt"). Logic as practically used, Kant says, ucan be nothing
other than a scholastic technique:' which he assigns to pedagogy;
reserving his applied logic to psycholog)T. The latter is the science
of the necessary laws or Urigidities" ('tCnotwendigen Gesetzen") of
the understanding and the reason, which have their own formality. 13
Intuition allows study of this ulogic of the imagination that is not
the logic of reason" (L, 41).
The artist of Bergson and Hulme is thus a sort of psychic spe..
lunker, advance scout for the new empiricism Bergson hoped to
found on the ~~immediate data of consciousness:' For this reason art
assumes tremendous importance in Bergson's philosophy. One may
see this pattern develop in subsequent French thought, like that of
Sartre, which actually turns to art to find a vocabulary for its in ..
sights, since philosophical discussion must pass over them in si..
lence. Philosophy dependent upon elements of art (and artifice) be..
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comes tractable as well to the needs of art, as Hulme discovered:
cCThe creative artist, the innovator, leaves the level where things are
crystallized out into these definite shapes, and, diving down into
the inner flux, comes back with a new shape which he endeavours
to fix. He cannot be said to have created it but to have discovered it,
because when he has definitely expressed it we recognize it as
true:' 14 The poet"empiricist visits the river beneath the static forms
reflected from its surface; that river, like Eliot's in CCDry Salvages:' is
cCwithin us:' a cCreminder of what men choose to forget:' Hulme's
consonance with Bergson here is not a contradiction, if we recog"
nize that Bergsonian intuition brings with it a ccpassionate desire for
accuracy:' a deep wonder, and hunger to locate the Huniversal in the
particular" -the Reality beneath reality. IS
In The Contrived Corridor, Harvey Gross develops the thesis
that Modernist writers are essentially mental explorers searching for
a vocabulary adequate to their experience of U radical reality:' their
knowledge gained through having Hlived in history as functioning
organs of the world's bod~" Gross sees Modernism as a literature of
the cCblood and nerves:' derived cCmore from insight than theory:'16
The encyclopedic detail and psychological intensity of the Cantos,
The ~ste Land, Ulysses, The ~ves, and Absalom, Absalom! give
credence to Gross's view. He sees Hvictims" of insight who present
moments of an intenser life, one that often creates a sense of moral
and intellectual crisis, as does Paterson, for example. The moments
often contract long histories into short spaces, attempting to reveal
continuities between widely disparate people and places. More im..
portantl)T, Modernist literature entertains the hope that through
understanding the necessary laws of the myth"making, or poetic
consciousness, we may find a means to Hmake sense" of the chaos
of memory and histor~
This literature adopts the Bergsonian principle that the past has
a real, sensual presence-though it is not visualizable in the scho..
lastic jargon. In order to communicate this intimate sense of history
No~ they try to make their poetry reify the smelting, flowing char..
acter of the deeper consciousness Hulme discusses. They amalga..
mate archetypal figures with pungently contemporary characters;
they strive to evoke images beneath images, even re..fusing words,
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as Joyce does in Finnegans \%ke. Such exploratory literature meets,
as Bergson suggests, the challenge of communication with revolu ..
tionary use of language, and at first udisconcerts, then teaches us to
see art differentl)T, and finally precipitates itself as, [in retrospect]
work of genius" (TS, 66, 33).
Such works, that challenge linguistic structures, that suggest a
"self..deconstruction:' call attention simply to a paradox and limita..
tion characteristic of all linguistic acts. As Kawin argues, it depends
upon your interpretation of such gross disturbances as the intrusion
of rude, anachronistic voices in the Cantos: Does the cacophony
suggest an "absence" at the heart of the text-or is the heart "inef..
fable"? When Pound says he cannot "make it cohere" (Canto
CXVI), does he write the final word on the palimpsest, encourag..
ing us to believe that language itself is alienated from U meaning"?
Or should we not look at the Cantos as an effort-though failed-
predicated upon a very different idea of the significance of the lin"
guistic act: "I have tried to write Paradise" (fragment of Canto
CXX).
Of course, it was against just such ambitiousness for art's respon..
sibilities that Eliot reacted in "Experiment in Criticism" (1929). In
that essa)T, Eliot recommended a return to literature intended to give
"refined pleasure to persons of sufficient leisure and breeding:'
rather than one with pretensions to "eliciting truth or acquiring
knowledge:' Eliot put much of the blame for this dramatic increase
in art's responsibilities upon Coleridge, a thinker with whom he
also strongly identified. I7 Though Eliot protested the move toward
an art with empirical and metaphysical responsibilities, he had to
confront its claims. A poem like Four Quartets takes those respon..
sibilities very seriousl)T, recording one poet's "findings" in a career
that asks very much to be read as a search for what Kenneth Burke
calls the "title of titles:' 18 The poetic voice of Four Quartets recurs
often to the intractability of language to inner experience. Indeed,
this seems characteristic of the Modernist long poem generally: that
it images "the radiant gist that / Resists the final crystallization"
(Paterson, book 3).
"Precisely:' critics of Bergson's aesthetic will sa~ Such an artist
can salvage nothing from his intuitive experience. He will stand in
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speechless awe before the revelation: USpirit, duration, pure
change" (CM, 37). How can he, in any case, suggest the nonverbal
through the verbal, the dynamic through the static forms of Ian..
guage; how can he communicate the uineffable"? Must not Bergson
oppose words themselves? He does tie language to the same imper"
atives that condition the intellect. Words ~~intervene" between us
and realit~ and ueven our own mental states are screened from us"
by language (L, 153). Words, as pre"cut molds for thought, auto"
matically convert tangible experience into frangible objects (TFW,
130). The word, in Bergson's evolutionary theor~ is essentially util..
itarian, reducing novelty to ucommonplace forms:' expressing the
new only as urearrangement of the old" (CM, 94..96). It would
seem that for Bergson the artises intuition cannot be cast into words
at all without its fluidity being arrested and its uniqueness con"
verted to public property. The poet tries in vain uto force the living
into this or that one of his molds. All the molds crack. They are
too narro\\T, above all too rigid for what [he tries] to put in them"
(CE, x).
From this standpoint poetry is a hopeless project; and Bergson
recognizes the pose of failure as fitting for the artist. Faulkner
claimed the honor of failure; Eliot speaks of the uraid on the inartic..
ulate / With shabby equipment always deteriorating" (FLU, 4;
CPP, 128). But there is another point of view consistent with Berg..
son from which the project is not hopeless. Intuition gave Ubirth to
poetry . . . and converted into instruments of art words which, at
first, were only signals" (CM, 94). From this standpoint the artist
is sovereign in language's realm, a real Power-in the Coleridgean
sense-who poses as god. This artist performs the task of taking
the coin of everyday speech handed down by evolution and umak..
ing it new:' Once he has intuited duration and felt the necessities of
action drop awa~ the artist becomes infused with the desire to ere..
ate. cl\nyone engaged in writing:' says Bergson, uhas been in a po"
sition to feel the difference between an intelligence left to itself and
that which burns with the fire of an original and unique emotion,
born of the identification of the author with his subject, that is to
sa~ of intuition" (TS, 38). The artist finds cChe cares no more for
praise and feels above glor~ because he is a creator" (ME, 70). In
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fact, Bergson's aesthetic theory stands in a long tradition of viewing
the artist as a secular creator.
Such a theory was traced by Renaissance aestheticians to Aris..
totle himself-this was their interpretation of the charge Aristotle
gave poetry to "imitate only ideal truth:' Spingarn notes that Scali..
ger (1540.. 1609) was the key figure to make this "adjustment" in
Aristotle's view of poetry for the sake of justifying poetry against
charges of sacrilege. Puttenham and Sidney clearly drew on Scali..
ger's defense of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio in their own "de..
fenses" of poetr~ Poets, according to Scaliger, viewed theology itself
as a form of their art-"the poetry of God:' For Boccaccio, Petrarch,
Dante, "the poet's function ... was to hide and obscure the actual
truth behind a wall of beautiful fictions:' Through obfuscation, the
poet created "another nature better than ever nature itself brought
forth:' thus giving a suggestion of God's own unimaginable glory.
For Renaissance aestheticians, then, the argument was that poetry's
impulse was cCat one with God Himself:' 19 Bergson has not funda ..
mentally changed the original argument: The poet's power derives
from contact with the universe's creative center; the poet's function
is to suggest a truth beyond everyday powers of seeing, to utter a
word that suggests, but does not usurp or evacuate, the unspeakable
center itself. For Bergson, too, the height of God's creation is the
creative human being. But for Bergson, the most important illusion
an artist can create (and he does understand it can be only illusion)
is that we have briefly penetrated the veil.
Not that the veil must be destroyed: cCFortunate are we to have
this obstacle, infinitely precious to us is the veil" (ME, 70). With..
out automatic responses, stock ideas, dead language, we would ac"
tually stand unable to function in a world requiring action, action,
action. But though we should not stare into the sun, we need light.
We visit the world art creates to be reminded that the curtains oc"
casionally part, and the artist creating the reminder is the uncom"
mon man, one who has remained close to his origin, like Words..
worth's child, retaining an ability to reconcile c'in a harmony
sensitive to the heart terms perhaps irreconcilable to the intelli ..
gence" (eM, 299). For the most part, we live in the "practical"
world, and this tends to divide us from ourselves. The artist shaking
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the veil reasserts the feeling inner part of our nature against the
utilitarian outer part. That intuitive facet of our nature is the key to
growth. Bergson sees the artist as having ~~no other object than to
brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially
accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us"
(L, 157). ~~Reality:' for Bergson, is self-·discovery and self"creation.
And Bergson suggests a technique for brushing aside the veil.
It is indirection. The higher the consciousness of the poet, the
greater will be the tension between any partial notation of Becoming
and the uparadoxical permanence of ceaseless change:'2o Inspired
by insight, the poet must "catch up" his readers by employing rig..
orous techniques of omission, making use of the inherent paradox
of language itself. His poem must resist us, just as language resists
his poetry. This is not merely his curse, the site of a paradoxical
absence, but his triumph also, for the incidental forms of the poem
can regulate our intuition by the mobility of the real, the stability of
truly uceaseless change:' Bergson's artist does not introduce feelings
or ideas into us, but Uintroduces us into them, as passersby are
forced into a street dance" (TS, 32). Not the bits of dust and paper
in the Metro, but the wind that stirs them should attract our atten ..
tion; yet it is only through the bits and pieces that the wind makes
itself known to us. Great literature, according to Bergson, catches
us up in its voice, bringing our thoughts into a dance, so that we
'~fan into step" (CM, 102). If the poet distracts us from practical
life, the border blurs, and we merge (with him) in intuitive rever~
seeing and feeling what he wishes to suggest (TFW, 14).
Thus Bergson offers a vocabulary for describing how the well..
wrought poem may embrace its medium and yet achieve an epiph..
any of spirit. The poem's unity of form is achieved by mental-that
is, scholastic-effort, but the poet is precisely that person who has
kept his '~ideas in touch with his feelings and his soul in touch with
life" (L, 106). Intellectual effort, in the common sense, is compar..
atively easy Uand can be prolonged at will:' but the intuition of the
artist is uarduous and cannot last" (CM, 39). Such effort can
achieve however ~~the unity of a ~directive idea' common to a great
number of organized elements:' uthe very unity of life" (ME, 225).
In the center of the winds of flux, there is an eye, a still point.
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4rl\bove the word and above the sentence there is something much
more simple than a sentence or even a word: the meaning, which is
less a thing than a movement of thought, less a movement than a
direction" (eM, 143). Through properly constructed art, we may
achieve fleeting contact with something like this directive prin..
ciple, according to which, as Wittgenstein says, words mean what
they do.
Bergson ascribes to the poem a logic reifying the logic of dreams,
of memory itself left to itself. For him, the experience of a poem is
virtually indistinguishable from that of memor~ and the power of
the proper poem can be released only when the reader exercises
heightened powers of memorization in order to intuit the presence
of a directive idea. With practice, says Bergson, we can memorize
instantaneously even a complex temporal sequence, grasping the
timeless unity of the timebound series. This means Umaking all the
ideas, all the images, all the words converge in one single point. It
is getting hold of the gold coin, instead of the silver or copper change
for it. What is the gold coin? How are so many images held together
in one simple idea?" (ME, 195). This is the simplicity costing unot
less than everything:' as Eliot has it. To make all converge on a
single point is a physical impossibility for the poet printing letters
on a page, but it is a psychological possibility for the poet putting
images into our heads. It likely remains only a possibilit~ but po..
etry ought to push us-beyond appearances, back toward some"
thing primordial and instinctive. It ought, according to Bergson, to
help us locate original novelt~ freshness, and vitality.
Such moments of contact with reality's heart were of great im..
portance to Modernist writers, like Pound, who called them mo"
ments of umagic:' in which we break through ufrom the quotidian
into 4rdivine or permanent world:"21 For Joyce, they are moments
when an object of thought yields its usoul, its whatness ... from
the vestment of its appearance:'22 Aldous Huxle~ whose theory of
perception owes a great deal to Bergson, defined them as revelations
of uthe impossible paradox and supreme truth-that perception is
(or at least can be, ought to be) the same as Revelation, that Reality
shines out of every appearance, that the One is totall~ infinitely
present in all particulars:'23 The well..wrought poem must, then,
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give the feeling that its finite parts make an infinite whole. Its pat..
tern must resist reduction to a roadmap. That is why Joseph Frank's
pioneering essay on spatial form in modern literature misleads us
when it asserts that Joyce seeks in Ulysses U to give the reader a
picture of Dublin seen as a whole:' and that the book can therefore
not really be ~~read" but only Hreread:' 24 Ulysses is no picture of
Dublin. Rather, it is an attempt to reveal the Dublin of Joyce's in ..
tuitive experience. The novel invites us to take stock of the interre..
lationship of its parts, to fabricate alternative maps of parts of the
cit~ but never offers us the resolution of a picture spread out in
space. Frank's essay emphasizes one side of reading Ulysses at the
expense of the other. It would be truer to say that we cannot reread
Ulysses-only experience it anew. And that is its magic.
To create such magic, Bergson says, the artist must stay perpet..
ually aware of the tension between intuition and the forged imple"
ments of language. The artist's work, like any manifestation of life,
accepts mobility ~~reluctantly" (CE, 128). The reader's attention
must be directed incessantly beyond what is immediately in view,
to attend as on a moonless night to what lies just beside the object
of apprehension. In The Spirit of Romance (1910) Pound distin ..
guished this concern of the artist carefully from that of the scien..
tist-implying thereby that art shares something with science. Art,
he wrote, is not unlike a river "perturbed at times by the quality of
the riverbed, [but] in a way independent of that bed.... Stationary
objects are reflected, but the quality of motion is of the river. The
scientist is concerned with all these things, the artist with that
which flows:' Of course, Pound knew that traditional science was
not unconcerned with what Hflows:' and that the artist hoping to
evoke the river had better know a great deal about the reflections
on the surface. But his artist enters a "divine or permanent world:'
and his poem must invite vision that penetrates static forms evoked
by nouns to the sweeping verbal flux of the river. The arts are always
"dynamic:' Pound writes, unot passive, nor static, nor in a sense
reflective, though reflection may assist at their birth:'25
The ureflections" here conduct to intuitive knowledge. At this
early stage of his career, Pound appears to be repeating the sorts of
things Hulme might have been saying about Bergson's aesthetics.
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That is the guess of William Harmon, who points out that the cen"
tral concern of all Pound's early criticism-the criticism that helped
forge Vorticist and Imagist dogma-was udiscovering the means for
subverting the temporal sequence of language so that images can
present the essence or effect of sudden illuminations that transcend
space and time:' 26 A poem like ~'In a Station of the Metro" seeks
not to reflect on such illuminations, but to give their effect. Many
other contemporary writers seem to have had the same concern with
moments of illumination. And most found it necessary to take
Pound's subversive approach-Eliot seeks, for example, to dislo..
cate Ulanguage into his meaning" (SE, 248).
Bergson's Introduction to Metaphysics had certainly provided
Hulme with an obvious vocabulary to talk about the necessity for
this incessant exhausting reorientation of vision poetry demands of
its readers. The poet's images ukeep us in the concrete. No image
can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images, bor..
rowed from very diverse orders of things, rna)', by the convergence
of their action, direct consciousness to the point where there is a
certain intuition to be seized" (1M, 15.. 16). Here is the Imagist
aesthetic passed on by Hulme, who acted as both translator and
promoter of the book in which it appeared. It helps explain both
Pound's revisions of The \V&ste Land, where he ruthlessly pared
away context and elaboration, and his own strategies of ~~indirec"
tion" in the Cantos.
It also helps us understand William Carlos Williams's heterodox
structures in Paterson (as it finally evolved). There, Williams gives
us the formula ~~No ideas but in things" (book 1). Yes, Uthingness"
is a trap in aesthetic discussion; it is static; it freezes. But living
things transcend their formal limitations, leaving us with more than
empty form. By a cunning arrangement of the images of things-
that is, after all, what Williams's dictum boils down to in poetic
practice-the poet may direct the reader's consciousness toward an
experience language cannot directly touch. The arrangement must
be intuitive, following the logic of dreams. It must seem random,
novel, incomplete . . . For it is a developing whole. But it will not
resolve its many tensions. They are the upoint:' Through that tech..
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nique, it may end in evoking for us something-we usually call it
emotion, but it is an amalgam of feeling and thought.
Eliot's Uobjective correlative" is rooted in a Bergsonian aesthetic.
It proposes a "chain of events which shall be the formula of that
particular emotion" poetry evokes (SE, 124). Faulkner, too, spoke
of aesthetics as a science, like chemistr~ with certain scientific rules
which, when properly applied, will produce great art as surely as
certain chemical elements combined in the proper proportions will
produce certain reactions:'27 Pound also spoke of poetry as a usort
of inspired mathematics, which gives us equations not for abstract
figures, triangles, spheres, and the like, but equations of human
emotions:'28 This desire to compete with science, to turn the pow"
ers of intelligence on unexplored psychic territor~ is profoundly
Bergsonian, and its strong presence in the work of trendsetters like
Pound and Eliot (and later Faulkner) changes our view of the se"
quence by which certain literary techniques were developed and
promulgated among American writers. The ubiquitousness of this
pseudoscientific rhetoric has often been noted, but always with the
emphasis on either the 4r4rmathematics" or the 4r4rinspiration:' In Berg..
son the impulses coexist. For him, the artist must use Uequations:'
but they must not be allowed to resolve. Rather, the language must
preserve what Ernst Cassirer calls the umagic circle with which con"
sciousness surrounds it:'29 The poet's equations, that is, must main..
tain a sufficient degree of impenetrability for the intellect if they are
to evoke intuition.
The poet does not aim merely to make it hard on readers, but he
must insist on a mode of reading. He must, as Eliot put it, create a
Uliving and developing scheme:' and even risk going utoo far" in the
direction of complexity and obscurity to do SO.30 In Bergson's vo..
cabula~ the poet must coin new words, create new ideas, though
he will stand accused of "no longer communicating:' not even uwrit..
ing" (TS, 242). The reader of such poetry does indeed find it de..
manding. He too must adopt a new method. Eliot describes it in
his introduction to Perse's Anabasis. One must allow 4r4rthe images to
fall into ... memory successively without questioning the reason..
ableness of each at the moment; so that at the end, a total effect is
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produced. Such a selection of images and ideas has nothing chaotic
about it.... The reader of a poem should take at least as much
trouble as a barrister reading an important decision on a compli ..
cated case:>31 The difficulty comes in shifting gears from courtroom
logic to intuition. To open memory after Eliot's fashion requires an
act of will by which intelligence is Cl:thrust outside itself" and the
mind is left in a state of active receptivit~
Thus, Bergsonian aesthetics help us understand why that arti ..
fact, the Modernist text, comes to look and feel the way it does.
M.L. Rosenthal and Sally Gall have actually claimed that there is a
umodern poetic sequence" that is a genre in itself (like the sonnet).32
Whether we accept this or not, certainly there is a common vocab..
ulary among many Modernist poets that springs from the root we
are tracing, and one might as well call it a Cl:sequence" whose goal
is to keep alive the intuitive ~~formulation'> of the poet through the
conscious creation of tensions: UBy choosing images as dissimilar
as possible, we shall prevent anyone of them from usurping the
place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then
be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that . . . they all
require from the mind the same kind of attention, and in short the
same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness
to a particular and clearly defined disposition-that precisely
which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without
any veiln (1M, 16.. 17; my italics). The poet reveals us to ourselves.
To evoke this experience, the poem must consciously not name it.
The whole poem is the Name. The method of the poem is univer..
sal, and yet it will result in totally different sequences, depending
upon the intuition to which the poet hopes it leads. And a part of
the revelation will always be linguistic; that is, the poet's revelation
of inner life will also incorporate the tensions he himself feels be..
tween the poem>s parts (word, phrase, image, stanza) and its ente"
lech~ between the partial notations and the vector.
Bergson>s aesthetic theor~ then, is not naive about formal arti..
fice. When the poet directs consciousness to that point at which
there is an intuition to be seized, we are filled with admiration. He
has torn aside the veil, Cl:the cleverly woven curtain of our conven"
tional ego;' showing us our fundamental selves in their Cl:infinite per"
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meation of a thousand different impressions which have already
ceased to exist the instant they are named:' Naturally; we laud the
artist for having known us "better than we knew ourselves. This is
not the case, however" (TFW, 133; my italics). Those who think
Bergson's aesthetic theory begins and ends in the pure innocence
of Becoming have simply not read far enough. We realize, on re..
flection, that we have been given another veil, another illusion:
"The very fact that [the poet] spreads out our feelings in homoge..
neous time and expresses its elements by words shows that he in
turn is offering us only its shadow" (ibid.). Great art overcomes this
obstacle through its very provisionalit)T.
It does so by returning to the incessant process of discovery-
the disorientation and reorientation of life. Witnesses of the poet's
foray; we are brought back into our own presence finally by the
process of our interaction with the text, which can restore our sense
of connectedness to both nature and culture. In this, Bergson antic..
ipates Paul Tillich's assertion that the literary symbol is a "sacra..
ment:' one that "opens up levels of reality which are otherwise
closed for us [and] also unlocks dimensions and elements of our
soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality:' 33
Literature can open these depths precisely because it participates in
the reality to which it points-the words mean what they do. For
Bergson, too, art can evoke living selfhood through its very artifi ..
ciality; for as we peel back layers, seeking meaning, we are perpet..
ually surprised at how meanings are, in Eliot's phrase, "perpetually
eingeschachtelt into meanings" (SE, 195). To become engaged,
through literature, in this unending process of discovery is precisely
to contact again at its most salient point the nature of our own
being.
At this point, the artist steps aside. He merely catalyzes. For
Eliot, he is platinum filament, for Bergson a reagent bringing out
latent images in film, revealing the canvas's pentimenti. The exper"
imental method cannot guarantee success; the equation may not
have result. For some readers (Bergson says) the poet's language
will seem vague, "and so it is in what it expresses. Others feel it
precise, because they experience everything it suggests" (eM,
299). Poetry concerns itself mainly with suggestion and impres"
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sion, not expression, the utilitarian Umessage:' It concerns itself
with experiences, not concepts (though perhaps with the experi..
ence of a concept). If we cannot have presentation of the original in
art, we can still have what Bergson-and after him Hulme, Eliot,
Pound and others-called the uemotional equivalent" of it (TFW,
15). The reader with such an object in view will perhaps not mind
changing his method, being patient, dispensing with some of his
old expectations.
He will not mind adjusting other things. His definitions of mem"
ory and histor~ for example. Ulysses, The Wzves, Paterson, The
Wzste Land, The Cantos, and Absalom, Absalom! collapse space
and time, suggesting that past, present, and future are No\\', that all
personalities are continuous. They point to an underlying reality
refracted through moments of intense·experience that ask to be ac"
cepted as usacraments" and revelations. They include much that
might be considered utrivial;' because of the poet's strategy of selec..
tion leading to tensions. Thrown into such an encyclopedia of
psychic, mythic, historical data, the reader must fall back on iIi ..
stinct, must read intuitively. This literature's zeitgeist, as it turns out,
is the very concept of a zeitgeist-or perhaps we should use
Pound's term, paideuma, which insists upon its flowing and devel..
oping character. Such art makes large claims to craftsmanship and
vision.
One of the greatest American craftsmen to come in the wake of
the Bergsonian tradition is Wallace Stevens. ~~The poems of Ste..
vens;' Frank Doggett comments, uremind us of the intuition of
Bergson ... an intuition that is both gnomic and intelligible:' an
intuition reflecting uthe flux of experience:'34 Stevens's poetry gets
at the psychic sensuality of intuition through a rigorous and dispas ..
sionate probing that is keenly alive to the sensual world. It lulls and
directs with its great care for the place of the syllable, the flow of
sound into sound. Yet its voice is intensely cerebral. Gnomic with
the mystery of process, Stevens's poetry is finally intelligible only to
those who understand something of its heritage, and therefore of its
intent. The final image of poem XI of uThe Man with the Blue
Guitar" refers us to this territory: ~~Deeper within the belly's dark /
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Of time, time grows upon the rock:' Here stands the rock of cease"
less change, gnawed by time, the moment's pregnanc~
For Bergsonian aesthetics, the mystery of any poem lies in the
tension between coolheaded laboratory techniques and the noise of
creation, the uhumming of life's depths:' Breaking down barriers,
rending veils, the poem yet maintains its self..consciousness, its dis ..
tance. It claims to rediscover a spirit from which it gains authorit)T,
and somehow to overcome the contradiction between that spirit's
dynamism and its own rigid form. Frost wrote that uthe greatest of
all attempts is to say one thing in terms of another, is the philosoph..
ical attempt to say matter in terms of spirit, or spirit in terms of
matter, to make the final unit~ 35 The philosopher tries to say it, the
poet to make it. In order to do this, he claims the ability of seeing
more deeply and clearly how CCevery moment is a window on all
time:' as Wolfe says in Look Homeward Angel.36 Bergson's aesthetic
is consonant with a long tradition behind watchers from privileged
windows.
The window offered by intuition is, ultimatel)T, a reveiation of
Self and Nature-it is their confluence. The uother world" of
prophecy subsumes our own. But is it a world of fatality or of self..
creation, as it appears in Modernist writing? Is it, as some would
sa)T, a world hermetically sealed off from meaning, or is it a world
such as the Greek oracles sa\\', a finished work? For Modernist writ..
ers there is perhaps no one good answer to this question. It is im..
portant to note, however, that for them it is at least true that there
could not be a fatalism denying growth. Growth might cancel itself
out in the long run; it might take place in a nonsensical relation to
its own medium, but growth was life, or life (and art) were not
worth pursuing. Bergson's own background of study in Spencer
and Lucretius reflects the divided allegiances of Modernist writers
like Faulkner, for whom free will CCfunctions against a Greek back..
ground of fate" (FLU, 38). Modernist writing involves a pathos
born of this dual awareness of the form and the spirit. Thus the
Modernist lays claim equally to craftsmanship and prophecy; learns
what Scaliger called the ccpoetry of God:' those rhetorical ploys that
create belief, insight, faith. Some, like Thomas Wolfe, bear their
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testimony with self..conscious drama. Others, hoping to be more
convincing, perhaps, make lesser claims.
When Lily Briscoe sits, mulling over memory and art in the
middle of To the Lighthouse, she finds herself wondering "what is
the meaning of life?" She realizes that no great revelation is likely
to arrive, yet believes that "little daily miracles, illuminations,
matches struck in the dark:' point the way. The mind wishes to
compose life, to see it whole, as a logical form with practical rela..
tions. But the spirit brooks no permanent "form": 6:6:Mrs. Ramsay
saying 6:Life stand still here'; Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment
something permanent (as in another sphere Lily herself tried to
make of the moment something permanent)-this was of the nature
of a revelation. In the midst of chaos there was shape; this eternal
passing and flowing (she looked at the clouds going and the leaves
shaking) was struck into stability. Life stand still here, Mrs. Ramsay
said:' 37 Lily's desire for permanence leads her intuitively toward this
shape. She tries to master ineluctable processes, just as Mrs. Ram..
sa}', as wife and mother, seeks mastery of her family's lives. Lily
"strikes" on the moment, and the moment is 6:6:struck" like a coin
into a stable image: her painting. Her "stand still" must remain am"
biguous so that it does not deny the dynamism it seizes. Only thus
can it strike us with 6:6:sudden intensity" on the book's final page.
Lily has come to finish her painting. She adds a simple line she
feels intuitively goes in the center. Her experience of insight is the
one toward which the entire book tries to point the reader, but it is
an experience that is not and cannot be explained.
Lily's"stand still" sounds like a conscious echo of the phrase that
should have damned Goethe's Faust at the end of part two. Faust
had agreed that if he ever uttered those words, ever came to a mo"
ment so full that he wanted only to prolong it indefinitel}', Mephi ..
stopheles would have his soul. With his legalistic mind, Mephi ..
stopheles hears only the direct reference of the phrase: "Verweile
doch, du bist so schon:' He thinks Faust wants the scene to remain
just as it is. But Faust's attention is on the way the scene is changing.
He wants it to go on changing still, to remain ever in process. The
principle of change is its stabilit}', in his eyes. For Modernist writ..
ers, Wallace Stevens's dictum in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction"
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that CCit must change" names a fact and a requisite. Poetry must
change; it cannot help but change. More than that, it is a distillation
of change and time (our pseudonyms).
Bergson, who came out of the self..building philosophies of the
nineteenth centu~ is a key link in the chain of metamorphoses
bringing us Modernist poet"prophets, the CCvictims" of an inspiring
voice (TS, 243).38 The craft of their work is born of that tension
between creative spirit and partial notations-the CCchange of Phi..
lomel" (voice of poetry) in The mzste Land, for example: ccUnder
the firelight, under the brush, her hair / Spread out in fiery points /
Glowed into words, then would be savagely still:' Poems of an ear"
lier age might be monuments or portraits; those of Modernism are
ccexperiences" of what is cCstill and still moving" (CPP, 119). Such
poetry works directly with its awareness that final form owes to a
molten core of creation that ccglows into words:' It seeks to make
readers understand something of the process by which fluidity is
captured so that it may flow again. Putting the coin of everyday
language to the fire, it seeks a renewed medium of exchange, one
closer to the heart of the matter, one which will ccsuffice" (Stevens'
term) until it must again be submitted to the flame. The majority of
men, Eliot wrote in his early sarcastic piece on philosophies of art,
cCEeldrop and Appleplex" (1917), use terms which are merely
ccgood for so much reality; they never see the actual coinage:'39
Modernist literature tries to return us just such ccchange:'
Unwilling to be written off, to ascribe to the imagination powers
weaker and less rigorous than those of science, Modernist writers
required a vocabulary amalgamated of aesthetics, mathematics,
physics-just the sort of vocabulary Bergson offered. If even those
whose works were profoundly affected by this change, the climate
in which it took place, the reactions against it, and the populariza..
tion of certain aspects of Bergson's philosophy-if even these writ..
ers sometimes fail to recognize that Bergson's science of philosophy
does not predicate itself upon an abandonment to the superstition
of the life..force, that is no reason for us to ignore the fact that Berg..
son signifies. He elaborated aesthetic theories that had once served
to defend art against charges of immorality and anti.. religiosity; ere"
ating a defense for modern art against the charges of a science..
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obsessed age. To us he bequeathed terminology that explains the
Modernist drive toward a new sense of lrlrformality;' one that would
be regulated by the truth of duration, mediated by language, but
patterned by intuition.
THREE
Eliot's Unacknowledged Debt
The greatest debts are not always the most evident.
-T. S. Eliot
~ Lyndall Gordon has rightly remarked that in the years 1911 ..
14 Eliot formulated his most characteristic ideas and attitudes. 1 But
though Philip Le Brun has convincingly argued that Eliofs Irlrmajor
formulations about poetry" were influenced by Bergson, Bergson's
influence on Eliot has generally been seen as limited to the narrowly
defined period of 1910.. 11.2 In the view of most, Bradleyan philos..
ophy eclipses Bergson in Eliot's thought. Staffan Bergsten, for ex"
ample, writes in Time and Eternity that Eliot's concept of tradition
as an Ir"ideal order" in the Bradleyan vein ""may be interpreted as a
rejection of Bergson's doctrine of time:' And yet Bergsten is forced
to admit that though ""as a critic Eliot thus seems to have rejected
Bergson's philosophy ... as a poet he has no doubt been influenced
by him:'3
Similarly Piers Gray has shown how we may trace a certain u ar..
gument" among different philosophical views of the self and expe..
rience going on in the 1910.. 12 writing.4 ·Gray finds Eliot's mind
essentially skeptical, and says he rapidly moved beyond Bergson's
concepts of time and experience. Indeed, Gray believes Eliot first
""out..ironies Laforgue;' subsequently (in Pru/rock and Other Obser..
vations) expresses his profound experience of reading Bergson (as
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an overla~ no~ to Laforguian irony), and then, in a typical shift,
becomes Udissatisfied" with Bergson-so much so that he simply
CCstopped writing poetry between 1911 and 1913:' The Eliot that
emerges after this dry spell has, in Gray's vie~ become thoroughly
skeptical about what can be known of the self and memory and
what can be said within any linguistic tradition. Thus, Gray places
Eliot in a Usceptical relationship" with the tradition of St. Paul, Lan..
celot Andrewes, Josiah Royce-and of course Bergson. Gray reads
The '\Mzste Land provocativel~ as a poem of ironies, the last of
which is that we are left speculating on the unmeaning syllables
UShantih Shantih Shantih:' which Ufeebly translated into our Ian..
guage, promise the unimaginable:'5
Bradley versus Bergson?
Gray's sensitive and intense readings show the utility of Bergson in
explication. His analysis leaves us, however, with an essentially un..
changed picture: that Eliot passed through a brief period of enthu..
siasm for Bergson but rapidly came under the influence of Bradley's
skepticism and remained of that camp thereafter. A review of Eliot's
poetry and criticism during this period and immediately after shows
that there is a problem with the Bradley..Bergson polarit~ and that
Eliot knew it.
First, there is the important and neglected distinction between
Bergson and Bergsonism-Bergson's disciples were not always stu..
dents of his philosophy. If Eliot passed out of discipleship, that
hardly means he no longer found Bergson's works illuminating. Sec"
ond, it is tempting to draw too harsh a distinction between Bergson
and Bradle~ who certainly reach profoundly different conclusions,
but also share some very important convictions and strategies.
Hugh Kenner was the first to claim that Bradley helped Eliot to
achieve u a view of the past, a view of himself and other persons, a
view of the nature of what we call statement and communication:'6
Eliot's doctoral dissertation had been dug out of the archives at Har..
vard in the late fifties and published in 1964, spawning many ar"
ticles and books about Bradley's influence. Sean Lucy echoed Ken..
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ner in asserting that Bradley was the primary source for Eliot's idea
of tradition.7 Eric Thompson's IS. Eliot: The Metaphysical Per..
spective was the first full ..length study devoted to Bradley's influence
on Eliot. Written without benefit of the dissertation, it is much less
adequate than Lewis Freed's IS. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher.8
Russell Kirk summarized a great deal of what is to be found in these
studies (including Gray's) when he wrote that Eliot got from Brad..
ley: 1) a concept of the self as an artificial construction and 2) a
hunger for the Absolute which deepened the schism in his thought
between the world of experience and the world of permanent val..
ues. According to Kirk, Eliot also acquired defenses against utilitar..
ianism and dry intellectualism.9
Anyone who has tackled Bradley's Appearance and Reality or
Eliot's dissertation, which spends a good deal of time on the object..
theory of Alexius Meinong and is thus somewhat unhappily titled,
will agree with Freed that what can be done with Bradley's philos..
ophy in relation to Eliot's criticism is, though occasionally very re"
vealing, still extremely limited. 10 Richard Wollheim has warned that
~~Knowledge and Experience is a painfully obscure work. Criticism
which sets out to understand Eliot's work as a poet and critic by
reference to it is likel}T, fairly soon, to admit bewilderment, or else,
overtly or covertl}T, to reverse the enterprise:' Wollheim draws ten"
tative conclusions, but offers them as merely general tendencies uin
Eliot's writing, particularly his critical writing ... that also occur in
Bradle}T, so that we can say of them that, even if they were not trans ..
mitted from Bradley to Eliot, they would have been reinforced in
Eliot by his reading of Bradley:' At the same time, Wollheim admits,
uto trace the influence of Bradley's philosophy upon Eliot any way
beyond such generalities seems to be a most hazardous and uncer"
tain undertaking:'11
Thompson suggests that ~~Eliot may have been doing what F.H.
Bradley suggests every metaphysician does: finding bad reasons for
believing what the poet knows on instinct:' And Kirk makes a par"
allel argument: Bradley uconfirmed" for Eliot uthat the past is not a
thing frozen:'12 Such claims keep to the general level recommended
by Wollheim; they do not ask us to believe that Bradley was a
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source for Eliot's ideas, though some have argued that UTradition
and the Individual Talent" is a Bradleyan piece. Of course, the idea
that the cCpast is not a thing frozen" seems as much a Bergsonian as
a Bradleyan notion. Indeed, Bergson and Bradley share a great deal
more than is generally recognized by those who have, mostly in
vain, sought to make sense of Eliot's poetics in the light of Bradley's
Absolute.
Like Bergson, Bradley reacted against materialism, particularly
that of John Stuart Mill. Bradley debunked the Greatest Happiness
principle by showing how it depended on positing terms which,
because they come from the intellect, are inevitably self..contradic..
tory. Wollheim notes in his book on Bradley's philosophy that a
cccomparison has often been drawn between Bradley and his con"
temporary Bergson, for Bergson, too, was preoccupied with the in ..
adequacy of Thought to Realit~ with the way in which concepts
and abstractions of discursive thinking mutilate and do violence to
the continuum of experience:'13 Like Bergson, Bradley viewed the
concepts of time, space, object, and self as essentially suspect be..
cause they were the vision of a cyclopean eye: the intellect. Bertrand
Russell drew the parallel: UWhat Bergson is trying to do is uphold
the reality of flux in experience as against the travesty of rigid forms
that pertain to reason and its picture of the world. Thus far the
problem of Bergson is reminiscent of Bradley: But the solution is
here quite different.... Bradley may be described as a rationalist
and Bergson as an irrationalist:'14 Since Bradley and Bergson con"
trast profoundly in their solutions to the problem, their fundamental
agreement on that problem's character is often forgotten.
William James, who admired Bergson, also saw that Bradley and
Bergson shared a view of primary experience. cCBradley's thought
and Bergson's run parallel for such a distance, and yet diverge so
utterly at last;' James wrote in 1910, with this in mind. Is For both
Bradley and Bergson, primary experience is something with which
we almost intentionally lose touch, a nonverbal darkness out of
which consciousness emerges mysteriously. Eliot refers to it repeat..
edly in his dissertation: uImmediate experience ... is a timeless ...
unity.... Immediate experience, at either the beginning or end of
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our journe~ is annihilation and utter night" (KE, 31). Bradley's im..
mediate experience, then, like Bergson's, is primar~ irreducible:
lrlrThere is no further point of view from which it can be inspected"
(KE, 22). It is a state in which all distinction between self and other
is lost. Bradley defines the finite center somewhat contradictoril~
according to Eliot; finall~ it is inseparable from immediate experi"
ence, duree, the eternal present. Thus, expressing some puzzle"
ment, Eliot admits that uthe Finite Center, so far as I can pretend
to understand it, is immediate experience" (KE, appendix 2). The
finite center-what common sense defines as consciousness or the
self-must then be a thing transpiring.
And yet Bradley insists that immediate experience is also an il..
lusion. Unlike Bergson-a thinker admittedly younger and with
different orientation-Bradley felt one must adopt a permanently
quizzical view of experience. William James found this aspect of
Bradley's thought puzzling. For Bradle~ somehow unot to enter life
is a higher vocation than to enter it:' and the knowledge of imme..
diate experience is replaced in Bradley's system by a lrlrtrans"concep"
tual evaporation . . . the absolute:'16 Bradley's extreme skepticism
bothered even his disciples, who attempted to make the philosophy
more supportive of the religious impulse-at least, Bosanquet tried
to adjust Bradley's theories in that direction. In his final metaphys..
ics, Bradley denies that his Absolute is at all related to personal
experience, denies freedom and keeps a distance on the idea of im..
mortality for the individual human soul. Appearance and Reality
defines the Absolute as neither personal nor beautiful nor moral nor
utrue:' It also argues that the aesthetic experience, because it in ..
volves pleasure, can never conduct to the Absolute.
These are not small matters for Eliot's own theories of poetry and
experience. The trajectory of his career leads Eliot away from Brad..
ley's skepticism and toward faith; but more than that, his critical
and philosophical writings show an affinity with Bergson's thought
that vindicates Le Brun's view. Eliot's reaction against Bergson is
no simple matter of rejection. His insistence on permanence and
conscious mind is balanced by belief in the importance of flux and
unconscious process.
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Reading Eliot Reading Bergson
For the young Eliot, just graduated from Harvard, Bergson seems
to have been a path chosen impulsively. During the winter of 1910..
11, Eliot had direct contact with Bergson's ideas and style when he
went to Paris to hear him lecture at the Sorbonne. He was already
identifying Bergson as a mystic, as we shall see. Later, he associated
himself publicly with two men on whom Bergson's influence had
been profound: TE. Hulme and Jacques Maritain. And in 1916
Eliot lectured on Bergson through the Oxford University Extension
Program, identifying Bergsonian philosophy as essentially mystical
and optimistic. I ? In 1948, he admitted that his only Hreal conver"
sion, by the deliberate influence of any individual, was a temporary
conversion to Bergsonism:' and in 1952 he wrote of Ha longing for
the appearance of a philosopher whose writings, lectures and per..
sonality will arouse the imagination as Bergson, for instance,
aroused it forty years ago:'18 This sense of having been Hconverted"
produced a genuine negative reaction to Bergsonism in the twenties
and thirties, when Eliot came to identify it as Hheresy:'
Bradle)T, in contrast, was a cerebral choice, though it is hard to
believe Eliot took Bradleyan philosophy seriously as a Hpath:' Brad..
ley's philosoph)T, Eliot would write in 1924, seemed to give him
everything he asked, but render it not worth having. 19 .r.rI spent three
years, when young, in the study of philosophy:' he later wrote.
HWhat remains to me of these studies? The style of three philoso..
phers. Bradley's English, Spinoza's Latin, and Plato's Greek"
(TCC, 20..21). Bradle)T, whom Eliot called master of .r.rthe finest
philosophical style in our language:' influenced profoundly Eliot's
prose style and his manner of solving problems.20 From Bradley
Eliot acquired a prose and a habit of thought at once hedging and
fearless-unafraid to confront uncertainties fully and to leave them,
though fully explored, still uncertain. This mark of Bradley on both
the criticism and the poetry is deep. It gives Eliot's work an extraor"
dinary quality of courage, since he faces reality's Hirreducible con"
tradictions and irreconcilable points of view" with such poise (KE,
112). Bradley's is the voice we hear when Eliot discusses impene..
trable problems: HThe admission of inconsistencies, sometimes rid..
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iculed as indifference to logic and coherence, of which the English
mind is often accused, may be largely the admission of inconsist..
encies inherent in life itself, and the impossibility of overcoming
them by the imposition of a uniformity greater than life can bear"
(5E, 332). Thus, Eliot in Bradleyan tones asserts CCit may be the
man who affirms the apparently incompatible who is right" (OPP,
142). But Eliot does not finally embrace Bradle~ though he re"
mains posed as the wide..eyed pessimist. He admires Bradley for
having written a philosophy in which Clracute intellect and passion..
ate feeling preserve a classic balance:'21 And this rigor clearly
changed his own approach as a writer.
But Bergson, whose style Eliot also admired as one of CCintense
addiction to an intellectual passion:' influenced him in a more pro..
found way: It gave him a vivid sense of his own age's optimism. His
reaction against that optimism was out of proportion to its presence
in Bergson's thought precisely because it touched a nerve in his own
struggle to clarify his moral and spiritual values. Thus, Bergson be..
came, for the Criterion's readers-and especially after Eliot had
converted to the Anglican Church in 1927-a Clrheresy:' Eliot came
to describe Bergson as a sophist who had Clrinvented new sensations
from metaphysics:' And Bergson's cCtime..doctrine" he called CCwholly
destructive:' for in it Clreverything may be admired, because nothing
is permanent:'22 Though Eliot never reached the stratosphere of
bombast navigated by Lewis, Benda, Lankester, and Santayana, he
did use hyperbole when it came to Bergson: ClrThe potent ju.. ju of
the Life ..Force is a gross superstition:'23 When, in the late twenties,
a portion of several issues of the monthly Criterion was given over
to a debate on humanism, Eliot squared off with J. Middleton
Murr~ Ramon Fernandez, and others. He disliked their vocabu..
lary: ClrWords like emergent, organism, biological unit of life, simply
do not arouse the right cresponse' in my breast:'24 But he disliked
even more the residue of Bergsonism he detected in their theories:
CCIt is possible, of course, that evolution will bring the human race
to such a point that thinking will no longer be necessary. Thinking
is painful and requires toil and is a mark of human incomplete"
ness:'25 Bergson, he implies, has encouraged men to think they are
complete in themselves. Given a choice between the cCunthinking"
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intuition of Bergsonists and the unpopular but honest intellectual
labor of Bradleyans, Eliot's public position could not be other than
it was.
He placed Bergson in the tradition of late..nineteenth"century
progressives whose thought had been Hharnessed to Spencer and
Darwin:' In this progressivism he detected the heresy of human..
ism: "The hope of immortality is confused (typically of the period)
with the hope of the gradual and steady improvement of this world"
(SE, 293). Bergsonism helped spread this optimism in the twen"
tieth centur~ and Eliot damns it as a form of fatalism: HTo assume
that everything has changed, is changing, and must change, accord..
ing to forces which are not human, and that all a person who cares
about the future must or can do is to adapt himself to the change is
a fatalism which is unacceptable. It is an exemplification of the
modern time..philosophy discussed by Mr. Wyndham Lewis....
Man is morally responsible for his present and his immediate fu ..
ture:'26 Eliot certainly should have been clear, as Le Brun argues,
that this attack could be justified against Bergson's disciples, but
not the philosopher himself.27 Still, Bergson had created a sort of
"epidemicn of which Eliot himself had, fortunatel~ been cured.28
Eliofs essays in the Criterion after 1927 recur often to this trouble..
some optimism with which Bergsonists seem infected. In Eliot's
eyes, they are fools looking for the easy way out, Hpious pilgrims"
of progress, Hcheerfully plodding the road from nowhere to no"
where, trolling their hymns, satisfied so long as they may be 'on the
march'" (SE, 325).
On the face of it, Eliot certainly had a point, for Bergson was
optimistic about progress, even in the late stage of his career, when
he asserted that Hthe essential function of the universe is a machine
for the making of gods" (TS, 306). Such statements gave credence
to attacks charging Bergson with encouraging fascism. 29 The
charge that Bergson's Vitalism ignores moral responsibility is a se"
rious and troubling one. Bergson himself seems to have been con"
cerned with working out other problems than his philosophy's
moral commitments until the publication of his last major book,
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in 1932, when for most
the question had already been settled in the negative. This book
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considers two principles in moral life: cca system of orders dictated
by impersonal social requirements, and a series of appeals made to
the conscience of each of us by persons who represent the best there
is in humanity" (TS, 75). Religion is indispensable to societ)', ac"
cording to Bergson, because it educates men to see that cCobedience
to duty means resistance to self" (TS, 12). Religion institutionalizes
conscience. The cCpressure" it creates is the first force of the book's
title.
And the second is the uaspiration" we feel when we contemplate
the lives of saints and mystics. This volume shows the profound
influence Christian mysticism was having on Bergson: cCChristian..
ity is the latest advance in justice:' he wrote, for it preaches cCthat all
men are brothers:' And Christian mysticism is the only complete
mysticism, full of udivine humility" (TS, 68, 216.. 17, 220). Bergson
said in 1907 that cCto change is to mature" (CE, 7), yet came to
believe that"men do not sufficiently realize that the future is in their
own hands" (TS, 200). And, in what seems an uncharacteristically
pessimistic tone, he wrote that man is nearly cCidentical" underneath
CCwith his remotest ancestors" (TS, 262). Finall)', Bergson is in sub..
stantial agreement with Eliot that the artist's standpoint is, though
important, U not final. ... The standpoint of the moralist is higher"
(ME, 31). And in his final works, Bergson exhibits a strong idealist
vein: cCThe great moral figures that have made their mark on history
join hands across the centuries, above our human cities; they unite
into a divine city which they bid us enter .... from the real society
in which we live we betake ourselves in thought to this ideal soci..
ety" (TS, 59).
Very likel)', Eliot never came to recognize the Augustinian side
of Bergson's thought (few have), although the Criterion gave The
Two Sources of Morality and Religion a positive review. One imag..
ines that Eliot would have been surprised to learn of Bergson's in ..
tention to convert to Catholicism.
He would have been surprised because he believed Bergson
stood clearly on the opposite side of what Eliot came to think was
cCthe real issue of our time:' namel)', that between the cCsecularists-
whatever political or moral philosophy they support-and the anti ..
secularists: between those who believe only in values realizable in
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time and on earth, and those who believe also in values realized
only out of time:=-30 It is important that we note the word cCalso:=- for
Eliot has a special sense in which he uses the concept of secularism:
Secularists profess views that are heretical. And a heretic is U a per..
son who seizes upon a truth and pushes it to the point at which it
becomes a falsehood:=- The secularist has lost the sense of tension
between what is true in time and on earth and that uabsolute to
which man can never attainn (SE, 436..37). This does not necessar"
ily mean that the uanti ..secularistn denies secular wisdom; he simple
inserts it in a broader context that mitigates its truth.31
Had Eliot not come to see his early experience with Bergson's
philosophy as a flirtation with heres~ he might have acknowledged
a broad parallel between his and Bergson's careers. Each ends by
humbling philosophy and poetry before the wisdom of the saints.
And if he had seen this broad parallel, Eliot might have been readier
to acknowledge that Bergson offered a wa~ in 1910, to clarify his
spiritual values and his commitment to the importance of intuitive
insights. Le Brun believes that in Eliot's failure to recognize what
he gained from Bergson there may have been U some process of
repression:=- It is a matter for wonder that Eliot does not distinguish
more carefully between Bergson and Bergsonists. But the reasons
for this are really more interesting than they are important. What..
ever Eliot has said, the evidence shows that Bergson helped him
phrase to himself questions that occupied him through most of his
career as a critic and poet. If he inserted Bergson's insights in a
broader context that supplies the moral stance he desired even in
1910, that does not in the least diminish the validity of those in ..
sights, just as Einstein=-s Theory of Relativity does not cancel the
validity of Newtonian physics for the man who (in Faulkner=-s
terms) is trying to nail together a chicken house in a windstorm.
Bergson provided Eliot with ground on which to build, and most
importantl~ with a mark of the era's confluence of thought, to
which, however he may struggle against it, Eliot also belongs.
Two manuscripts from Eliot's stay in Paris and subsequent work
on Bergson provide us with our own necessary mark to steer by in
evaluating Bergson=-s significance to Eliot. The first is a booklet of
notes (entirely in French) from Bergson's lectures heard mostly in
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January and February of 1911. The notes are neatly copied in com"
plete but grammatically crude sentences-a reconstruction, one
supposes, from fragmentary jottings made during the lecture. We
cannot kno~ of course, how much Eliot selected and edited. There
are virtually no marks indicating his opinions or impressions, only
an occasional question mark. The notebook records a familiar sort
of introductory course in the philosophy of self and personali~
Bergson discusses Mill, Spencer, Hume, and Kant, spending most
time on the latter, whose thought Eliot notes Bergson apparently
found "extremement profonde est tres instructive:' Bergson's own
observations reflect directly the thrust of his work: "Le moi est un
unite mais n'est pas l'unite d'un chose mais d'un forme:'32 The note..
book suggests a thoroughness in Eliot's study of Bergson that a
second manuscript at Harvard confirms.
Sometime after returning to Harvard, he drafted a paper in En..
glish on Bergson's philosoph~ We cannot precisely date the essa}7,
nor is it certain whether he wrote it for purposes of lecture or with
the idea of publication. Lyndall Gordon guesses that it was com"
posed in 1913 or 1914, since it is not in Eliot's 1910.. 11 handwrit..
ing (he changed handwriting styles after leaving Paris). The essay
exposes some of Bergson's apparent contradictions, especially his
use of the spatializing language condemned in Time and Free Will,
and suggests that Bergsonian intuition (pure perception) cannot it..
self escape the dictum of Matter and Memory: l:l:percevoir signifie
immobiliser" (to perceive means to immobilize).33 If we accept this,
Eliot asks, "then how can perception be identical with the object,
which, in itself, is pure motion? Where, again, is the realit}7,-in
the consciousness, or in that which is perceived? Where is the
one reality to subsume both of these, and can we or can we not
know it?"
Eliot's chief criticism, in this essa}7, is that Bergson has failed to
make good his l:l:claim to mediate between idealism and realism:' In
insisting on this disjunction, Eliot has already achieved the orien..
tation of his later thought. Indeed, the bone he has to pick with
Bergson never changes hereafter: Bergson denies the polarity by
which alone man determines value. (Eliot has not yet called Berg..
son a "secularist:') Of course, Eliot has already been reading Brad..
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ley-at one point, Bradley's name gets written down by mistake,
then is corrected to HBergson:' And in the paper's conclusion Brad..
ley comes forth as a crucial part of the interpretation Eliot gives to
Bergson's philosophy.
Eliot identifies Hthe last part of M + M [Matter and Memory]-
cap [sic] iv + conclusion" as Ha very remarkable and provocative-
indeed tantalizing-piece of writing-I find one of the most inter..
esting + most important parts of Bergson's work:'34 This, the pen"
ultimate section of the book, discusses imager~ perception, and
matter. Eliot recapitulates it in some detail, concentrating on driving
home two points. First, that Bergson would have movement prior
to both matter and consciousness. Second, that Bergson's Hpure
memory" is the significant mediating factor in his equations for the
extended and unextended, quantity and quality. Eliot disposes of
the first point by asserting that motion cannot exist "without a con"
sciousness to perceive:' and that Hperception means immobilisa..
tion:' He thus appears to catch Bergson in the bind of having used
Hperception" covertly in the very sense he wishes to avoid. Eliot's
approach to the second point is more complicated and much more
interesting.
The crux of the problem, as Eliot sees it, is that Bergson has
tried to establish a middle ground between idealism and realism,
and has been led to put consciousness (consciousness's most salient
characteristic, for Bergson, is, of course, memory) in two roles: Has
half of the dichotomy and also as potentially absolute.... Bergson's
philosophy must stand as a kind of pluralism and a kind of realism
as well. This is the one side of the case, and this is the side I have
chiefly emphasized, because it is the side which I am interested to
oppose:' (The words Hin attacking" were crossed out here and re"
placed by Hto oppose:') Bergson's middle way cannot avoid slipping
to one side or the other, according to Eliot. Pure memory cannot,
he contends, be held to reach a level at which it is no longer part of
a relational chain: perceiver, object, perception. Thus, Bergson's at..
tempt to Hoccupy a middle ground" is inadequate, and the duree
reelle must be viewed as Hsimply not finaI:'35
HYet there are:' Eliot goes on immediately to sa~ Has I have inti ..
mated, suggestions, more than suggestions, of leading toward an
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absolute; suggestions which have often led Bergson's critics to call
him a mystic. With this appellation I am not disposed to quarrel;
though, as at present elaborated in Bergson's [sic] it is a rather
weakling mysticism:' Eliot notes the implicit monism of Bergson's
philosoph)', which cCtends toward an absolute which sees eternity in
a single moment:' He regards the "evolutionary" doctrines of Berg..
son's work as having somehow obscured its real tendenc)', though
having certainly contributed "largely to Bergson's popularitf' And
he ends by asking the reader to "consider Bergson in the light of
neo..Platonism;' a rather astonishing request. Eliot then claims that
Bergson's attempt to institute a philosophy of pure change has only
"reinaugurated" the timeless and eternal in a new form. Spatialisa..
tion gives one the illusion of timelessness, yes, but let the flux of
inner states more and more concentrate as the "tension" of the per"
ceiving mind contracts history into what Bergson called a few mo"
ments of more intense life-let those inner states press more and
more into each other and they ccapproximate nearer + nearer to one
state;' Eliot claims. And thus the "limit will only be a single eternal
present. Timelessness of another sort:' Eliot echoes his foe of later
years, John Middleton Murr)T, who had published in 1911 a brief
essay saying that Bergson was cCdeclaring once more today" the PIa..
tonic truth of the "eternality of art:'36
In his conclusion, Eliot argues (as Maritain also argued) that
Bergson does not himself understand clearly toward what his phi ..
losophy leads. "If Bergson, then, had begun his philosophy with
the duration of pure identity which I have suggested, the descent
into the world of plurality + externality would appear not as a
quickening, but as an arrest. Reversing the apparent conclusions of
his theor)T, time would be the child of space; the formula being time
= eternity/space. And this I call neo"Platonism.... In such a sys..
tern-Bergson Resartus-science in the narrower sense of the word
would of course find short shrift:' Science is Eliot's real target here.
It can never be complete, nor can memory complete through partial
notations the infinite. And he accepts the dead end this implies:
cCFinall)', nothing essentially new can ever happen; the absolute, as
Bradley says, bears buds + flowers + fruit at once; time gives the
Menue monnaie ad infinitum:'37
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Now this is indeed, as Eliot admits, CCBergson Resartus;' and
Bergson would certainly not have agreed to Eliot's conclusions, not
even at the end of his career, when his idealism came more to the
forefront. At first, one is impressed almost wholly by the consist..
ency of Eliot's view with his later pronouncements on histo~ the
absolute, evolutionism, etc. Here it all is, with remarkable consist..
enc~ before he had achieved any recognition as a poet and critic,
before his conversion, before CCBurnt Norton;'where the Bradleyan
Absolute (Cbuds + flowers + fruit at once") appears in the lotos
vision. It is easy to forget the most salient characteristic of Eliot's
whole discussion, namel~ that he attributes these views to Bergson
himself. Eliot's essay is an attempt to get the two philosophical sys..
terns to overlap. It is not a straight attack on Bergson, for it does
not condemn the philosopher's views, but strives to adjust them.
Above all, Eliot seems to be assessing the significance and power
of memory and intuition, two profoundly interrelated concepts in
Bergson's philosophy. He wishes to preserve these principles. But
he also wishes to assert that from a certain Upoint of view:' memory
is cca futile attempt to emulate the completed infinite by a sequential
infinite:' Though memory is H a tool of tremendous effect in practical
life:' if one seeks Uwhat Parmenides would call truth, it is no more
possible that truth should be gained by these means than that a man
should ever catch sight of himself with his eyes closed:'38 And later,
in his debate with Middleton Murr~ he writes of intuition: uI do
not at all wish to expunge the word Cintuition' from the dictionary
. . . I mean that intuition must have its place in a world of dis ..
course:' The issue here is really a simple one. Eliot does not reject
the 4:4:native gift of intuition" (OPP, 257). But he insists that one
should not make it cCthe key to the universe:'39
In his notes for Philosophy 24A at Harvard in 1913.. 14 Eliot
says that 4:4:the lotos alone is perfect, because it has many flowers and
many fruits at once ... mutual relation of final reality and manifes ..
tation:'40 This image of what is both in and out of time represented
itself in Eliot's work on Bergson himself at approximately the same
time we have assumed he embraced Bradley. But Eliot was still
working seriously on Bergson long after he had been reading Brad..
ley. Eloise Knapp Hay explains the presence of the lotos vision in
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the Bergson paper at Harvard by saying Eliot wrote the paper after
giving the philosophy class and taking Royce's seminar, so that the
lotos vision had obviously Ustayed on Elio{s mind:'41 But the paper
may predate the class notes. And in any case, what are we to do
with Eliot's working on his reading of Bergson three years after hav..
ing left Paris-and supposedly Bergson-behind? We have been so
convinced that Eliot's mind works by progressive consideration and
rejection of ideas that we are almost prepared to ignore the facts.
Piers Gray's book is structured entirely on this view of Eliot's intel..
lect: that it grew by digesting and then expelling philosophies and
literary devices whole. But it seems to me Eliot grew differently. He
selected as well as rejected. He kept what he could not or would
not throw awa~ and in this fashion evolved a solution over many
years to a central problem already becoming fairly clearly defined in
1910.. 11: the polarity between ufinal reality and manifestation" that
just had to be accepted someho\\T.
Eliot's essay gives Bergson's philosophy of change importance
where merely C:C:practical" considerations obtain, but denies its hav..
ing approached Utruth:' We make a great mistake, I think, if we
take Eliot's pronouncements on truth and the Absolute to mean he
wholly condemns Bergson's empirical approach. After all, whether
we are poets, mechanics, or politicians, our lives consist mainly of
C:C:practical considerations:' Only the mystic or the saint, as Eliot
wrote in Four Quartets, takes the Absolute as his vocation. The
practical effect Bergson had on Eliot's thinking was, finall~ pro"
found. UChange as process:' Elizabeth Schneider observes, C:C:may
have engaged Eliot at a deeper level even than did its content or
result-deeper, that is, than the actual Christian view of life ar"
rived at:'42
Some of Eliot's most perspicacious critics have long acknowl..
edged the broad parallels between Bergson and the poet/critic.43 In
what follows, I have sought to make that parallel specific, to show
how Eliot's vocabulary and operative principles owe a debt to Berg..
son's thought. It would be well to sa~ at the outset, that while no
single point in what follows will convince overwhelmingl~ the
weight of the points taken together does convince, even if one al..
lows for the fact that there are no new ideas under the sun, and that
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Eliot could conceivably have gotten some of them elsewhere or in ..
dependentl)T.
Bergsonian Concepts in Eliots Criticism
For Eliot, as for Bergson, change is the defining characteristic of
life and its most fundamental experience. And while the change
transpiring in nature may appear random, it is not so when it is
manifested in a truly vitallife..form. Vital life always changes into
something both new and continuous with the past-life develops
into novelty by a continuous inner..directed growth, passing for..
ward constantly into the unpredictable. Bergson and Eliot agree on
these points concerning the world and experience. And they agree
on two points about the nature of the perceiving mind that con"
fronts experience: that the fundamental tendency of the mind is to
shield us from reality by falsifying it, and that art is one of our most
important weapons in combating this tendency which would even"
tually rob us of our vitality and our ability to grow. Finall~ Bergson
and Eliot share a theory that language has a dual source: It comes
partly from the evolutionary heritage, partly from divinity. In this
theor~ language can be rejuvenated only by constant recurrence to
the personal and unique. For this reason, Eliot, like Bergson, puts
the poet in the roles of explorer and prophet, Ucatalyst" and vehicle.
For Eliot, as for Bergson, language begins and ends not in the util ..
itarian concept of the Umessage:' but in a dimly known realm of
experience made available to us by intuition.
Bergson identified change with life itself; he even denied that
change needed anything to operate upon. For him, ccthere are
changes, but there are underneath the changes no things which
change: change has no need of a support . . . movement does not
imply a mobile" (eM, 173). This fundamental process in creation
could never be susceptible to reason, and it became in Bergson's
philosophy the single absolute criterion of existence. For Eliot, too,
mobility equals existence, and this is a value prior to any moral or
ethical standards. Immobility for Eliot means death. In uThe Pen..
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sees of Pascar' (1931) he writes, "So far as we are human, what we
do must be either evil or good; so far as we do evil or good, we are
human; and it is better, in a paradoxical way, to do evil than to do
nothing: at least we exist" (SE, 379;80).
This principle, that inactivity is synonymous with inexistence, is
at the heart of Eliot's view of society and literature, and he draws a
distinct line between those whose work concerns living things-
like literature-and those who deal with a conceptualized (spatial;
ized and hence immobile) world like that of mathematics or specu;
lative philosophy. "On my side of the line:' he says, "one is con;
cerned with living things which have their own laws of growth,
which are not always reasonable, but must just be accepted by the
reason: things which cannot be neatly planned and put in order any
more than the winds and the rains and the seasons can be disci;
plined" (OPP, 15). The poe{s business is with such mysteries; he
himself is part of them. According to Eliot, "the poet makes poetry,
the metaphysician makes metaphysics, the bee makes honey, the
spider secretes a filament; you can hardly say that any of these
agents believes: He merely does" (SE, 118). A curious view for one
who condemned the "fatalism" of Bergson's creative evolution!
So Eliot may have decried Bergson's emphasis on the "organic"
and "emergent:' but in his own theories of language and experience
he exhibits a strong streak of Vitalism. When we read poetr}7, he
advises, we must try to grasp what it is "aiming to be ... its ente;
lechy" (OPP, 122). The poem's principle of inner development is
its vitality, and "we must be patient to be able" to perceive "vitality
in it, to recognize that real vitality is never aimless, yet not to spec;
ulate upon the aim itself:'44 We must read, then, for this vitality
with our intuition, for the poem itself began with the intuition of
vitality, with "nothing so definite as an emotion, in the ordinary
sense:' but "still more certainly not an idea" (OPP, 106). Eliot's
paper on Bergson chided the philosopher for having reduced con;
sciousness "to a matter of rhythm:'45 But On Poetry and Poets ar;
gues that rhythm may be the essence of the poetic consciousness:
"A poem, or a passage of a poem, may tend to realize itself first as a
particular rhythm before it reaches expression in words:' and "this
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rhythm may bring to birth the idea and the image" (OPP, 32). This
theory appears to make poetry an activity predicated on glimpses
into the heart of change.
It is, a closer look at Eliot's language theory reveals, only one of
many theories based on the criterion of change; Eliot seems to have
had the principle continuously in mind. UIt is, of course, a neces"
sary condition for the continuance of a literature that the language
should be in constant change. If it is changing, it is alive" (TCC,
49). Many words, he notes, u must change their meaning, because
it is . . . their changes in meaning that keep a language alive, or
rather, that indicate that a language is alive" (TCC, 65; Eliot's
italics). This principle found a direct application in the Criterion
itself, when Eliot, as editor, proclaimed that the magazine would
aim "to be perpetually in change and development, to alter ... with
the phases of the contemporary world for which and in which it
lives:' 46
Both Bergson and Eliot seem to have drawn the logical conclu..
sion from this belief in change as the criterion of life that to pin
down things is to render them lifeless. This stricture applies equally
against determinist science and literary theory: ~1\ny theory which
relates poetry very closely to a religious or social scheme of things
aims, probabl~ to explain poetry by discovering its natural laws; but
it is in danger of binding poetry by legislation to be observed-and
poetry can recognize no such laws" (UPUC, 139). Poetry can rec"
ognize no such laws, for to bring into consciousness the uncon"
scious processes of life and art kills them. We become conscious of
social traditions qua traditions, for example, "only after they have
begun to fall into desuetude" (ASG, 25, 19). "Experience:' wrote
Eliot in his dissertation, ~~both begins and ends in something which
is not conscious" (KE, 28). To bring living things into conscious..
ness is to tempt fate, and if we wish to preserve the living spirit of
our culture and our art, we must uscrupulously guard ourselves
against measuring living art and mind by the dead laws of order:'47
Here Eliot makes the Bergsonian distinction between intellect
and the world..in..experience. Unless we recognize that intellect kills
things in order to "understand" them, we can do justice neither to
culture nor to art, for both involve inherently emotional processes.
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So Eliot is led to say that poetry's function is u not intellectual, but
emotional;' that it cannot therefore ~be defined adequately in intel..
lectual terms" (SE, 118). But more than that, aesthetics is danger..
ous business for poets, as Hit may make us conscious of what oper..
ates better unconsciously:' 48 Eliot, like Bergson, touches here the
mainstream of the Romantic reaction against rationalism; Goethe's
Mephistopheles put it thus glibly:
Wer will was Lebendiges erkennen und beschreiben
Sucht erst den Geist heraus%utreiben.
Denn hat er die Teile in seiner Hand . . .
Fehlt, leider! nur das geistige Band.
[Faust, I, 1936..39]
Eliot's commitment to the Romantic view on this question helps
explain the preference he announces in his social as well as aesthetic
criticism for unconsciousness over consciousness. Thus, despite his
contempt for those who make intuition the ~~key to the universe;'
Eliot is driven to admit that U meaning is of the intellect, poetry is
not:'49 And in this Eliot distinguishes himself markedly from
Pound, who responds, ~~Saxpence reward for any authenticated case
of intellect having stopped a chap's writing poesy! You might as well
claim that railway tracks stop the engine:'50
Eliot does believe that intellect raises obstacles to poetr)T, how..
ever. And he believes this because he subscribes to a theory of ex"
perience that parallels Bergson's. For Eliot, as for Bergson, life has
an inherent direction of growth that is graspable only intuitively.
Poetry captures, emulates, or embodies this living process. Eliot
says of the mature literature of a nation, for example, that it partici..
pates in a process of self.. realization not explainable by historians:
~~ mature literature ... has a history behind it ... that is not merely
a chronicle, an accumulation of manuscripts and writings of this
kind and that, but an ordered though unconscious progress of a Ian..
guage to realize its own potentialities within its limitations" (0PP,
55; italics mine).51
Many have been puzzled by this streak of Romantic organicism
in Eliot, who remarks, in To Criticize the Critic, that he inclines
toward an Horganic" view of the conservative tradition, or writes, in
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The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, that we should consider
the critical tradition not as U a sequence of random conjectures, but
as readaptationn (TCe, 139..41; UPUC, 27). Unable to see the
true continuity of Eliot's stance, commentators have often opted for
the standard Hazlittian dissection. George Bornstein, for example,
tells us candidly that ulike his mind, Eliot's poetry divides against
itself:' 52 Bomstein argues that Eliot covertly wrote poetry in the
Romantic tradition while attacking Romanticism in his criticism,
and he characterizes Four Quartets as Uromantic against the grain:'
by which he seems to mean that Four Quartets rehearses a dialectic
between Eliot's drive to write a poetry of novelty and his critical
orthodox~ Bornstein explains this apparent contradiction between
Eliot's Romantic imagination and his Pauline intellect as a simple
case of id versus superego: uEliot's response to feared forces within
himself [was] denial, restraint, projection:' 53 To the extent that Ro..
manticism is associated, in his thought, with abandonment to the
confusion of primary experience, Eliot felt the dangers Bornstein
discusses were very real. And there is, of course, no way to deny a
theory of repression, in which latency takes on sinister hues. But
Eliot's criticism is simply not Uorthodoxn in this sense, as Edward
Lobb's IS. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition makes clear.54
I believe the criticism-I will refrain from addressing the poetr~
for the moment-has a public and a private face, and the public
face does indeed argue for restraint, self..denial, and orthodoxy; but
not necessarily because these repressions were felt as necessary in
the poet's life. Eliot seems to have felt that they were essential to the
survival of culture. The private face, however, clearly sets itself in
the Romantic tradition, and argues vehemently against the abuse of
that tradition. We have already partly explored the crux of the mat..
ter here: Eliot and Bergson share with the Romantics of the previ"
ous century a belief that life is process, and especially a process
directed by an inner principle not capable of legislation by the in..
tellect. The artist is thus instinctive-for Bergson Uintuitive:' Eliot
seems to have had no trouble realizing this consciously. When he
praised Wyndham Lewis's Tarr in 1918, he said the book gives one
udirect contact with the senses, perception of the world of immedi..
ate experience:' and went on to offer a theory of the artist as umore
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primitive, as well as more civilized, than his contemporaries....
Primitive instincts, and the acquired habits of ages are confounded
in ordinary men. In the work of Mr. Lewis we recognize the
thought of the modern and the energy of the cave..man:'55
When it comes to the Romantic poets themselves, Eliot identi..
fies most strongly with Coleridge. c;c;The criticism of today;' Eliot
writes, "may be said to be in direct descent from Coleridge:' and he
has in mind here especially Coleridge's writings on Shakespeare
(OPP, 115). Coleridge pushed criticism in the direction of other
disciplines, toward the academ~ where it has found its home in this
century (OPP, 127). The artist has been affected too; he must,
sometimes against his will, look to politics, economics, religion, and
philosoph~ in addition to consulting the monuments of his art. 56
But most importantl~ Coleridge explained why the artist must
never rest, must seek always the flowing of that inner development,
a power behind all that evolves, whether in the natural or the
psychic world.
This is where Bergson fits in the Romantic tradition. As Michael
Roberts noted in his early book on TE. Hulme, c;c;In substance,
both Hulme and Bergson were trying to restore to 'reason' the
meaning it had for Coleridge and the Cambridge Platonists:' For
Hulme and Bergson, Roberts says, the mind is more than a logic
machine; Uit is a power that controls and coordinates:' 57 Bergson
adopts the Coleridgean concept of the imagination's power: "True
genius does not merely restructure the given, but melts and re"
shapes things" (TS, 38). And Eliot must also incorporate this idea
in his theory of poetry.
To evoke the richness of the parallel between Coleridge, Berg..
son, and Eliot on this point, let me quote a well..known passage
from Coleridge's criticism of Shakespeare:
No work of true genius dares want its appropriate form, neither indeed
is there any danger of this. As it must not, so genius cannot be lawless;
for it is even this that constitutes its genius-the power of acting ere"
atively under laws of its own origination.... the mistake lies in con"
founding mechanical regularity with organic form. The form is me"
chanic, when on any given material we impress a predetermined form,
not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material; as when to
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a wet mass of clay we give whatever shape we wish it to retain when
hardened. The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes, as
it develops, itself from within, and the fulness of its development is one
and the same with the perfection of its outward form. Such as the life
is, such is the form. 58
This reflects Eliot's belief that cCreal vitality is never aimless:' It also
sheds light on Elioes own criticism of Shakespeare, which takes as
its major principle the fact that Shakespeare's career is one contin..
uously developing whole and makes that a standard by which lesser
poets may be judged. Eliot agreed with Coleridge that a poem or
play is an indivisible whole. He then extended the theory Coleridge
had put forth on individual plays to Shakespeare's whole career.
Shakespeare set a standard for poets, Hthat of a continuous de..
velopment from first to last.... We must know all of Shakespeare's
work to know any of it" (SE, 170). Again and again Eliot applies
this principle in his criticism: cCThe test is this: does every part of a
man's work help us to understand the rest?" (OPP, 249). Every
poet must strive to give expression to that continuous development
that is the highest criterion of life and art. His work must always
have U significant unity:' changing, but not merely changing, rather
Hevolving" through time, so that we may say it is Hunited by one,
consistent, and developing personality:' as Shakespeare's was: ccThe
whole of Shakespeare's work is one poem" (SE, 179). From very
early in his career Eliot applied this standard-to the work of
Pound, for example, which he found can only be evaluated if we
cCacknowledge the whole design:'59 ccThe music of verse;' Eliot ar"
gues, His not a line by line matter, but a question of the whole poem"
(OPP, 30). What is true of the poem is also true of the poet's ca"
reer-and finally true of poetry generally. Only the poet conscious
of tradition can further the development of his nation's literature, for
the cCcontinuity of a literature is essential to its greatness" (TCC,
146..47). And yet, as Bergson says, Hin all continuity there is con"
fusion" (ME, 28). We come to understand true continuity only
retrospectively. This is precisely what Eliot meant when he wrote
in this dissertation that Hthe only real truth is the whole truth" (KE,
163). To know what something is, we must know what it will be..
come.
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And Bergson and Eliot agree we cannot know this in advance.
For both, true continuity must be characterized by genuine novelty.
How else could Eliot have held the view that ~~the conscious present
is an awareness of the past ... which the past's awareness of itself
cannot show" (SE, 17)? Because there is genuine novelt)T, uthe past
has to be reinterpreted for each generation" (TCC, 119). This rein..
terpretation is no mere "review"; it is a rebirth and rediscovery in
one. Eliot's view rests on the same foundation as Bergson's argu..
ment against determinism: The '~possible" is known only retrospec"
tively as such (CM, 22). uPremonitory" signs appear only after we
know the conclusion (CM, 24..25). Bergson and Eliot have, in a
sense, transferred the Romantic Sublime from a symbolic location
out there in the world-in cataracts, ice..floes, and alps-directly
to the interior place, the location of immediate experience, the
uplace of passage" as Bergson calls it in Matter and Memory (MM,
196..97). And here the same failures of imagination and language
that occupied the Romantics occupy Eliot and Bergson. For them,
the present is always a heart of darkness; in life, we must always
wait to understand. A work of art, for example, becomes only uret..
rospectivelya work of genius" (TS, 66). We talk of the occurrences
of the present, but ~~practical1)T,we perceive only in the past" (MM,
194). In short, novelty eludes us because we always confront it post
facto. That, of course, is for our own protection, according to Berg..
son. We need time, as Eliot says, in order to know what we have
experienced (OPP, 50).
Bergson would agree completely with Eliot that the forward
thrust of life's vitality into the future acts directly on the past. Eliot
writes that U a living literature is always in process of change. . . . It
is not that we have repudiated the past, as the obstinate enemies-
and also the stupidest supporters-of any new movement like to
believe; but that we have enlarged our conception of the past; and
that in the light of what is new we see the past in a new pattern"
(TCC, 57). That new pattern usually shows a more heterogeneous
character. ~~ simple state can, in remaining what it is:' writes Berg..
son, ubecome a compound state solely because evolution will have
created new viewpoints from which to consider it" (CM, 27). The
appearance of the Romantics, for example, caused the Classicists to
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appear retrospectively to divide into subgroups, one of which we
began to think of as cCpre..Romantic" (CM, 24.. 26). And Eliot
makes a similar statement about nineteenth"century American writ..
ers, who could never have conceived of their cl\mericanness" as we
do, for CCit is only in retrospect that their Americanness is fully vis..
ible" (TCC, 51 .. 52). This newly patterned past is real enough; but
it is an illusion to imagine a secret Americanness having been in
preparation during the eighteenth century. That is, though Ameri ..
can literature has continuit~ there are still genuinely new events
transpiring in its histo~ so that, finall~ both prediction and expla"
nation must remain problematic.
Yet we still cling to the illusion of cCpre..Romanticism:' And Eliot
would agree with Bergson's explanation for our obstinate faith: Man
prefers to conceptualize immediate experience rather than intuit it.
He conceives time as a line, searches for and finds patterns in it.
But this knowledge uimposes a pattern and falsifies:' as CCEast
Coker" warns: cCFor the pattern is new in every moment / And every
moment is a new and shocking / Valuation of all we have been"
(cPP, 125). That our intellectual constructs of experience are re"
peatedly and inevitably rendered provisional teaches, admittedl)',
different but related lessons for Bergson and Eliot. For Bergson, it
means we have pursued knowledge by the wrong means. For Eliot,
it is proof of our incomplete knowledge of God's ways and works.
cCThe only way in which we can handle reality intellectually;' Eliot
writes, cCis to turn it into objects.... At the same time we are forced
to admit that the construction is not always successful" (KE, 159).
But while for the philosopher cCintuition attains the absolute" (1M,
74), for the later Eliot, intuition is merely better than intellectuali..
zation, for there is an absolute (eto which man can never attain"
(SE,437).
One must remember that Eliot asserts this unattainable absolute
in addition to, not instead of, Bergson's duree. That Bergson's was
not the whole truth did not invalidate his insights. For both Eliot
and Bergson the CCorgan of attention to life:' the intellect, is a poten..
tial cCobstacle to perception" (ME, 59; TS, 303). One must go by
the path of the intuition to overcome the obstacle. And when one
does, Eliot and Bergson agree, one sees that object and subject are
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by no means distinguishable entities. uThe self, we find;' Eliot
writes, ccseems to depend on a world which in turn depends on it;
and nowhere, I repeat, can we find anything original and ultimate"
(KE, 146). For everyday purposes, we act as if this were not so:
"We perceive an object ... in a special relation to our body" (KE,
155). The body's relationship to an external world is a fabrication
that both Eliot and Bergson attack, though both admit that it ccpro"
tects mankind" (CPP, 119). The intellect is of great practical value.
But its supposedly CCobjective" truth is merely a shado~ merely ccrel ..
ative truth; all we care about is how it works" (KE, 169). As we
shall see, the artist's intuition comes to the aid of both philosopher
and poet here, suggesting a way of talking about primary experience
that does not succumb to the falsifications of the intellect's concepts.
Eliot's aesthetic, Ronald Schuchard has said, appears to come partly
from 1:E. Hulme, Bergson's student and translator. I agree with
Schuchard that Hulme may be seen to have placed the CCkeystone
for [Eliot's] classicism:'60 Hulme's aesthetic and poetic, as formu ..
lated in Speculations, fit Eliot's theories. We have already reviewed
part of this ground in chapter two, where we observed that Hulme
sees the artist as ccleaving the level where things are crystallized out
into these definite shapes, and, diving down into the inner flux,
[coming] back with a new shape:' Once the artist has made this
new form, anyone can see what he has seen. He is only able to
'break the moulds and . . . make new ones" because he has de..
tached himself from the practical, or ccobjective" view of the intel..
lect. The artist struggles against the ccstock types" that undermine
his work, the tendency of language to become the cclowest common
denominator:' The artist seeks, in a U passionate desire for accuracy:'
to communicate something of the true individuality and novelty of
primaryexperience.61
Hulme's aesthetic, in which the artist opens a door from objec"
tivity into the flux of reali~ showing us that to which intellect
blinds us, is remarkably close to Eliot's.62 The theory is detectable
in a general form in Eliot's dissertation, where primary experience
is defined. And later, Eliot states directly that the artist seeks ccsome
new experience, some fresh understanding of the familiar, or the
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expression of something we have experienced, but have no words
for" (OPP, 7). For Eliot, the poet must uexplore:' He must try lrlrto
find words for the inarticulate, to capture those feelings which
people can hardly feel because they have no words for them" (TCC,
134). Poetry; Clrif it is not to be a lifeless repetition of forms, must be
constantly exploring (lrthe frontiers of the spirit:'63 It should, for
Eliot, remind us of the udeeper unnamed feelings which form the
substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate; for our lives
are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and an evasion of the
visible and sensible world" (UPUC, 155). Now there really can be
no way to this kind of truth save through intuition, through re ..
nouncing practical ends and allowing the mind to contemplate what
Bergson says Clrit has a material interest in not seeing" (eM, 161).
Eliot's poet cannot avoid exploring, digging lrlrbelow the surface
of contact between the self and external objects ... to the depths of
the organized and living intelligence" (TFW, 136). It is another
country he enters: UBeyond the nameable, classifiable emotions and
motives of our conscious life when directed toward action ... there
is a fringe . . . of feeling of which we are only aware in a kind of
temporary detachment from action" (OPP, 86). Authentic poetry
penetrates to such depths through the disinterested state of intui..
tion; sailing into the unconscious, it offers our only hope of avoiding
a Clrrelapse into unconsciousness:'64 The poet exercises that detach ..
ment professionall~ for the sake of raising to consciousness both
individual experience and cultural heritage, things his poem must
have in its bones. Indeed, a great poem may carry something in its
mere rhythm; a poem in a language unfamiliar to us thus may leap
directly into the mind: uln poetry you can, now and then, penetrate
into another countr~ so to speak, before your passport has been
issued or your ticket taken" (0PP, 14). It can only offer us this if it
was born of intuition, of a renouncing of the Clrprocesses which we
generally employ for practical ends" (1M, 67). Sometimes, appar..
entl~ we can achieve those umoments of inattention and detach..
ment" in which we uperceive a pattern behind the pattern" by ser"
endipity (SE, 232). More often, we must earn them.
In Eliot's life, one such moment, brought about by illness, en"
gendered a section of The \V&ste Land. lr~ piece of writing medi..
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tated apparently without progress for months or years:' he wrote,
umay suddenly take shape and word; and in this state (brought on
by illness) long passages may be produced which require little or
no retouch.... He to whom this happens assuredly has the sensa"
tion of being a vehicle rather than a maker" (SE, 358). The poet's
sensation of being a vehicle rather than a creator follows naturally
from Bergson's concept of intuition as a negative function of con"
sciousness. Where the stamina to effect this conscious relaxation of
the intellect lacks, illness may serve as a helpmeet; this it appears to
have done for Eliot in 1920, when he experienced an lrlrefflux of
poetry:' lrlrTo me:' he later wrote, Uit seems that in these moments,
which are characterized by the sudden lifting of the burden of anx"
iety and fear which press upon our daily life so steadily that we are
unaware of it, what happens is something negative: that is to sa~
not lrinspiration' as we commonly think of it, but the breaking down
of habitual barriers-which tend to reform very quickly" (UPUC,
139). These lrlrhabitual barriers" that make daily living possible
buffer us from the wellspring of poetr~ which may visit us if we let
it. And Eliot appears to have found that, for him, writing good po..
etry was the art of courting this serendipit~ He quotes Housman
admiringly: lrHI have seldom: he says, lrwritten poetry unless I was
rather out of health: I believe I understand that sentence. If I do, it
is a guarantee ... of the quality of Mr. Housman's poetry:'65 Thus,
paradoxicaIl~ genius is a sort of self..effacement which, Udriven on
... by an inner necessity:' yields to what uhad to express itself"
(ASG, 25; TS, 38).
Bergson's intuition philosophique is thus profoundly helpful in
understanding Eliot's view of personality and the act of writing.
The ground for this view remains, of course, the uprimary experi"
ence" defined in Eliot's early philosophical writings: lrlrln feeling the
subject and object are one:' and primary experience cannot there..
fore be U mine" for uI am only I in relation to objects:' Because this
relation disappears in primary experience, so must our commonly
held views of the self and the world. In immediate experience, the
self merges in a utimeless unity" with the whole world.66 Thus, the
most universal truth is the most intensely personal: uEach [mind or
finite center] expanded to completion, to the full latent reality
76 Bergson, Eliot, b' American Literature
within it, would be identical with the whole universe" (KE, 202; my
italics). For Eliot, this transformation of personality is an "imper"
sonality" more significant than the impersonality of craft with word
and form. The poet can always think of his work as like the "turning
of a jug or a table leg" (SE, 96). It is harder to achieve the rendering
of highly personal matter in a way that brings out its universalit~
reminding us of the unity behind our world of "subject and object:'
The more profound impersonality ~~is that of the poet who, out of
intense and personal experience, is able to express a general truth;
retaining all the particularity of his experience, to make of it a gen..
eral symbol" (OPP, 299). Yeats, Eliot said, had achieved this. By
becoming more Irish, Yeats became more universal, and Eliot called
the line in which Yeats named his own age in a poem "a triumph"
(OPP, 300..301).
There is no conflict between the theorist of "impersonality" and
the poet who writes about his trips on the London tube in "Burnt
Norton:' There has only been a misunderstanding about what im..
personality meant to Eliot. It is the impersonality of intuition, an
"extinction of personality" in the face of and for the sake of reveal..
ing an underlying reality. No good poetr~ Eliot tells us in his intro..
duction to Valery's Le Serpent, is "divorced from personal experi..
ence and passion:' ~~Indeed:' he says, "the virtue, the marvel of
Lucretius is the passionate act by which he annihilates himself in a
system and unites himself with it, giving something greater than
himself:'67 The artist struggles not to deny the value of personal
experience, not to abandon the world of "appearance:' but to "trans..
mute his personal and private agonies into something rich and
strange, something universal and impersonal" (SE, 117). Universal
does not mean "public:'
But language is a public medium of ~~exchange"; it gives the il ..
Iusion that it is substantial coin. So the first problem the modern
poet faces is making a new relationship between primary experi..
ence and these outward signs. Like Bergson, Eliot recognizes that
words inevitably tend to sink away from that vital beginning and
come to substitute for experience rather than evoke it. In his disser..
tation he had asserted that the symbol is "continuous with that
which it symbolizes:' and that name and object form a "mystic mar"
Eliot's Unacknowledged Debt 77
riage" (KE, 104, 132, 135). But Eliot's criticism is really more con"
cerned with the divorce of these things, with the difficulty of rec..
onciling them. In his essay on Swinburne (1920) he asserts that
t:~language in a healthy state presents the object, is so close to the
object that the two are identified" (SE, 285). So long as language
is in a Uhealthy state:' meaning, which Ucannot be merely contem..
plated, but must be erlebt:' keeps its immediacy and life (KE, 94).
Unfortunatel~ language must be continually restored to health, for
it becomes with time a Ushabby equipment always deteriorating / In
the general mess of imprecision of feeling" (CPP, 128).
In a sense, for Eliot the poet must murder to create; he must
smash the precut molds for thought, the language for which expe..
rience has ceased to exist. He must shake the arras of this Uutilitar..
ian" language as the madman shakes his geranium in t:t:Rhapsody
on a Windy Night:' He must fight the tendency of words to convert
the unique (that is, the universal) into public property. That is what
Eliot had in mind when he wrote that t:t:all significant truths are
private truths. As they become public, they cease to become truths;
they become facts, or at best, part of the public character; or at
worst, catchwords" (KE, 165). For Eliot, intellectual Uobjectivity"
can never capture living truth. The poet must thus become subver..
sive, must plot to overcome the natural tendency of language. He
must Ubecome more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more
indirect, in order to force, to dislocate, if necessar~ language into
his meaning" (SE, 248). This dislocation of language-not mean"
ing-is tantamount to a smashing of molds. A poem thus re ..shaped
jerks us out of our depersonalized, stereoptican world into the world
of mutating, interpenetrating forms the artist has exposed by his
impersonal vision. We do not merely contemplate a message pre"
sented to us with proper etiquette; we find ourselves Hforced into a
street dance" (TS, 32).
The poet does not interfere in this erlebnis; he designs it and
catalyzes it. He has in mind not so much t:t:communication" as in ..
voking memory. He must use language in new ways if he hopes to
have any effect at all, for otherwise the language will bury again
what he has unearthed. He cannot literally recreate the experience,
and should not pretend to. He can only go so far in udislocating"
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language without losing his reader entirely and careening wildly
past the universal into the cryptic. But he is left with one great tool:
the image. Here lies the burning fountain of poetry as Philip
Wheelwright calls it. We have already discussed the similarities be..
tween Eliot's "objective correlative" and Bergson's image theory pre"
sented in Hulme's translation of Introduction ala metaphysique. For
Bergson and Eliot the effect of any arrangement of images must be
to evoke a nonverbal moment-an intuition-which can only be
achieved if the individual "parts" of the poem function not as "com..
ponent parts, but [as] partial expressions" (1M, 29). For both Eliot
and Bergson "the novelty of [the artist's] form has rather been
forced upon him by his material than deliberately sought" (ASG,
25). And for both, that novel form must be organic to be authentic,
must grow from seed and contain in every cell the genetic code of
its mature expression: the whole poem.
The poet's target is our spirit; he tries to bring us back into the
moment. But he cannot simply bang away at that objective with a
hammer, or what he pins down will be rendered lifeless and ineffec..
tual. Therefore, he is really forced more and more into ~~indirection:'
He holds up an image to our inner eye, but his real object lies just
off to the side; it is a trick of seeing, like that we use on a moonless
night. If his poem is crafted well, he brings us into an unnamed-
because ineffable-experience. We thus justifiably call him a cata"
lyst, for he is in himself unimportant, merely the means of our re"
awakening. Eliot likened the poet to a platinum filament. Bergson
called him a "reagent" like that used in developing film (eM, 159).
The logic is the same: The poet brings out latent energy in an ap"
parently static scheme. His strategy must always catch us off guard,
but it is anything but illogical.
The poet's logic is simply other than the scientist's. Any apparent
irrelevancies in his work are ~~due to the fact that terms are used
with more or other than their normal meaning:' It is certainly not
true that "the ideas of a great poet are in any sense arbitrary; cer"
tainly in the sense in which imagination is capricious, the ideas of
a lunatic or an imbecile are more ~imaginative' than those of a poet.
In really great imaginative work the connections are felt to be bound
by necessity as logical as any connections to be found anywhere"
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(KE, 75). They are connections felt, however, not seen. The scien..
tist conducts his raid on a material world spread out upon a table-
simply there. But for the poet there is another, richer world, a
""knowing and being in one:' as Bradley puts it.68 Great art works
upon this ground of knowledge not with the scalpel, but with the
intuition, the faculty that claims the ability to know without dis ..
secting the unit we can ""never analyse away" (KE, 30).
Finall)T, in Eliot's poetic there is a dedoublement that parallels
Bergson's: He places the poet in both the passive role of ""vehicle"
and the active one of prophet. In On Poetry and Poets he writes that
the true poet ""does not know what he has to say until he has said
it" (OPP, 108). And he defines inspiration as this very discovery of
meaning: ""If the word "inspiration' is to have any meaning, it must
mean just this, that the speaker or writer is uttering something
which he does not wholly understand.... This is certainly true of
poetic inspiration" (OPP, 137). Since ""creation" would also be ren..
dered meaningless without this affirmation of genuine novelty in the
world, the poet is elevated to a level of participation in the great
creative current mnning through all life. What is most significant
about him is therefore least explainable: ""If either on the basis of
what poets try to tell you, or by biographical research, with or with..
out the tools of the psychologist, you attempt to explain a poem,
you will probably be getting further and further away from the poem
without arriving at any other destination" (OPP, 108). Thus, both
Eliot and Bergson believe that the poet's creation must, if it is gen..
uine, always contain an element that remains ""unaccountable, how..
ever complete our knowledge of the poet, and ... that is what mat..
ters most:' The poem is absolutely novel, and ""cannot be wholly
explained by anything that went before. That, I believe, is what we
mean by "creation'" (OPP, 124).
Life is change; but also development into the genuinely new.
And art must exhibit these features also. The legacy of Bergson's
thought in Eliot's criticism is rich on this point. Eliot had echoed
some of Bergson's arguments against determinism as early as his
doctoral dissertation: ""The mathematical representation of motion
is and is not the same as the motion represented:' The dissertation
iterates, as well, the theory of entelechy: ""The character of a science,
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like the character of a man, may be said to be already present at the
moment of conception, and on the other hand, to develop at every
moment into something new and unforeseen" (KE, 26, 61). Here
Eliot first formulated the critical approach needed to penetrate the
principle of cCinner development:' The impossibility of legislating
what truly lives must force us back on a strategy of simply avoiding
preconditioned responses: cCThe true critic is a scrupulous avoider
of formulae; ... he finds fact nowhere and approximation always.
His truths are truths of experience, rather than calculation"
(KE, 164).
Literary law must be ccdiscovered;' not cClaid down" (UPUC, 45;
TCC, 41 ..42). Eliot said of Addison that he had made the cCelemen..
tary error" of thinking he had ccdiscovered as objective laws what
[he had] merely imposed by private legislation" (UPUC, 60). As
much as any scientist, the critic must guard against this failure of
objectivit)7, especially since the very concept of inner development
must contain something forever inaccessible to analysis. We are
constantly grasping at smoke, carried forward so rapidly and irrev..
ocably that we can never say precisely where we have been or are
going. Indeed, inner development is nothing like a journey on land.
It is ccno concatenation;' but a CCstarting point which expands itself
and can neither be arrested nor analysed, for the process is not one
simply of addition, but of inner development, so that you cannot
say absolutely what the starting point was" (KE, 116.. 17). Caught
forever in the midst of such a blooming..outward, the mind lives
perpetually in a state of disorientation: cCln poetr)T, as in life, our
business is to make the best of a bad job" (UPUC, 45).
That is Eliot's characteristically pessimistic vie\\', one that seems
to divide him irrevocably from the philosopher who saw the history
of life on this planet as a great unfolding progress. For Eliot, the
cCforces of deterioration are a large crawling mass, and the forces of
development half a dozen men:'69 For Eliot, man and nature are
cCradically imperfect;' while for Bergson they are only incomplete
(SE, 437; ASG, 45 ..46). And yet, when Eliot formulates his theory
of language and the artist, he is forced to posit something on which
human knowledge will be grounded, and that ground is immediate
experience. He is also forced to draw from this ground the principle
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of the free act, however exceptional, and to define it as Bergson
does: cCThe free act may be termed a synthesis of feelings and ideas"
(MM, 243). Eliot is then driven to see the parallel between free
action and artistry in Bergsonian terms as well: We act freely when
our acts Uspring from our whole personality ... when they have that
indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between
the artist and his work~~ (TFW, 172). And he is thus brought to
conclude that good art performs a liberating office by returning us
to the consciousness of that cCunity of life" which cannot be analysed
away (ME, 225). Born of the intuition of this uni~ the poem car"
ries some spark of its fire to us, or else fails. Thus, for Eliot, poetry
should bring a cCsatisfaction of the whole being" (SE, 368).
Like Bergson, Eliot believed poetry and philosophy had taken a
wrong tum sometime in the seventeenth centur)T, when thought and
feeling appeared to fall more and more apart. That change was felt
in verse as an unfortunate hostility to intellectuality: ccFrom Donne
to Tennyson, something happened to the Mind of England.... It
is the difference between the intellectual poet and the reflective
poet. Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they
do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose. A
thought to Donne was an experience" (SE, 247; my italics). In ef..
fect, Eliot wants to restore to Uthought" the quality of erlebnis which
poets had denied it, the emotion that became their truth and that
was their private territory. Bergson also, though he spends as much
energy as Bradley in trying to destroy the common concept of the
intellect, wishes to restore this unity to mental life, this interpene"
tration of instinct and intellectuality: uI smell a rose and immedi..
ately confused recollections of childhood come back to my memory.
In truth, these recollections have not been called up by the perfume
of the rose: I breathe them in with the very scent' (TFW, 161; my
italics). Poetry and philosophy~sslipping away from this unity of the
sensual and intellective functions is, for both Eliot and Bergson,
symptomatic of a disintegration of personality. Eliot saw uin the
history of English poetry . . . the splitting up of personality....
What we have to do is re ..integrate it" (UPUC, 84..85). And for
Bergson, of course, free acts can spring only from a cCwhole person..
ality:' If F.O. Matthiessen is right that Eliot's most fundamental
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tenet as an artist and critic is the necessity for this reintegration of
thought and feeling, then surely Bergson's intuition philosophique
is an indispensable tool for our understanding Eliot.70 Intuition was
an idea that, rankled him; but he could not escape it in his own
Upractical" view of art.
In that vie~ the poet emerges finally as a risk..taker who cares to
submit himself to the ufire of an original and unique emotion born
of the identification of an author with his subject, that is to sa~ of
intuition" (TS, 38). Seen in the broader context of Eliot's Christian
orthodox~ this Promethean risk is also part of the pattern God has
conceived and which He determines. But the risk is the closest
thing to freedom that we have, and even if it is a kind of fate to take
it, still, it is better to act ill than to act not at all. A consciousness of
man's inherent incompleteness does not invalidate this imperative.
And the artist champions this aspiration. In him, the vitality of im..
mediate experience must gleam. This, as Eliot says, is the first cri..
terion for any critical judgment: Is it a living performance, a free act
born of a whole personality? One distinguishes ua great dancer and
a merely competent dancer" by pointing to that something intangi ..
hIe that melds mere sequence into organic whole. It is the dancer's
intuitive contact with creative fire, "a vital flame, that impersonal,
and, if you like, inhuman force which transpires between each of
the dancer's movements" (SE, 95).
The great dancer's performance ,may be recognized by what
Bergson calls its utrue continuit~ real mobilit~ reciprocal penetra..
tion-in a word, that creative evolution which is life" (CE, 162).
Eliot's critical thought has to reckon with this force-inhuman
whether we like it or not. To see its primacy in his criticism is to
recognize the importance of his early philosophical training in the
phrasing of those profound tensions, so often characterized as mere
ucontradictions;' that are the hallmark of his work.
FOUR
Time, Intuition, and Self-Knowledge
in Eliot's Poetry
For most of us, there is only the unattended
Moment, the moment in and out of time . ..
- T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets
~ ~~The essence of mystical contemplation:' wrote Evelyn Un"
derhill in Practical Mysticism, is dualistic: Hunion with the flux of
life, and union with the whole in which all lesser realities are re"
sumed:' To achieve these different sorts of union, you must first let
Hintuition have its way with you:' 1 This challenge encapsulates the
struggle of Eliot's career as a poet, for in positing Himmediate ex"
perience" as the ground of poetic knowledge, yet still subscribing
to an Absolute in which that experience must be resumed as a
Hlesser reality:' Eliot assumes a highly ambivalent posture toward
Hintuition:' Intuition is not Hthought"; indeed, it is associated with
instinctive behavior, raising for Eliot the spectre of atavistic Hape..
neck" elements in men. But if intuition involves a disturbing sort of
giving up, it is still essential to art, and even finally to the mystic.
In his preface for Thoughts for Meditation: A \V&y to Recovery
from Within (1952), Eliot wrote of ~~emotions and states of the soul,
which are found, so to speak, only beyond the limit of the visible
spectrum of human feeling, and which can be experienced only in
moments of illumination, or by the development of another organ
of perception than everyday vision:' To penetrate to this level-and
he expressly uses the language of the ineffable and of nonvisualiza ..
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ble form-he admits we must abandon CCour usual motives
abandon even the Love of Knowledge:' 2 This dispassionate aban..
donment bears obvious similarity to Bergson's intuition, achievable
only when intentionality collapses. By this date, Eliot had found a
way to talk about his view of immediate experience and intuition-
a way that gives ccabandonment" sanctification. But earlier in his
career, he associated it with embracing the carnality and decay of
the world. In coming to admit that one cCmust not deny the body"
(CPP, Ill) Eliot also seems to have come to find in intuition the
cCprinciple of its own self..transcendence" (KE, 166).
Over the course of his career as a poet, then, he moves from a
painful dilemma to a conviction that intuitive experience can be-
must be-included. Ultimatel~ he comes to identify it with God's
love, love that wove an cCintolerable shirt of flame:' This image from
Four Quartets acknowledges a place for Vitalism in his art, just as
the mystics described by Evelyn Underhill sought both Absolutism
and Vitalism in a cCgenuine life process and not [merely] an intellec..
tual speculation:' 3 It is part of a vision of human existence de..
scribed by Eliot's friend, Joseph Chiari, that is cCPlatonic [but also]
essentially Christian. There is no possible contradiction between
the Bergsonian stress on duration as a means to reach an awareness
of existence and continuous becoming, and the Christian stress on
the instant of grace and illumination as a means to reach Eternity.
Christian thought ... is above all existentiaI:'4 But is Four Quartets
really consistent with Eliot's earliest poetic impulses? And are those
impulses really consistent with Bergson's emphasis on duree? That
would involve some rather dramatic changes, it would seem. The
changes, I shall argue, are gradual, the result of a long meditation
begun with Eliot's first work in philosophy.
EliotsEarlier Poetry
At Smith Academ~ St. Louis, in 1905, Eliot wrote a graduation
poem that proposed the school's motto should be CCProgress!"5 He
had been brought up in a household in which cCHerbert Spencer's
generalized theory of evolution [was] regarded as the key to the
mystery of the universe:' 6 As late as 1917 Eliot quotes J.B. Yeats
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(approvingly) that Uin every great poet there is a Herbert Spencer:' 7
It had become abundantly clear by this time, however, that Eliot
would not abide progressivism. uThere never was a time:' he wrote
later, "so completely parochial, so shut off from the past" as those
years immediately following the war (SE, 352).
Eliot's early verse is preoccupied with the role of art in a world
gone mad over "progress:' That is one explanation for his repeated
attempts to propose the Ustudy of history-including language and
literature:' for the good of the "collective mind:' 8 There is a knot of
themes one notices in the Prufrock volume, for example: automa"
tism, regression, powerlessness. Things swim along in a haze or
dream, predetermined, so that characters "are acted" rather than act
themselves:
And I have known the eyes alread~ known them a11-
The eyes that fix you with a formulated phrase,
And when I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin . . . ?
Admittedl~ the issues are many: feminine wiles, the dead end of
the salon world, the deja vu of the guillotined man Udying with a
dying fall / Beneath music from a farther room:' But there is also
plainly an angst about the possibility of freedom.
Eliot's playing the role of the sensitive plant may seem strange,
but there is an element of that in his early work. Action and busi..
ness he rejects-the ushort square fingers stuffing,pipes / And eve"
ning newspapers, and eyes / Assured of certain certainties" (CPP,
13). Instead, he tells us, he is "moved by fancies that are curled /
Around these images and cling: / The notion of some infinitely
gentle / Infinitely suffering thing:' The bits of paper used to curl a
woman's hair; the notion of something (with its wistful air)-these
are the "things" Eliot opposes to the male world of the clock, mone~
business. What good is poetry? "There's nothing in it:' says the
materialistic Mr. Nixon of Pound's "Mauberley:' But Eliot manages
to pack into these verses ominous tones suggesting there will be a
reckoning, a rude awakening: The readers of the uBoston Evening
Transcript" sway in the wind "like a ripe field of corn" ready for the
Grim Reaper.
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There has been an inversion of values, so that the age advances,
as Eliot will later say in uThe Rock:' Uprogressively backwards"
(CPP, 108). Backwards equals degeneration. It also means a pri..
mordial automatism. The street..lamp of uRhapsody on a Windy
Night" beats ulike a fatalistic drum:' The world yields up the ~~secret
of its skeleton, stiff and white:' a form Uhard and curled and ready
to snap:' Crabs scuttle across the ocean bottom in ~~Prufrock:' An..
other crab grips automatically a stick held out in "Rhapsody:' The
moon herself has "lost her memory:' She twists a paper rose.
Some read the poems of this period as part of an argument Eliot
was carrying on with himself about the true relation of memory to
experience. According to such a reading, Eliot arrives at a conclu..
sion that Bergson's intuition is simply not adequate to explain the
problem of experience; he then stops writing such poetry. But I
think we see in these early poems a problem Eliot was having with
the nature of poetic creation itself, to which he was obviously
deeply drawn, but which raised certain unpleasant difficulties. If a
poet does anything at all, he clearly deals in rhythms that (as post..
Darwinian thought and research were making clear) come with the
genetic code of the human being. ~~The greatest poetr)T, like the
greatest prose:' he wrote, has a doubleness; the poet is talking to
you on two planes at once.~~9 Here again is the tension of Bergson's
aesthetics. Ideas and images constitute its first term: Here the issues
of purpose, time, the age's lack of memory and sensitivit)T, its auto"
matic behavior, come forth. The second term is that drumbeat.
In a 1923 article, Eliot specifically connects "drumbeat" to an
evolutionary mechanism essential to poetr)T, saying that drama and
verse have their source in this primordial rhythm and lamenting the
fact that ~~we have lost the drum:' 10 One might have expected a
different sort of proposition from the classicizing thinker who 10"
cated the flower of Western Civilization in Dante's Ital)', rather than
Cro"Magnon's cave. The value of unconscious processes to poetic
creation is no small source of puzzlement in Eliot's criticism. In a
characteristic response to inquiries about his "night..mind:' he
claimed to find it CCquite uninteresting:' 11 But without some contact
with a primitive ground of being, Eliot's other beliefs about poetic
creation make no sense.
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A struggle was clearly going on in his thinking after he returned
to Harvard to do graduate work in philosoph~ And that struggle
did not end with his decision not to complete his Ph.D. Ronald
Bush has said, and I completely agree, that Eliot's work in philos..
ophy was part of an attempt to set the vocabulary of rationalism,
particularly of Spencer, at odds with itself: UEliot's drift toward phi..
losoph~ striking even before the subject became the serious study
of his postgraduate years, was precisely an attempt to justify the
value of the affections:' 12 And yet Eliot's verse expresses revulsion
at the carnal world out of which the affections gro\\T, so that the
"protozoic slime:' usummer sweat:' "rank feline smells:' and ccbees /
With hairy bellies" trouble the poems of 1920 (CPP, 24, 33 ..34).
It has been enough for some to see Eliot in this period as already
feeling the pull of the Church, since his commitments seem so di..
vided. He seeks an art of primordial rhythms, and yet he seems to
feel a revulsion toward human sexuality (hardly 'separable from the
drumbeat itself). But that will not explain much, especially if a com"
mitment to the Church is seen as a rejection of carnal impulses on
theological grounds. The vocabulary may become more subdued,
after 1927, but the issue seems to have remained the same: Eliot's
stance as a poet and critic was to make a rationale for the life of the
heart. It is precisely here that the ccnew vocabulary" of Hulme and
Bergson came to hand. But Bergson was the heir of Spencer's evo"
lutionism, and Eliot had become convinced that in some matters
there was no such thing as CCprogress:' ~~We have the right to take
human value as the standard for natural evolution, but what stan"
dard have we for religion or society?" 13 He had not achieved, yet, a
standpoint from which the change, carnalit~ growth, decay of
which poetic creation is a part could be made sense of. He had been
trying, through verse and prose, and through the very study of his ..
tor~ language, and literature he recommended to all.
In the process, he was constructing, bit by bit, a vocabulary of
symbols peculiar to himself, yet drawn from the times he saw as
needing to be rescued. One may think of his poetry and criticism
taken together as a vast, sometimes self..contradictory attempt at
performing for culture what uanalytic psychology attempts to do for
the individual mind:' 14 Eliot brings before the reader images of
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things discovered in reading, discovered also in something that
must have been a kind of ~~night"mind:' Many have noted the qual..
ity of courage in Eliot's writing. It impresses one over and over: his
stamina and fortitude. UBy this moment, and this onl~ we have ex"
isted / Which is not to be found in our obituaries:' Eliot wrote in
The Wzste Land, speaking of a moment of risk, daring. One finds
him daring to risk a great deal at every point in his career, and it
would be hard to think of anything more daring than attempting to
bring into the twentieth ..century poetic vocabulary what Bergson
brought into its philosophic one: Christian mysticism.
Eliot's early work brings the creative act to the table, looks at it
lying there, ~~etherized:' and seeks ways to breathe life back into the
bod}'. uPrufrock" images the danger of bringing unconscious pro..
cesses to consciousness: uHuman voices wake us, and we drown:'
And The Wzste Land shows us a world subject to atavism. The
nymphs have become bored typists, smoothing hair Uwith auto"
matic hand" and setting a record on the gramophone. The world
these poems examine is a URat's Alley:' a cuI de sac. ~~The Hollow
Men" shows the final crackup, rendered in Thomistic vocabular~
but with a pathology of creativity that is pure Bergson:
Between the desire
And the spasm
Between the potency
And the existence
Between the essence
And the descent
Falls the Shadow
For thine is the Kingdom
For thine is
Life is
For thine is the
To fill in the blanks, compare this with the description of free con"
sciousness Bergson provides: UBetween the idea and the action,
some hardly perceptible intermediate processes come in . . . the
feeling of effort. And from the idea to the effort, from the effort to
the act, the progress has been so continuous that we cannot say
where the idea and the effort end, and where the act begins" (TFW,
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211). If the world was engendered in a vital ccspasm:' then the trans"
mission of energy is cCbreaking up" (in the parlance of the aviator)
and revealing horrifying gaps, CCgesture without motion:' Life be..
comes cCdeath's other kingdom" (my italics).
Eliot admitted in an interview in 1953 that he had thought his
poetry was over after cCThe Hollow Men:' 15 But forcing the moment
to its crisis did leave, after all, something else to sa~ the possibility
of a place to begin again. As I chart Eliot's poetic career, cCThe HoI..
low Men" represents the nadir of his reaction to the loss of possi ..
bilities for poetr~ a loss being sustained on two fronts: first, the lack
of value placed upon cultural heritage-the loss of memory-
within Eliot's own culture; second, the lack of a standpoint from
which to make sense of the chaos and difficulty of moral and intel..
lectual growth. Was such growth possible at all? The answer was
not encouraging. And it was particularly not encouraging so long
as the role of duree (experienced time) in poetic creation remained
unclear.
But through adopting a vocabulary of mystical awareness, Eliot
began to bring to the center of his poetic activity the intuitive act,
the knowledge made available in fits of forgetting. Thus, he began
to create verse that turned more and more toward the values of
openendedness and primary experience. He finally finds a point of
view from which chaotic and contradictory experiences can be or"
ganized, and one that has the cCdoublesided" awareness by which
alone one can fix value.
The crucial point in the development of this vocabulary and this
point of view was reached when Eliot became a communicant
member of the Anglican Church in 1927. But as A.D. Moody and
other biographers have noted, the change was a gradual one, and
the results in Eliot's life and work were not felt with cataclysmic
swiftness. Indeed, one might fairly say that Eliot's ccdrift toward phi..
losophy" begun around 1910 in Paris was completed in his coming
fully into possession of the tradition of Christian mysticism. (Recall
that he identifies Bergsonism as ccmysticism" even then.) Very early
on, when reviewing Russell's Mysticism and Logic, he had decided
that philosophy was not a matter of stating laws, but rather of cCin"
sight" and cCvision:' 16 And in 1952 he looked back on this period
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as one in which the philosopher went off the track in trying to com"
pensate for U a feeling of inferiority to the exact scientist:~ As it
turned out, he went on, the root cause for his ~~dissatisfaction with
philosophy as a profession-I now believe to lie in the divorce of
philosophy from theology:~ 17 Hindsight is often inaccurate, but
contradiction of Eliot~s self"evaluation would involve a great deal of
dichotomizing of his career, the kind that so many have unjustifia"
bly performed before.
Rather than a reactionary stance toward human failings and car"
nality in general and poetic creation in particular, Eliot~s move into
the Church appears to have sanctified a troubling drive he had been
writing about for years. The ~~soul of Man must quicken to crea"
tion:~ as he wrote in ~~The Rock":
Out of the formless stone, when the artist united himself with
stone,
Spring always new forms of life, from the soul of the man that
is joined to the soul of stone;
Out of the meaningless practical shapes of all that is living or
lifeless
Joined with the artisfs eye, new life, new form, new colour.
Out of the sea of sound the life of music,
Out of the slimy mud of words, out of the sleet and hail of
verbal imprecisions,
Approximate thoughts and feelings, words that have taken the
place of thoughts and feelings,
There spring the perfect order of speech, and the beauty of
incantation.
[CPP, 111~12].
Here the equations have changed. Intuition and evolution take their
place in a human order that is part of the divine: uThe LORD who
created must wish us to create" (ibid.). This represents an accept..
ance that poetry is, as Heidegger says, the primal language, not just
u one tool which man possesses along with many others; it is only
language that makes possible our standing within openness to what
is:~ 18 The meaningless practical shapes are remade to a purpose,
and speech is evolved out of the sea's coma, carnality's mud. Here
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also is the Bergsonian imperative that God undertook to Hcreate
creators" (TS, 243).
There is a reconciliation underwa~ here, between temporal life
and that Hfinal" standpoint from which alone progress may be said
to be occurring at all. Ulf the progress of mankind is to continue as
long as man survives on this earth:' Eliot wrote in 1932, Uprogress
becomes merely change; for the values of man will change, and a
world of changed values is valueless to us-just as we, being a part
of the past, will be valueless to it:' But that is not his last word: HWe
must believe, first, that the human race can, if it will, improve in ..
definitely; that it can improve both its material well ..being and its
spiritual capacities. We must also have a conception of a perfect
society attainable on earth:' 19 The Choruses from The Rock affirm
this. ~~What life have you if you have not life together?" they ask.
And they assert: Hyou must not deny the body" (CPP, 101, Ill).
Eliot will have it both ways, that man exists in a tension, at Han
infinite remove from perfection:' but also knowing that U perfection
is as nearly attainable for man here and now as it ever will be:' 20
The reconciliation taking place around the time of Eliot's con"
version has not been seen clearly for what it is, completion of a
synthesizing of two competing symbolic systems and conceptual
frameworks: on the one hand, that of duree, evolution, and intui..
tion; on the other, that of the Absolute, finalit)T, Greek fate. This
synthesis was attempted, as I have shown, as early as his 1913.. 14
paper on Bergson. In the later twenties, the synthesis begins to
come about in clear terms. Eliot's move into the Church coincides
with his increasing reliance on the vocabulary of intuition, which
he now allows to have its way with him.
Four Quartets and Mysticism
In his study of Eliot and Bradle~ Hugo Roeffaers concluded that,
for Eliot, the ultimate goal of our understanding must be the Htran ..
scendence of immediate experience:' but that this analysis cannot
depart finally from what it transcends.21 Roeffaers's view simply
conforms to Eliot's that ~'we cannot banish becoming any more than
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we can banish being:'22 But that has not stopped a small but pow"
erfullobby in American criticism from calling Eliot's career a retreat
from experience that concludes with a poem which revolts against
the very human genius that made it. I am speaking of Leavis, Ishak,
Bergsten, Vendler, and Nuttall, who find that Eliot's conversion was
a reactionarist movement adversely affecting his poetry-turning it
into preaching. ~~[It] is not faith but the peculiar combination of a
covert reliance on faith with an ostentatious (and censorious) ratio..
nalism" that bothers N uttal1. 23 Helen Vendler characterizes Four
Quartets as Eliot's Ecclesiastical Sonnets. 24 And Floyd Watkins, in
The Flesh and the Word, says that Eliot simply reversed all his po"
etic values, becoming abstract, talk~ and intrusive.25 Even A.D.
Moody finds Eliot Hdwindles" to a man of letters, his poetry pur"
suing Hthe ideal at the expense of the actual:' 26
This view of Eliot's career, though not universal, has still been
very powerful in shaping attitudes and critical intentions. Thus, we
have a plethora of books on Eliot's early career; not nearly so much
on the late, when it is assumed that metaphysics simply swamped
the boat. But it is the mystical and not the metaphysical that Eliot
finds closely allied to his theory of poetry.27 ~~ Poet who is also a
metaphysician;' he had written in 1924, His conceivable as a uni ..
corn or a wyvern is conceivable [for] such a poet would be a mon"
ster:' 28 Eliot's later poetry does not codify his ~~seduction" by the
Church away from his earlier poetic values. To invoke the idea of a
whole new aesthetic stance to explain the sublimation of experience
in Four Quartets is to go badly wrong in reading his whole oeuvre.
Bergson wrote to William James in 1909 that he would have to
make a large place in his philosophy for the unconscious, Hfor there
is a certain consoling emotion drawn [from there]:' 29 For Eliot,
from the beginning, this consolation had to be drawn out, but it
had to be reached someho~ and this is the work of many poems
and essays up to and including Four Quartets. If some find the
poem less a consolation than a consolation prize, that is perhaps
because they have misunderstood the mystical language as having
metaphysical intentions. Perhaps it would have been wiser for Eliot
to stay with the original epigraph he had planned for HBurnt Nor..
ton;' taken from Pickwick Papers: HWhat a rum thing time is, ain't
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it Neddy?"30 That tone might have won a larger audience, though
not made a better poem.
The epigraphs from Heraclitus on which Eliot settled, and the
metaphysical vocabulary of the opening stanzas, with their illusion
of syllogistic reasoning, do set a tone of scholasticism, but it will
rapidly be broken:
Time present and time past
Are perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
If the past never ceases to exist, every future state will f:f:contain" the
past-and the present moment (which will then be past, as well).
If time is not chaos, the seeds of the future were contained in the
past. But if we take these interdependent propositions to heart, we
confront a world in which nothing can change, in which everything
is eternally present. As Bergson says, if we give to the concatenation
of memories the Hobligation of containing and being contained,
which only applies to the collection of bodies instantaneously per"
ceived in space:' we falsify our experience of duree (MM, 193).
But there is change. Turning abruptly from this dead end,
f:f:Bumt Norton" admits frankly that we are on the wrong track
trying to Hthink" time. It must be intuited. The poem does not pre"
tend to be Hfinal": HMy words echo / Thus in your mind. / But to
what purpose?" This admission is followed by an equally frank in..
vitation: HOther echoes / Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow?" The
bird..voice evokes a siren"song, as in uMarina:' or with Philomel in
The Wlste Land. It is an open deception, then, this f:f:deception of
the thrush ... our first world:' In f:1\nimula" our f:f:first world" was
a sensuous one close to nature, but blind to its meaning. The bird
will claim to show us blinding truth: uGo, go, go, said the bird:
human kind / Cannot bear very much reality:' But there is another
truth behind the sensuous one associated with transgression in the
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Garden, an echo which Bergson says is Ctrthe earliest thing in the
memory of each of us, as it is in the memory of mankind" (TS, 1).
.r.rBumt Norton:' then, stirs up the dust of history; memory; desire,
guilt-and lets it settle.
A second sort of truth emerges. In the scene following the bird's
invitations, a suprasensible and paradoxical vision is described, full
of unseen presences and Ctrunheard music:' This latter is a riddle
.r.rDry Salvages" unravels for us. Unheard music is music intuited,
Ctrheard so deeply / That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
/ While the music lasts" (CPP, 136). CCBurnt Norton" presents this
flash:
Dry the pool, dry concrete, brown..edged,
And the pool was filled with water out of sunlight,
And the lotos rose, quietl)T, quietl)T,
And the surface glittered out of the heart of light,
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool.
Then a cloud passed, and the pool was empt)T.
This creative heart is the same Absolute to which Eliot appealed in
his 1910 paper-the Hmenue Monnaie ad infinitum:' But here it
expresses what could not be expressed then, a feeling for its creative
vitalit~ a making of its truth more fully real to us. The thrush's order
to depart translates this moment into a decided sense of loss. When
lines echoing parts of the opening lines make their appearance
CCTime past and time future ... CC), the affirmation that they point
to one end CCalways present" is tempered. Earlier, that end seemed
likely to be Death. No\\', paradoxicall~ it is Life as well.
But why the Garden, the thrush? Who are CCthey"? The thrush
is one of those carefully chosen symbols that resonate with Eliot's
earlier work (like uMarina"). He hoped to tie together the poetic
vocabulary of his work in this way. In 1931 he had written about
Harry Crosby that he was most interested in Crosby's usearch for a
personal symbolism of imagery ... a set of symbols which should
relate each of his poems to the others, to himself:' But, Eliot says,
cCeven to speak of a cset of symbols' is clumsy; for such a phrase
suggests a lifeless, not a living and developing scheme:' Eliot was
seeking for himself that continuous development of personality he
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associated with Shakespeare's career, and he pursued it through
symbolism because ~~symbolism is that to which the word tends
both in religion and poetry; the incarnation of meaning in fact:'31
He hoped to create a poetry that evolved, organicall~ and he based
his theory on the Bergsonian idea that poetry furnishes U conscious..
ness with an immaterial body in which to incarnate itself" (CE,
265).
There are, of course, personal experiences behind the poem. It
grew out of lines discarded from Murder in the Cathedral and The
Rock. Written in 1935, it was published as the last poem in Col..
lected Poems, April 1936. ~~Bumt Norton'''s beginning coincides
with the inception of a project Eliot gave considerable thought to
over the next six years, Old Possums Book of Practical Cats, which
I have elsewhere defended against charges of ~~preacheI')T."32 Eliot's
fascination with the children he heard in the garden at Burnt Nor..
ton and the empty concrete pools becomes a major symbol of thirst
for renewal; and in his children's poems he labored at more than
merely Upractising his technique behind the mask of the comic ver"
sifier:'33 What happened in the garden obviously touched him and
offered him a symbol for the kind of rejuvenating experience for
which he said he was longing, one that would renew him as a poet.
In his foreword to Chiari's book on Symbolism, Eliot remarked
that the poetic movements culminating in what he calls "modem
writing" led to a Upeculiar development of self..consciousness:' 34 I
take it Eliot had in mind here both a profound artistic self..
knowledge and an open acknowledgement of artificiality C~my
words echo thus in your mind") in the poem itself. There is a dia..
logue going on-one might almost say it is simply a dialectical pro..
cedure-in Four Quartets about modes of knowing and the poem's
status in regard to ~~knowing:' (Recall that in his early essay on
Bergson Eliot speaks of seeking truth as like trying to catch a
glimpse of yourself with your eyes closed.) UBurnt Norton" enacts,
insofar as it can, a process of awakening to the meaning of an intu..
itive experience. And that process is reflective C~my intuition is re"
flection, not feeling:' says Bergson). The second section of the
poem distances us as far as possible, in subject matter, diction, and
rhythm, from the experience that has posed the paradoxical vision
96 Bergson, Eliot, ~ American Literature
of permanent change. We look at things cosmicall~ as they are Hfig ..
ured in the drift of stars:' But still, we are looking at Hcirculation;'
the fCtrilling wire in the blood;' the rhythm of the drum. This is one
aspect of history-reconciled in the long vie\\', a pattern repeating
Has before:'
That is the view out of time; but we live in time:
Time past and time future
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose..garden ...
Be remembered; involved with past and future.
Only through time time is conquered.
To be in time is to intuit duration: HWe do not think real time, but
we live it" (CE, 46). In this, Eliot's poem attempts to make more
fully real the teachings of the Christian mystics, like St. John of the
Cross, a significant figure in both Four Quartets and The Two
Sources of Morality and Religion. But when one is in time one is
not rationally conscious of it (to be conscious is not to be in time).
It is like trying to catch a glimpse of yourself with your eyes closed.
Evelyn Underhill wrote about the parallel between Bergsonian
intuition and mystical experience: C'Bergson ... comes as a media ..
tor between these inarticulate explorers of the Infinite and the map"
loving human mind [and] brings their principles and their practices
into immediate relation with philosophy: telling us, in almost Au ..
gustinian language, how great and valid may be the results of that
new direction of mental movement:'35 Underhill explains the mys ..
tical experience as a fCdilitation of the whole personality; which,
normally screwed down by action, expands;' and as an act of im ..
mersion-a conscious letting go in which, as Bergson says Hwill
and vision become one:' fCShaken to its depths by the current which
is about to sweep it forward:' Bergson explains, Hthe soul ceases to
revolve around itself" (TS, 218). It thus achieves a vision of Now
so much richer than the fCnow" of ordinary consciousness, that the
mystic Hcan only describe it as 'partaking of the character of Eter..
nity'" (Underhill). In this vision, the soul realizes itself as a micro..
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cosm of the universe, ever..moving, never..resting. It can only de..
scribe the sensation as like that produced ~~when we, and the object
on which our attention is fixed, are moving at the same pace:' Thus
the paradoxical vocabulary of stillness and immobility: uHence
comes a persistently static element in the highest of man's apprehen"
sions of God:' And the mystic's contemplation is precisely a udisci ..
plined and developed intuition:' 36
Some doubt that such intuition has anything to do with Four
Quartets. They see in the poem Bradley's Absolute, and they point
to Eliot's mordant skepticism. But compare Four Quartets to Un"
derhill's work, including her little books of poems, Immanence
(1912) and Theophanies (1916), which try to get the mystic expe..
rience into verse. The first speaks of the ~~friendship of the happy
dead:' whose message comes in (Cwhispers" while clouds sweep
across the sky; it speaks of uthe changeless pivot of the passing
years:' of the prophets' song after which we run like Uan enchanted
child that hastes to catch the sun:' It also speaks of the transcenden..
tal journey along (Cstarry paths to the utmost verge of sky;' and home
again.37 The parallels are not accidental. They stem from a common
vocabulary and goal.
Theophanies contains more such parallels. Tree leaves are lik..
ened to children, branches give a rush of joy in Uhigh summer:'
which (Csings" in its cells, its ~crhythmical cycle of life:' In a garden
we hear ~~wordless whispers" symbolized by a bird, ~~the silent min..
strel of reality:' In its synesthetic verbiage, Miss Underhill's verse
stands in rather startling relation to Eliot's. Clearl~ they share a vi..
sion; but where Eliot manages to give his thrush sensuality and
etherealit)T, Underhill only manages the bald claim, uI think the
thrush's voice is more like God's:'38 Through a traditional symbol..
ism, Underhill sought to make the mystic way more fully real to her
readers. She failed as a poet, but certainly succeeded with her pop"
ular books, Mysticism and Practical Mysticism (1915).
Four Quartets, on the other hand, succeeds. In fact, one might
think Eliot is speaking, in his mode, to the same audience Under..
hill addresses in Practical Mysticism: UIt is to you, practical man,
reading these pages as you rush through the tube to the practical
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work of rearranging unimportant fragments of your universe, that
this message so needed by your time-or rather by your want of
time-is addressed.... Though it is likely that the accusation will
annoy you, you are already in fact a potential contemplative:'39
UBurnt Norton'''s third and fourth sections bring home the lesson
to such an audience, that Utime and the bell have buried the day:'
Dig it up, drop out of circulation, the poem seems to sa~ and don't
go riding the tube straight down.
The final section of the poem sounds a note of despair of finding
a language adequate to this altered sense of time-the mystic's.
Eliot seems to be looking for something very like the gold coin
Bergson describes:
only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.
In architecture, Bergson says, Hin the midst of this startling immo..
bility [there are] effects analogous to rhythm" (TFW, 15 .. 16). In
language, where are such durable shapes to be had? The problem
is not really different. Words, like stones, cCcrack and break.... De..
cay with imprecision, will not stay in place, will not stay stilI:' The
poet's problem of construction does not change the facts, however.
And if his form fails, that suggests only the limit of the individual
and his language.
The experience on which the entire sequence of Four Quartets
has been built is as elusive as it is absolute. It leaves us with a
profoundly unsettled vision-one might call it cCbicameraI:' in the
sense that it legislates two seemingly contradictory sorts of language
that determine what sorts of experience are available, for one is
open, the other very definitely closed:
The detail of the pattern is movement,
As in the figure of the ten stairs.
Desire itself is movement
Not in itself desirable;
Love is itself unmoving,
Only the cause and end of movement,
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Timeless, and undesiring
Except in the aspect of time . . .
This passage has a flatness of rhythm (as of someone tiredly climb..
ing stairs) reinforced by recurrence of forms of "move" that do
not-they swa~ perhaps. The riddles here are incantatory and tra"
ditional. The rhythm is deadening.
But with the return of the image from the garden scene the verse
itself becomes more lively:
Sudden in a shaft of sunlight
Even while the dust moves
There rises the hidden laughter
Of children in the foliage
Quick no~ here, no~ always-
Ridiculous the waste sad time
Stretching before and after.
"Burnt Norton" has invited us to open the doors of perception. The
task of the three subsequent Quartets is to turn us back to the door
by which we entered. The world we see at "Little Gidding"'s con..
elusion is a transfigured one in which history may be defined not
as a nightmare, a chaos, but rather as an unending process of self..
discover~ full of suffering, certainl~ but also full of growth and di..
vine love.
That the world should finally be one of growth and evolution is
the lesson these poems try to embody; the very fact that the poet
conceives of his task as one of "embodiment" should strike chords
in our memory of Eliot's contact with Bergsonian thought. And the
techniques of oxymoron and paradox to communicate the intuition
of the ineffable fit as well. Negation is used in the first two sections
of "Dry Salvages:' for example, to assert the blending of ideas which
(as Bergson has said) ~~when once dissociated, seem to exclude one
another as logically contradictory terms" (TFW, 136; my italics).
The future is ~~futureless:' The wailing "soundless:' "Unprayable"
prayers are sent up. And these coinages are part of the poetry of
God.
In "Dry Salvages" too we find what seems to be a direct refer"
ence to Bergsonian philosophy:
[CPP,26].
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It seems, as one becomes older,
That the past has another pattern, and ceases to be mere
sequence
Or even development; the latter a partial fallac~
Encouraged by superficial notions of evolution,
Which becomes, in the popular mind, a means of disowning
the past.
Notice that the idea of udevelopment" is a upartial fallacy" promul..
gated in the upopular mind:' Evolutionism has been used as an
excuse to ignore the past (what's done is done). Those who know
better are nevertheless also being stripped, like Glaucus; they are
exorcising, not abandoning the past. Age brings detachment, de..
tachment a revelation of the past no longer covered over by ucurrents
of action:' Strong currents deceive. The argument parallels Berg..
son's: What serves our practical ends covers over truth. What the
organism wants-survival, pleasure-dictates a covering of the
world and the self, a regression.
That is precisely why Eliot points out at this moment in the
poem that when we review the past we tend to think of the uvery
good dinner:' the moment of happiness. We have forgotten the
crude, primordial self, threatening to break through: uBehind
the assurance / Of recorded history" lies always the U primitive ter..
ror:' This should teach us to fear the recrudescence of Apeneck
Sweeney:
(The lengthened shadow of a man
Is histor~ said Emerson
Who had not seen the silhouette
Of Sweeney straddled in the sun.)
This is to sa~ as Bergson did, that underneath, modern man is es"
sentially the same as his Uremotest ancestors" (TS, 262). The only
thing, clearl~ that can stand between us and this reversion to type
is our knowledge of the past.
The fifth section of UDry Salvages" reiterates the principle of
mystic intuition. It is something only given in cCself"surrender:' The
saint gives up all hope of anything beyond Now, and gains under..
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standing. What have we? UHints and guesses, / Hints followed by
guesses:' the poet says. But the Uhint half..guessed, the gift half
understood, is Incarnation:' Not the doctrine of incarnation, but
incarnation itself. This is the life that leaves us with what Harr~ in
The Family Reunion, calls the upartial observation of one's own au"
tomatism" and the Upartial anesthesia of suffering without feeling"
(CPP, 235). We only half guess the meaning of incarnation be..
cause we only rarely penetrate to the level of being where we can
sense our confluence with the divine. When we can hold still-and
for most of us this involves a "distraction fit"-we commit the upos"
sible, but exceptional" mystical act (TS, 7). It is a passive conquer..
ing, a quiet merging with and acceptance of the tides and currents.
The Four Quartets insist on a particular mode of perception. If
we try to uconverse with spirits ... release omens / By sortilege, or
tea leaves:' we get nowhere. We cannot uriddle the inevitable with
playing cards:' But there is something we can do in the experience,
even if there is nothing exactly to be done with it:
right action is freedom
From past and future also
For most of us, this is the aim
Never here to be realized;
We are only undefeated
Because we have gone on trying.
Right action is freedom-it has that openness that springs from the
uwhole personality:' It is wise action.
And uwisdom:' Eliot wrote in uGoethe as Sage:' is a unative gift
of intuition, ripened and given application by experience:' If Ian..
guage is generally inadequate to communicating anything, still uthe
language of poetry is the language most capable of communicating
wisdom" (OPP, 257, 264). That is because poetry communicates
on two levels at once; like music, it touches a substratum in our
being. The final poem of Four Quartets offers what it can of wisdom
about past and future and Now.
Eliot had visited the chapel at Little Gidding in May 1936. The
town had been the site of a religious colony formed in 1625 by
Nicholas Ferrar, an Anglican priest and an acquaintance of George
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Herbert.40 The colony sought escape from the war. It survived until
Charles I's rout at Naseby in 1647. Charles is said to have prayed
at the chapel afterwards. Ruined by fire, like Burnt Norton, the
chapel was restored in the nineteenth centur~ Eliot's choice of this
place, a failed community where a doomed king once stopped, has
been cited as evidence that he believes in seeking out lost causes
for the sake of joining ranks with the "undefeated:'41 But the choice
of place is not perverse. The very point is that here and now are not
important in themselves. The poem wishes to establish ho\\T, in
Bergson's words, "detachment from each particular thing becomes
attachment to life in general" (TS, 201).
At the same time, the choice of Little Gidding is not meaning"
less. It is a place nearest to death, to consecrated ground and his..
tory. Suspending our animation, we enter the world of the dead:
"What the dead had no speech for, when living, / They can tell you,
being dead: the communication / Of the dead is tongued with fire
beyond the language of the living:' Poetry itself, in the sense that it
speaks for what lies buried in each of us, is a tongue of the dead.
The poem's second section plays on the alchemist's quadrapartite
cosmogony to give a litany: ccdeath of air ... death of earth ... the
death of water and fire:' In the terza rima section based on Inferno,
15, the poet meets a loiterer who looks like "some dead master /
Whom I had known, forgotten, half recalled / Both one and many:'
Thus, the "compound ghost" represents a colony of the not..living
who reflect us, in passing: cCSo I assumed a double part, and cried
/ And heard another's voice cry: cCWhat! are you here?' / Although
we were not. I was still the same, / Knowing myself yet being some..
one other:'
This dedoublement is at the heart of the intuition, the revelation.
The words themselves have engendered the world in which they are
heard. They hold up a mirror, in which we see a "face still forming:'
yet the words suffice CCto compel the recognition they preceded:'
This conundrum of linguistic creation acknowledges a fundamental
fact: There is a sense in which the moment creates itself. In renew"
ing language, the poet performs the office of renewing contact with
experience and offering the protection of "aftersight and foresight:'
If one assumes that the object of the poem is to reveal to us ourselves
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(the Bergsonian assumption) then the uface still forming" is ours.
We are perpetually Becoming. As the poem concludes, it explicitly
tells us that uhistory may be servitude, / History may be freedom:'
It depends upon the mode of grasping it. The actors in even the
most vicious conflicts are eventually ufolded in a single party" to
become ~~united in the strife which divided them:'
What we receive from the dead, finall)T, is a usymbol perfected in
death:' Here Eliot presses home the idea that the symbol incarnates
umeaning in fact:' Helen Gardner's reproduction of the ULittle Gid..
ding" manuscript shows that at this point Eliot cancelled lines deal ..
ing with Shakespeare's Richard III, and specifically with Richard's
defeat, when his enemies discover his crown in a thornbush.42 This
would have made the point, but too negativel)T, perhaps: There are
no victors. Instead, Eliot chose to leave the specific mention of the
uspectre of a Rose" in lines above to hover until the poem's last line,
when it would be united with the fire. That fire, the subject of the
poem's penultimate section, is matter using itself up: We can choose
only ~~pyre or pyre:' If we are literally fired matter-energy using
itself up-we still hope for a redemption from passion. We wear an
intolerable shirt of flame. Eliot refers apparently to the poisoned
robe given by Nessus to the wife of Heracles, which she in turn
gave to her husband, believing it would increase his love for her.
Heracles, however, killed himself because of the pain.43 The con"
trast is drawn between human and divine passion. But the death
toward which these symbols point is not a punctuation mark. It is
a mode of being, a seeing and feeling that transfigures. We can
choose, that is, only our kinds of fire; but the choice is everything.
ULittle Gidding'''s conclusion adopts a self..consciousness about
endings and beginnings that reconciles the poet and his language
to a world in which the only finality is a continuous Becoming:
to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from. And every phrase
And sentence that is right (where every word is at home,
Taking its place to support the others,
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious,
An easy commerce of the old and ne~
The common word exact without vulgarit)T,
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The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together)
Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning,
Every poem an epitaph. And any action
Is a step to the block, to the fire, down the sea's throat
Or to an illegible stone: and that is where we start.
Think on your end (memento mori, always present), and move in
measure to the rhythm of creation, the complete consort, dancing
together. The poet takes his place with those who accept, not deny
life, knowing that every vital action is a leap to a fall but neverthe..
less part of the creative impulse of the universe.
The mystic who udies" to this world is born to it again in a union
with God: ~~We die with the dying ... we are born with the dead:'
This rebirth, for Eliot, is symbolized in the return of the past to vital
presence: uSee, they return, and bring us with them:' The past, as
Bergson says, is not really dead; it has only ceased to be useful to
us. But ~~Little Gidding" establishes that use-uliberation:' Real
histor~ like myth, is immanent. To intuit this life is to bring past
and present into a timeless act of thought: uSo, while the light fails
/ On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel/History is now and
England:' Strangel~ we return to this world, knowing that our out..
ward explorations lead to a revelation of self, and that the self ~~van"
ishes" as it merges with creation.
This is the key to the equilibrium which Being and Becoming
finally strike in Eliot's late work, an acceptance of the mystical con"
sciousness described by Underhill and others: UThe struggle of the
self to disentangle itself from illusion and attain the Absolute is a
life..struggle. Hence, it will and must exhibit the freedom and orig"
inality of life; will, as a process, obey artistic rather than scientific
laws. [The] self, always changing, moving, struggling-always, in
fact, becoming-alive in every fibre, related at once to the unreal
and to the real [is] with its growth in true being, ever more con"
scious of the contrast between them:'44 The self we see in Four
Quartets is one of dual consciousness, a self both in and out of time,
and a self conscious of the tension between what is true in time on
earth and what must be true outside this time and above this earth.
The poem represents the exploration and resolution of the crucial
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issue of Eliot's career as a poet. That issue is of continuous impor;
tance to him over a period spanning the two World Wars. Its
conclusion allowed Eliot to set down, for practical purposes, the
poet's pen.
FIVE
Eliot, Bergson, and the
Southern Critics
[The past] will find strength to cross the threshold of
consciousness in all cases where we renounce the interests
of effective action to replace ourselves, so to speak, in the
life of dreams. . . . The body, always turned towards action,
has for its essential function to limit, with a view to action,
the life of the spirit.
-Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory
~ In Reactionary Essays on Poetry and Ideas (1936), Allen Tate
defends 1:5. Eliot; Tate rails against the umodern desire to judge an
art scientificall~ practicall~ industrially:' and claims poetry is not to
be judged as a Upragmatic instrument:' He goes on to deny that The
mzste Land is ua satire on the unscientific values of the past:'
Rather, in Tate's vie~ the poem satirizes the idea that man has fi ..
nally found truth in science. Tate praises (in the same volume) the
way in which l:l\sh Wednesday" "succeeds in creating the effect of
immediate experience by means of a broken and distracted rhythm:'
(He refers to the passage beginning uIf the word is lost . . :') He
also says that upoetry finds its true usefulness in its perfect inutility,
a focus of repose for the well ..driven intellect that constantly shakes
the equilibrium of persons and societies with its unrelieved imposi"
tion of partial formulas upon the world:' 1
These patently Bergsonian terms had gotten into the vocabulary
of Tate, Warren, and Ransom, each of whom defended TS. Eliot at
some length during the late thirties and early forties. That is no
coincidence. We know how enormous was Eliot's direct influence
on the Southern New Critics generally (despite the original baffle..
ment and lack of appreciation for Eliot among the Fugitives of the
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twenties), and on a number of critics who wrote for the Kenyon
Review, like Empson, Warren, Tate, and Brooks, in particular.
Many of them, like Ransom, had been reading Bergson themselves.
William Handy noted two decades ago the Kantian heritage of the
Southern New Critics and their adaptation of Bergsonian aesthetic
vocabulary.2 They clearly use that vocabulary to argue the validity
of aesthetic experience as a mode of knowing.3 In this, they follow
in Eliot's footsteps, disseminating Bergsonian principles of critical
and literary theory among American writers of the thirties and for"
ties.
Ransom's The New Criticism (1941) also defends Eliot. The
one complaint he has about Eliot's work, which he praises for rec"
ognizing the Hgnomic truths" of poetr~ is that Eliot does not go far
enough in the direction of defending poetic knowing as another
mode of cognition. He makes it clear that he does not wish to de..
nigrate scientific knowing; only to establish the legitimacy of a dif..
ferent mode.4 The argument was one he had already elaborated in
The Worlds Body (1938):
The aesthetic moment appears as a curious moment of suspension;
between the Platonism in us, which is militant, always sciencing and
devouring, and a starved inhibited aspiration towards innocence
which, if it could only be free, would like to know the object as it might
of its own accord reveal itself. The poetic impulse is not free, yet it
holds out stubbornly against science for the enjoyment of its images.
It means to reconstitute the world of perceptions. Finall~ there is sug..
gested some such formula as the following:
Science gratifies a rational or practical impulse and exhibits the
minimum of perception. Art gratifies a perceptual impulse and exhib..
its the minimum of reason.
The heritage of Ransom's approach is clear. He speaks about a Hfor..
mula:' He argues for two modes of mental life, one practical (that
is, intentional) and scientific, the other perceptual. He uses the term
CCPlatonism" to refer to the ratiocinative side of this dichotom~ and
suggests that there is another cClogic" (poetry is not free) not the
logic of Platonism. Thus, the volume is filled with the argument
that Hscientific predication concludes an act of attention, but mira..
culism initiates one;' and that Hthe predication of Metaphysical po..
108 Bergson, Eliot, ~ American Literature
etry is true enough. It is not true like history:' And that aesthetic
attitudes Hmake an opposition to the utilitarian and scientific atti,
tudes and, I think, to the moral ones:' 5 (The last phrase rehearses
Eliot's and Bergson's position that art must not practice in the moral
sphere.)
That is as much as to say that truth can be represented in two
ways; your representation depends upon your mode. One can look
(intuit) or grasp (analyze). Poetry is based on the former mode. If
there were any doubt that Ransom's perceptualism bases itself on a
Bergsonian intuition of the object, he clears the matter up: Poetry
returns us to a state in which we are Hlooking, marvelling, and rev'
elling in the thick dinglich substance that has just received strange
representation:' In sentiment, we move close to the object in a Hnon..
utilitarian way:' It is not cCuseful, nor moral, nor even disciplinary;
it is simply aesthetic" and seeks only to know its object: HSentiment
is aesthetic, aesthetic is cognitive, and the cognition is of the object
as an individual:' 6
Ransom and the contemporaries he gathered together through
the Kenyon Review were engaged in the struggle to justify art as
Hspecially brilliant but detached fragments of knowledge:'7 They
clearly sensed their kinship with Eliot, and not particularly with
that other American expatriate, Ezra Pound. That is because Eliot
spoke so directly to their issue, and on so many occasions provided
the leading review, set up the targets, identified those who were
coming closest to the mark. The Kenyon Review in its inception
(1939) simply codified what was already a clear pattern in the crit,
icism of a number of American writers, many of them members of
the then ..dispersed Agrarian movement. Like Tate, Ransom had
moved by 1938 far in the direction of accepting a technological
society. The World's Body does not contain a single essay that ad..
dresses Agrarian principles for living a balanced life. Eliot himself
had exhibited an inchoate preference for agrarianism. One finds it
still lingering in passages of Notes Towards the Definition of Culture
(1948), and this may have been one of the elements that drew Ran ..
som and other Agrarians, like Davidson and Warren, in his direc'
tion. But by the late thirties the Southern New Critics (and through
the Kenyon Review a number of others) had already gone beyond
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Eliot in asserting the argument for a poetic c;c;knowing" with its own
rigor and formulations.
Tate, particularl~ had worked closely with Ransom in the latter
part of the twenties, and had published a dogmatic and shrill article
against the New Humanists in Eliot's Criterion that showed the
degree to which Ransom's ideas were shaping his own (the essay
appeared in July 1929 and was reprinted not long after in Hound
and Horn). What Ransom had to say to Tate at that point in their
careers is best indicated by John L. Stewart's definitive study of the
Fugitive and Agrarian movements, The Burden of Time. Stewart
talked to Ransom in 1946, and asked him what was the earliest and
most consistent guiding principle behind his criticism and poetry:
C;C;[It was] that modern man is crippled by a dissociation of reason
and sensibility which results in an imbalance whereby the reason,
armed with abstract principles which have been spectacularly suc"
cessful in supplying the material needs of the bod~ tyrannizes over
the sensibility and restricts its innocent, profitless delight in the viv..
idness and variety of the world. With this conviction went a C;fury
against abstractions and a desire to restore the sensibility to its
proper eminence in man:"8 This idea, which Ransom remembers
as all his own, was confirmed in his reading of Kant, Schopenhauer,
and Bergson. It clearly influences Tate in Reactionary Essays: upo"
etry is one test of ideas; it is ideas tested by experience, by the act
of direct apprehension:'9
Tate's uThree Types of Poetry:' like Empson's Seven Types ofAm..
biguity, performs an analysis of poetry along new lines indicated by
its status as a mode of prehension. He divides poetry into types
reflecting C;C;three attitudes of the modern world":
First: Poetry of Hthe spirit of the practical will:'
Second: Poetry in revolt against the domination of science.
Third: Poetry of the Hcreative spirit"; a synthesis of the first two types,
Hnameless because it is perfect:'
A dialectical process leads to the third sort of poetry. There is sci..
ence providing abstractions on which the first house of poetry is
built. Along comes the romantic impulse to flee outdoors; the sec"
ond type of poetry produces, then, Hromantic irony:' The third type
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of poetry exhibits the hallmarks of the Bergsonian aesthetic, and is
aptly called the poetry of Ucreative spirit:' It is interested in uthe
quality of experience, the total revelation-not explanation for the
purpose of external control by the will:' 10
For Tate, the term uwill" is loaded with much the same baggage
as HPlatonism" is for Ransom. Tate puts forth a concept of poetry
as seeing, in which (as Bergson says) Hwill and vision become one"
(TS, 218). In putting science opposite romanticism Tate claims to
have isolated two opposing sorts of Hwill;' both stemming from the
same basic wilfulness, and hence both erring. Romanticism is just
Hscience without the systematic method of asserting the wil!:' The
validity of poetr~ then, lies in the kind of Uobjectivity" described so
ably by Bergson, one that has abandoned intentionality and seeks
nothing, except to let the object reveal itself as it would, and then
to formulate that experience in a linguistic artifice that avoids the
sort of Adamic Unaming" associated with control C~wilt:' again).
The upshot of Tate's theory is a sharp attack on I.A. Richards. Tate
will not accept Richards's distinction between Ucertified" and
Hpseudo" statements. He sees Richards as coming back once more
to the well of utilitarianism, defining poetry in terms that make it
no different from any linguistic system used for purposes of Him..
mediate action:' It ought to be clear, Tate says, that Richards's ap"
proach is the one society has developed instinctively toward the
arts, since we live in a scientific age. 11
William Empson makes the identical attack on Richards, with
his usual acerbic wit. He says Richards's vocabulary opens up all
sorts of inconsistencies, and that the fundamental one rests on a
doubt about how to define ~~truth:' Empson argues for the reality of
a truth unaddressed by Richards, one that touches upon realms of
belief but lies finally in a complete entanglement of practical with
aesthetic impulses. And the consequence of this, for Empson, is
that one cannot adopt Richards's vie~ essentially a refashioning of
the old one that poets tell "excellent lies:' 12 One finds here the foun ..
dation for a theory of poetic truth based on modes of knowing and
speaking that humanist psychology cannot address because it does
not recognize the primacy of insight.
Robert Penn Warren wants to argue in a similar way for a litera..
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ture of illuminations. His 1942 Princeton lecture on "Pure and 1m..
pure Poetry:' printed in the Kenyon Review, praises Eliot and
Faulkner for having adhered faithfully to experience and defends
their work against charges of adulteration and "impurity:' He argues
for the heterodoxy of all "pure poetry:' Pure poetr~ he says, cannot
be poetry whose language is composed entirely of the "poetic" ef..
feet, for to be true attar"of"poetry it must distil the spectrum of Ian..
guage available in the poet's society. Its heterodoxy declares its pu..
rity precisely because it resists a final analysis.
In this essa~ Warren declares his debt to the Bergsonian heritage
in a number of ways-for example, when he figures the analytical
exercise graphically as abschnitten, the "cuttings" of Bergson's Time
and Free Will:
[The] poem is like the monstrous Orillo in Boiardo's Orlando Inna..
morato. When the sword lops off any member of the monster, that
member is immediately rejoined to the bod~ and the monster is as
formidable as ever. But the poem is even more formidable than the
monster, for Orillo's adversary finally gained a victory by an astonish..
ing feat of dexterity: he slashed off both the monster's arms and quick
as a wink seized them and flung them into the river. The critic who
vaingloriously trusts his method to account for the poem, to exhaust
the poem, is trying to emulate his dexterity.... But he is doomed to
failure.
The reason the critic is thus doomed seems clear: The poem is a
living thing, and the critic can deal only with dead concepts. He
can hack off a piece here or there, but the whole remains uncon"
quered, miraculously still whole.
To this monstrous defiant organism Warren opposes a bogus
"pure poetry" which "tries to be pure by excluding, more or less
rigidl~ certain elements which might qualify or contradict its origi..
nal impulse:' But such poetry emasculates itself: "Nothing that is
available in human experience can be legislated out of poetry.
[Even] a chemical formula, for instance, might appear functionally
in a poem:' Part of Warren's intention is to defend The ~ste Land,
but his larger intention is a defense of all poetr~ adapting the anti ..
legislative jargon Eliot used to advantage in his own criticism. War"
ren describes Eliot's masterpiece as "elliptical" (borrowing the term
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from Frederick Pottle). The CCelliptical" poem is so for cCpurposes of
inclusion, not exclusion:' It makes nonsense of Poe's suggestion
that the long poem is a contradiction in terms. Warren's cCpure po..
etry" inheres in the cCset of relationships" created by the poem's parts
and is not dependent upon any feature or quality that can be sliced
off for inspection.
We thus find in the criticism of Warren, Ransom, and Tate a full
flowering of the Modernist organicism whose aesthetical roots lie
in Bergson's Creative Evolution and William James's Principles of
Psychology (1890). This criticism defends a long poem, cCelliptical"
in structure, which founds itself on what Bergson, Hulme, and
Warren alike call cCtensions:' Warren explains the cCresistances" such
a poem offers:
There is the tension between the rhythm of the poem and the rhythm
of speech ... between the formality of the rhythm and the informality
of language; between the particular and the general, the concrete and
the abstract; between the elements of even the simplest metaphor; be..
tween the beautiful and the ugl~ ... This list is not intended to be
exhaustive; it is intended to be merely suggestive. But it may be taken
to imply that the poet is like the jiujitsu expert; he wins by utilizing the
resistance of his opponent-the materials of the poem. In other words,
a poem, to be good, must earn itself. It is a motion toward a point of
rest, but if it is not a resisted motion, it is a motion of no consequence. 13
The poem Warren describes is vital and complete in the Bergsonian
sense, a human cCcreation" in which all particular manifestations of
life accept their mobility ccreluctantly"; cca reality making itself across
a reality unmaking itself' (CE, 178, 128, 251).
Pure poetry; as Warren defines it, resides in the complete moving
consort-the action of the parts together. Thus, the cCellipses" sug"
gest and also call up an experience that cannot otherwise be
reached. They turn the resistances of language back on language
itself, bending words to their cCwill:' Warren's argument is simply
Bergson's: that the poem summons its idea to the reader's mind
through tensions between its parts, thus demonstrating that idea-
not in the sense of logical proof, but through experience.
Ransom, Tate, Empson, and Warren show that in American crit..
icism in the thirties an argument begun twenty years earlier in Eu ..
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rope was still being carried forward and developed. The influence
of Eliot's habits of mind and vocabulary on Ransom and Tate, par"
ticularly; seems undeniably to have been substantial in the long run,
even though each man felt independently the importance of the par"
ticular issues and the terminology early on. Ransom was headed
down this road even when he was still resistant to the sort of poetry
being written by Eliot, Pound, and Hulme. Still, the parallels with
Eliot's thinking are so striking that there must have been a very
conscious pattern of selection and rejection on Ransom's part, a
moment of decision about commitment to particular approaches
and ideas and not to others. The same seems to have been true of
certain other Kenyon Review critics.
One finds throughout Tate's work, for example, signs of Eliot's
having been there before. When Tate evaluates the case for and
against the American Humanists, he makes essentially Elio{s point:
The doctrines of Humanism are sound in themselves, but because
they are not complete, they are rendered false. That is, Tate admits
that nthe rightful concern of man is his humanity:' but 'still says
Humanists end in the same moral and philosophical plight as Nat..
uralists, since they can appeal to no higher authority; discover no
cCabsolutes:' Finally; Tate says, if you deny religion, you expect it of
literature and end up with neither. 14 It is as much in these broad
generalizations, their technique, their discriminations of the critical
and philosophical issues that count from those that do not-as
much in these generalizations as in the specific aesthetic judgments
made by the Southern New Critics (and their compatriots in the
Review), that one sees Eliot's influence.
It is difficult to decide whether Eliot's influence is merely con"
tributory; and not determining. There is, naturally; the larger ground
of the philosophical convictions of Ransom, Tate, Empson, and
Warren. They were conscious of an important comradeship with
Eliot, but the standards they consistently applied may have been
shared because of a similarity in origin: philosophical and aesthetic
stud~ The climate of opinion and belief surrounding these writers
was also created by them. Their heritage is Kant, Schopenhauer,
Coleridge, James, and Bergson. The specific judgments, however,
are colored heavily by the aesthetic stance, the Defense of Poetry;
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enabled by Bergson and offered in the interpretations of Hulme and
Eliot. Bergson is seldom held up for praise, for reasons that have
already been discussed, but perhaps bear brief review.
There was, first, the fact that Bergson had been denigrated, in
acid language, by the representatives of the New Classicism. Ran ..
som and Tate stood in uneasy relationship to this movement, and
were careful always to point out their differences-especially with
Eliot, for example. But finally; they were steeped in the dispositions
of Eliot and Santayana. They took their stand in the late thirties as
the Fugitives had in the twenties, but this time the rhetoric of Agrar..
ianism had been replaced by one of anti .. Humanism. They became,
for the most part, spokesmen for values that are only to be fixed
through some final term not available to Humanism. And they saw
that in this fight Bergson had been labelled the enemy.
At the same time, they had already experienced some of the ex"
citement over creative evolution and upsychology" generated by
James and Bergson. The language of aesthetic discussion had al ..
ready by 1930 been thoroughly invaded by the terminology of
Bergson's intuition philosophique. Perhaps its roots lay as much at
home as across the Atlantic. But the acceptance and nurturance of
those shoots was evidenced dramatically by a gradually increasing
enthusiasm for particular aspects of Eliot's work, which spoke to
the need Ransom and others felt: to establish a beachhead for the
role of the artist in American culture and thought. The Great
Depression made the need for such a victory seem, if anything,
more urgent to those in the South.
Adoption and adaptation of Bergsonian philosophical and aesthetic
ideas fostered literary innovation. That innovation fathered another
parallel growth in the critical enterprise, which resulted, finally; in
the establishment of the Kenyon Review. In 1937, Ransom had
decided, uI see so much future for critical studies that my own are
just beginning; it's the biggest field that could possibly be found for
systematic study [and] I want to wade right into it:' 15 Ransom's
sense of excitement, and his willingness to restrict the Review to
arts and letters when he had for so long argued against the separa"
tion of the work and the life, represents more than just the discovery
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of a new career goal. It shows that the prospects for and the im..
portance of a systematic and separate literary criticism had dawned
on him.
Since Ransom had decided to accept, with Eliot, the fact that
modern man's dissociations were here to sta~ the next question be..
came the systematization of literary study along particular lines.
And it was to that task that Ransom bent himself in the Review.
The approach, beyond any doubt, is an outgrowth of the philosoph..
ical attempt to justify and explain the importance of art and sensi ..
bility in the culture, and to do so in a forum and on grounds that
would make literature the equal-the twin, or doppelganger-of
science. This agenda lay behind the Review's variegated entries. If
no single number of the publication quite measured up-as Ran ..
som lamented in 1951-to the expectations of ccperfection:' that
does not mean there was no such goal in mind.
Ransom's chagrin is balanced, then, by a sense of Hpride in the
achieved body of criticism however long that may have taken to
accrue:' a body of criticism which has Hfunctional integrit~ perhaps
bearing a national importance:' Ransom's high estimation of the im ..
portance of the critic is not mere aggrandizement of the accomplish..
ments of writers among whom he numbered himself in the Review's
pages. Rather, it is the consequence of his having perceived the
importance of the issue of art in societ~ its need for strong defense:
We have lost our facult~ and to some extent we have lost our taste, for
the rule of action which is positive and life..giving. And why not accept
the confident voices of ancient authority? It is becoming better and
better established that the one authority which is still universally rep"
utable is literature. But literature is cryptic, it is Delphic.... It is the
critic who must teach us to find the thing truly authoritative but hid..
den; the critic trying and judging the literary work which has a content
that is visible and another content which is not so visible .16
The role of the literary critic, as Ransom defined it, was to master
the substance behind the outward form, to interpret and to bring
forth the truth there to an age in desperate need of art's resources.
In this wa~ Ransom thinks of the job he has been performing as a
rescue operation, something positive and valuable in an age of dark..
ness and chaos: a reading of the oracle.
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Such high expectations verge toward the demands Richards put
on art, and away from those of Eliot, who carefully excludes litera..
ture from having such powers to rescue culture. But these expecta"
tions are nonetheless an extension of Eliot's own views. He would
have said, perhaps> that they were true, but had been pushed to the
point where they became false. What Ransom did not apparently
see was that the New Critical approaches, and particularly the pro..
fessionalization of literary criticism, would lead to a polarization of
art, on the one hand, and on the other to an increasingly hermetic
critical vocabulary. Few trained literary critics now play the impor"
tant social role Ransom predicted for them. And few would agree
with him that literature is the one authority still <Creputable:'
What has been lost is precisely what Hazard Adams finds he
cannot rescue in The Philosophy of the Literary Symbolic: the elite
art object. Since the magic sign has been banished from discussion
by the dogma of deconstructionism, there can be no place for such
objects, and thus no place for such criticism. The temple topples.
In Arts on the Level, Murray Krieger, a student of Eliseo Vivas
(once a contributor to the Kenyon Review) considers the outcome
of these historical trends:
I feel, obviousl~ that many of the demythologizing tendencies in our
recent theory may be health~ provided they do not end by taking dis ..
criminations in value-or worse, the objects themselves-from
us.... [thus] I would hardly recommend that we try to return to the
unquestioning confidence we once had in the critical enterprise before
we had to respond to the awareness aroused by recent antagonistic
theory. The recognition by critics of their own fictions, together with
the limits of the aesthetic fictions they at once create and uncover for
us, gives them self..deconstructive shrewdness that can only increase
our confidence in their more grandiose claims.
But Krieger ends on a note of frustration with the enervation of the
critical enterprise. Finall~ CCit is the critics' power to lift that art ob..
ject off the level and to reconstruct it at its full height that sustains
us as it sustains their culture and the uneven arts themselves:' 17 We
see, as we trace the fallout of the Bergsonian debate in the twenties
and thirties, the emergence of a critical approach that apparently
contained the seeds of its own demise.
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The Bergsonian aesthetic promoted by Southern New Critics
had profound effect on the acceptance of innovative poetry and fic ..
tion. Their embracing of such an aesthetic, and later their defense
of Eliot and justification of The Wzste Land's innovative techniques
had influence on most young writers coming to maturity during the
two decades following World War I, including, naturall)T, William
Faulkner.
SIX
Deciphering Faulkner's
Uninterrupted Sentence
Well, I believe that our whole psychical existence is
something like a single sentence, continued since the first
awakening of consciousness, interspersed with commas,
but never broken by full stops.
-Henri Bergson, Mind..Energy
~ Any discussion of Bergson and American literature must deal
with Faulkner. My object is, however, not only to explain Faulkner's
relationship to Bergson. I wish to show how Bergsonian philosophy
and aesthetics illuminate American literature. I have demonstrated
that Eliot and the New Critics owe a debt to Bergson that is little..
recognized because Bergson has not been reread for so long. If
Faulkner can be profitably discussed in relation to Bergson, he is
not alone, and in my final chapter I will suggest how other Ameri ..
can writers might be approached along similar lines. I remind the
reader simply that this volume does not attempt to be comprehen"
sive, but rather to restore Bergson's dualism to the discussion of
American literature.
Let us first dismiss the weak claims some have put forth that
Faulkner was directly influenced by Bergson's thought. In dismiss ..
ing the claims, I do not pretend to settle the issue of how thoroughly
Faulkner may have known Bergson's work. Rather, I mean to make
it clear that no one can be sure of the answer, any more than of other
puzzling issues in the writer's life. Faulkner once said he agreed
with Bergson on the nature of God and Time (LIG, 70). He made
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this statement to LOlc Bouvard, a French graduate student, in
1952. Millgate and Meriwether attach considerable importance to
Bouvard's interview, saying Faulkner seems to have revealed himself
candidly to questioning. Perhaps so. But is this a basis on which
we can speak of the ~~influence"of Bergson?
When Faulkner says he was influenced ~~by Bergson, obviously;'
we must interpret cautiously. Faulkner may only have meant that
most writers of his time, including Eliot, were so influenced. But
many critics have tried to go beyond this, and build a case for Faulk..
ner's own study of Bergson. Joseph Blotner guesses in his Biogra..
phy that Faulkner had Hread his Henry Bergson" long before
1946-possibly while still of college age. Faulkner apparently later
gave an aspiring young writer, Joan Williams, a copy of Man's Fate
and encouraged her to read Creative Evolution, saying, ~~It helped
me:' 1 Could Creative Evolution have helped Faulkner become a
writer? Encouraged by the implications here, Richard Adams sug..
gested that Faulkner Hprobably read Creative Evolution and Laugh..
ter, which was translated in 1911, and very possibly also Introduc ..
tion to Metaphysics . ... It seems reasonably certain that Faulkner
learned to do his share of the work partly by studying Bergson's
theories:' 2 And by ~~his share of the work;' Adams clearly means
writing. Conder has assumed the same, and speaks of Hthe influ ..
ence of Bergson on Faulkner:'3
But no available evidence supports or refutes Blotner's and
Adams's claims about Faulkner's reading. Virtually no philosophical
works-classical or popular-were contained in Faulkner's private
librar~ which included over 1,200 volumes from more than two
dozen countries at the time of Faulkner's death, but no work of
Bergson's.4 A personal letter to Professor Blotner brought the reply
that Hthere seemed to be nothing concrete to go on apart from WF's
recommending Bergson to people and his comments with the
French graduate student in Lion in the Garden ... but I think it is
not unlikely that he read some Bergson:' 5 Cleanth Brooks may be
right when he says that Faulkner never ~cread Bergson very deeply
or thoroughly:' Brooks finds that ~~the influence of Bergson has been
generally overestimated and that its importance has been occasion..
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ally pushed to absurd lengths:'6 It is not clear exactly what Brooks
means by ccthe influence of Bergson:' but he is right that in Faulk..
ner's case assertions of direct influence should be viewed with polite
skepticism.
But then we must explain some remarkably convincing exposi ..
tions of Faulkner's work in Bergsonian terms-the latest of which
is Conder's in Naturalism in American Fiction. The relation be..
tween Faulkner and Eliot has been explored on several occasions,
and it is clear that Faulkner made use of ccPrufrock:' The Wzste
Land, and others of Elio{s works.? I contend that Faulkner studied
Eliot thoroughly enough to have picked up critical judgments and
aesthetic values just as much as specific literary devices. Knowing
the impact Eliot had on Faulkner, and seeing that impact in the
criticism of other Southern writers, particularly Ransom and Tate,
we see why we find in Faulkner a deep, rich vein reflecting Berg..
sonian values. This is a vein everyone, including Brooks, is forced
under some guise to admit.
Faulkner and the Duree Reelle
More is involved than just Bergson's thorough identification with
experienced time. But that is where we must start: with Faulkner's
obsession with fluidit~ change, and the related concepts of l:l:endur..
ing" and CCoutrage:'8 Over and over Faulkner identifies life with
l:l:constant flux ... constant change" (FlU, 151). In this Ufluidity
which is human life:' the only ccalternative to change and progress
is death" (FLU, 239, 190). Faulkner speculated more than once in
his classes at the University of Virginia that man is by nature uin"
capable of peace ... the only peace man knows-he says, l:Why
good gracious, yesterday I was happy'" (FLU, 65). He character..
ized himself as a uman in motion who happens to be a writer:' and
declared that l:l:what is important is that man continues to create"
(FLU, 197..98; LlG, 364). Like anyone else, writers must cope and
compromise with change if they hope to accomplish anything
(FLU, 37). The writer tries uto arrest motion, which is life, byarti ..
ficial means and hold it fixed so that 100 years later when a stranger
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looks at it, it moves again, since it is life. Since man is mortal, the
only immortality possible for him is to leave something behind him
that is immortal since it will always move" (LlG, 253). The paradox
here is that the most immortal art is that which is most Uliving" and
hence ccmorta!:' The artist tries to cccatch this fluidit}T, which is life;'
but must ask ucompassion, understanding, that change must alter,
must happen.... That no matter how fine anything seems ... once
it stops, abandons motion, it is dead" (FLU, 277).
But Faulkner also views other matters after the Bergsonian fash ..
ion. He claimed to see the life..force as cCthe mind that spawns ... a
force, a blind force, that by its standards is neither good nor bad:'9
The essential amorality of that life..force is often forgotten in discus..
sions of Faulkner's characters, who must deal with the hunger for
permanence in a world that is Unot interested in good and evil"
(LlG, 252). The hunger for permanence is often tied to moral im..
peratives, and becomes confused with morality when it is consid..
ered as life..denying. Don Quixote, notes Faulkner, cCentered reality
only when he was so busy trying to cope with people that he had
no time to distinguish between good and evil" (LlG, 253). If
Faulkner valued this Ucoping" above a denial of life, that does not
necessarily mean he thought mere coping intrinsically moral or mo"
rality intrinsically opposed to life. Like Eliot and Bergson, Faulkner
saw art's business as simply other than that of morality.
Faulkner also believed that good art is an Uincarnation" of con"
sciousness. Like consciousness itself, a novel must have the fluidity
of life. Conrad Aiken was the first to see in this a key to Faulkner's
prose style. In a 1939 article Aiken focused on two important fea ..
tures of the prose. First, Faulkner works on the reader by a cCprocess
of immersion:' Second, his formal aesthetic requires that the sen"
tence, and even the novel, stay psychologically cCunfinished, still in
motion, as it were, until the dropping into place of the very last
syllable:' 10 The result was what Clifton Fadiman later called the
unon"stop or Life..sentence:' a sentence that tries to be a microcosm
of an expanding universe. 11 Aiken's article assumes that Faulkner
believed, like Bergson, that all life-psychic or material-is a mat..
ter of self"creation cCthat draws much from little, something from
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nothing" (eM, 31). t:t:Life, like conscious activity:' Bergson said, is
this sort of uunceasing creation" (CE, 25). Since life has this con"
tinuit~ the writer's prose must strain, in Faulkner's words, to Ucram
everything, all experience, into each paragraph:' 12 The sentence
must try to put uthe whole history of the human heart on the head
of a pin:' and uthe long sentence is an attempt to get [a character's]
past and possibly his future into the instant in which he does some"
thing" (FLU, 144, 84). Precisely because consciousness is ulike a
single sentence:' the uwhole past still exists" (CM, 56). A good
novel, then, pushes us into the river and lets us sink or swim, ac"
cording to Aiken, who does not raise questions of overall design, of
final form.
Several critics have assessed Faulkner's characters by the degree
of their alienation from the flowing of consciousness, and in the
fifties they began to recur to Bergson. Perrin Lowre~ in a 1954
essa)T, argues that The Sound and the Fury presents three dissociated
awarenesses of time in Benj~ Quentin, and Jason, integrating them
in Dilsey: 13 Peter Swiggart also defines Faulkner's characters in this
way: Bergson's real duration, Swiggart says, is a standard toward
which the dissociated consciousnesses of time may be thought to
point. 14 Karl Zink makes a similar claim, saying Faulkner's images
of stasis increase the reader's awareness of tension between U expe"
rience" and usimple clock or calendar time:' 15 The article implies
that Faulkner thought calendar time illuso~ real time uflux:'
Darrel Abel's uFrozen Movement in Light in August" (1957) was
the first attempt to relate Bergson's terminology to Faulkner's char..
acters and style, and it suggests a number of intriguing parallels. 16
Abel says the artist may be thought of as making Ucuttings" out of
his intuitions of becoming, and he also suggests that Joe Christ..
mas's problem is mainly one of self..urealization"-that is, he cannot
establish what Bergson calls the one thing uwe all seize from within,
by intuition . . . our personality in its flowing through time-our
self which endures" (1M, 3). Finall~ Abel sees Hightower's vision
of the wheel as a triumphant moment condensing t:t:a long history"
in a uquasi .. instantaneous vision" (see CM, 105). Curiousl)', the
article sees Hightower's wheel as no different from Joe's entrapping
circle; both are Uintuitions of duration:'
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Duree Versus the Durable Form
At this point, we have come to the crux of the problem. Faulkner
has, like Bergson, been labeled an irrationalist, and while that may
help us in understanding how his characters hunger to be "sloshing
around in Bergsonian duree:' as Estella Schoenberg puts it, it ere"
ates grave problems when we try to understand Faulkner as crafting
"that single urn or shape" of the novel-as a conscious pattern..
maker (FLU, 65).17 Encouraged by Faulkner's public statements,
some critics have been drawn to view his fiction as part of a state"
ment against rational mind, against conceptualizing or abstracting,
and in favor of immediate experience. 1:1:1 don't have much confi..
dence in the mind:' Faulkner claimed (FLU, 6). 1:1:1 don't know any"
thing about rational and logical processes of thought at alI:' he said
while in Japan, and explained further that he thought of rationality
as l:'the processes of the mind which must follow a reasonable, I
mean, a mathematically reasonable pattern:' 18 Like Bergson's attack
on the narrow rationalism of his time, Faulkner's skepticism of what
is "mathematically reasonable" was construed as a more general re"
jection of the intellect. The mistake of taking Faulkner at his word,
compounded by the mistake in pigeonholing Bergson, has never
stopped troubling the issue.
Walter Slatoff's Quest for Failure (1960) drew a logical conclu..
sion from the assumption that Faulkner is an irrationalist. Noting
that Faulkner's vision is often "accordant to Bergson:' Slatoff finds
that Faulkner believes in intuition and not intellect. 19 Since the in..
tuition is irrational, the novels are too-Faulkner's prose deliber..
ately emphasizes its own flaws. 20 Slatoff's logic is valid, but his con"
elusion is untrue. If Faulkner believed flux to be shapeless, it would
not be amiss to see self..destructive tendencies in his sentences and
narratives. But he does not.
Several interesting dissertations were written on Faulkner and
Bergson after Abel's and Slatoffs work appeared. Shirley Parker
Callen's "Bergsonian Dynamism in the Writings of William Faulk..
ner" (1962) interprets Faulkner's novels as, at base, a rejection of
conceptualization. She divides the characters into those who en..
dure by maintaining contact with real duration and those (the great
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mass) who are guilty of using ~~adopted concepts:' 21 Another dis ..
sertation, by Agnes Pollock (1965), also attempts to discriminate
characters on the basis of their time..awarenesses: intuitive or con"
ceptualized.22 Unaware, for the most part, of the aesthetic dilemma
Bergson was creating, the studies concentrate on what characters
say and do and think, a defect also found in Margaret Church's
otherwise sensitive essay on Faulkner and Bergson in Time and
Reality (1963). According to Church, Joe Christmas, because he
achieves a moment of insight into Bergson's transcendent flux,
comes to represent ccthe highest achievement of man:' 23
If Joe Christmas's death represents the highest achievement of
man, then perhaps it is not surprising that that vindictive corpse,
Addie Bundren, has found the meaning of life. Such is the conten"
tion of Robert Nadeau, for whom Bergson's dynamism is a skeleton
key to As I Lay Dying. Nadeau actually believes that As I Lay
Dying ends on a triumphant note, as the life..force is seen to perpet..
uate itself in Anse's marrying.24 Jesse Gatlin performs a similar au"
topsy on The Sound and the Fury, ending on the puzzling note that
Faulkner's duree, unlike Bergson's, runs in a circular track.25
Such are the peculiarities and superficialities generated by the
use of Bergson to analyze Faulkner's characters and values indepen..
dent of his narrative structures. These arguments don't do justice to
the dual vision of the novelist; they attribute to his characters a view
of time antithetical, in a sense, to the very writing of a novel. That
is because they do not begin with that ccuninterrupted sentence"
that is the ground of our understanding Faulkner's values and his
characters' behavior. And here Bergson can be of real help, if we are
willing to admit the nature of language into the discussion, and to
see that Faulkner, like Eliot, looks on final form as the goal as well
as potentially the ccenemy."
The problem of an aesthetic ccimmersion" first raised by Aiken
finally reemerges with Eric Larson's ccThe Barrier of Language"
(1967).26 Larson seems to agree with Slatoff that Faulkner inten..
tionally builds up cctensions of irresolution" at the level of phrase,
sentence, chapter, and presumably even the novel's whole fabric.
But where Slatoff sees failure, Larson sees success. By breaking up
the familiar forms, Faulkner gets the reader to supply the lack, be..
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come a participant, help create the Unonverbal or experiential truth
or motion:' In this, he agrees with Richard Adams, whose Faulkner:
Myth and Motion (1968) shows what a rich relationship exists be..
tween Faulkner's use of myth and the use of myth by Eliot, Joyce,
Pound, Fitzgerald, and Hemingway.27 Adams sees Faulkner's use
of myth as only one element in a carefully planned program to create
in the reader a ustartling sense of temporal dislocation:'28 This tech ..
nique keeps us from Ufeeling time as a thin, straight string with
events marked off at measured intervals; instead, we feel it as a
heavy knot, cluster, or tangle, with all the ends lost in the middle.
Motion is lost, or stopped; and time is held still for aesthetic con"
templation:' Yet Faulkner, like Bergson, ~~is primarily interested in
motion:' It is only that the motion of life's stream is never truly per"
ceived until ~~some object, or better, some person, can be made to
stand still against its flow:' Thus, the function of Faulkner's static
images is uto make motion emphatically apparen{' at the same time
that it fixes it ufor aesthetic contemplation:' 29 How these two func ..
tions can be consonant Adams never explains.
Adams's study must, then, return to the question of language
raised by Larson. If Faulkner agrees with Bergson that uperception
signifie immobiliser" and that nothing immobilizes like the word,
how can the novels believe in their chance at communicating this
unspeakable flux of becoming? Susan Parr attempts to confront the
problem of what Faulkner called uthe impossibility-or at least the
tremendous difficulty-of communication" (LIG, 72). According
to her, Faulkner purposely created confusions in order to blow apart
the illusion of his fiction. 30 Faulkner constantly undercuts his nar"
rator's veracit}7, rendering all ~~fact" ambiguous and forcing the
reader back onto his intuition.31 Like Slatoff, Parr has developed
Larson's ~~tensions" with a Bergsonian approach. But what about
the problem that Stephen Dedalus points out in Portrait of the Artist
plagues all uesthetic discussion": We must know uwhether words
are being used according to the literary tradition or according to the
tradition of the marketplace:' 32 Is all language really ~~by its very
nature doomed to failure:' as Parr asserts ?33 Does successful art do
nothing more than spin the reader in the confusions of the ineffable,
to end in holding up a fractured mirror to the self?
126 Bergson, Eliot, b- American Literature
In this, Bergson has been dragged in to verify Faulkner's pose of
failure, his Hanti ..intellectualism" and contradictions of style, image,
plotting. It is generally recognized that duree is a positive value in
both Faulkner and Bergson, but the consequences of accepting this
god continue to be negative. Donald Kartiganer describes Faulk..
ner's narratives as Hdislocating the possibilities of form" and exhib..
iting a Bergsonian drive toward uan act of self..destruction:'34 And
Andre Bleikasten sees Faulkner's fiction as a reaction against history
and intellect.35 The reasoning here is at base aesthetic and not "the..
matic": All Hforms" are seen as life..denying, and the artist (in Kar..
tiganer's words) is caught in Ha tragic dynamic of opposed commit..
ments-one to motion and the other to form:' 36 As Bleikasten puts
it, uimmersion in 'rear time only means further disarray and dislo..
cation:' 37 Form and experience are irrevocably alienated and Berg..
son is said to give his benediction to this Utragic" opposition.
Some deny that Faulkner's metaphysic is one of Htragic time:' In
The Abstract and the Actual (1974), Panthea Reid Broughton
makes the crucial distinction between language in the marketplace,
which has lost its contact with vital experience, and language in
literature, which has had its connection to experience renewed.
HFaulkner's heroic characters:' Broughton argues convincingl)',
Hhave seen how ultimately inaccessible to reason is existence; yet
they are not paralyzed by the sight:' 38 Language is no more culpable
than action in the alienation many of Faulkner's characters experi..
ence from life; but language offers an unparalleled opportunit~
Faulkner, Broughton makes us see, knew Hthe difference between
an inert and a vital abstraction.... His entire canon, in fact, stands
as a caveat against the fixed abstraction:' Faulkner writes mostly
about people who use abstractions to uevade reali~ not to embrace
it:' but the fact remains that a constantly revitalized language is not
uimmobile, inert, life..denying:' 39
Faulkner pursues, according to Broughton, a consistent tech ..
nique in vitalizing his own abstractions. He weds them to the ac"
tual. One problem remains, however: How can nonverbal Hactual..
ity" be gotten into words? Though Broughton does touch on
Faulkner's "sonorous, almost hypnotic" prose, which creates a
mood that is Hitself a level of meaning:' she does not make the con"
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nection between this level of "communication" and the semantic.
Bergson is still seen as supplying the concept of a "living and fluid
irrational world" and must then offer no possibilities for transcend..
ence in language; Whitehead, "unlike Bergson" (why "unlike"?),
finds in "vital abstraction a means to transcending" the merely rna"
terial and static, and is therefore more applicable to Faulkner.40 The
static images are somehow more vital than the prose's sonority.
But Faulkner has a dual vision, and it is only our conventional
image of Bergson that has prevented us from seeing how really use"
ful he is in unlocking some of Faulkner's secrets. Cleanth Brooks
summarizes the problem neatly in Toward Yoknapatawpha and Be..
yond (1978): "In spite of Faulkner's acceptance of Bergson's con"
ception of time as fluid and continuous ... it is hard to think of a
novelist who exceeds Faulkner in his careful attention to the details
of clock time and calendar time.... Faulkner's characters clearly
lived their lives and underwent their passions in Bergson's temps
duree, but this fact does not absolve them from living through a time
that could be ticked off by the clock and measured by the calen..
dar. . . . I find little in Faulkner's narrative treatment that can be
certainly attributed to Bergson's influence:'41
Eschewing the proposition of influence per se, I will argue that
Bergson offers plenty of insight into Faulkner's narrative forms, be..
ginning with the all .. important building block of voice. The confu..
sion comes from the assumption that Bergson rejects clock..time as
"unreal" and therefore unimportant. Bergson does not, as these crit..
ics suppose, believe only in an amorphous Present and reject all
possibilities for the mind to know-that is, to give form to-that
Present.42
Bergson's Present is never amorphous, though it may be con"
fused. The point is-and this is as true for James, Whitehead, and
even Sartre, as for Bergson-it cannot be a visible Present. It is a
hyphen: that which is being made. That is why it is so inaccessible
to consciousness, which tries to give it visible form, only to find
itself falling into past or future "states:' What is being made is not,
however, lawless. If life is pure mobilit~ it is nevertheless true that
"wherever anything lives, there is open somewhere a register in
which time is being inscribed" (CE, 16). Pure memory itself, when
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we let it ""cross the threshhold" into consciousness, ""retains and
ranges alongside each other all our states in the order in which oc"
cur, leaving to each fact its place and consequently marking its date"
(MM, 195; see also 199). Why should we suppose that Bergson's
philosoph~ rigidly adhered to, would ""absolve" Faulkner's charac..
ters from the exigencies of clock and calendar? Why should we
expect, as Brooks seems to do, that if Faulkner had really taken
Bergson to heart, he would have written as though calendar time
were ""something with which man did not need to concern himself
because it was Cunreal' "?43
No; for Faulkner as for Bergson, there are two kinds of knowing.
One we call ccperception;' but it is actually""memory:' for as soon as
we have visualized the present state, it is gone. Memory offers to
consciousness, then, a reconstruction. And it necessarily concen"
trates on information that is ""useful": cCThe past has not ceased to
exist; it has only ceased to be useful" (MM, 193). The other kind
of knowing cannot be rendered in visualized states. It lies in the
very feel of consciousness. The healthy mind knows in both modes,
not one only: Bergson would no more approve a Gail Hightower,
who lives ""dissociated from mechanical time;' than a Joe Christmas,
caught in the circle of his ""fence picket days" (LA, 272, 246). He
would have agreed with Faulkner that Joe and Hightower are op"
posites.44 And Faulkner would have agreed with Bergson that the
truly enriching consciousness incorporates an ordered past in a de..
veloping present that proceeds in a Hreasonable evolution" (MM,
243). The reasonableness of consciousness fits no mathematical
formula, it is true-but it may fit a verbal one.
The Shape of a Voice
A fact little noticed in discussions of Faulkner's style is his virtuosity
in blending voices. Many novelists have excelled in creating voices,
but few have succeeded as Faulkner in making those voices sound
with the resonance of one keyboard, one harp of sympathetic
strings. If we are to discover the ""reasonableness" of Faulkner's nar"
ratives, I believe we must listen attentively to his many voices. J0"
seph Reed is right when he says that you can only explain Faulk..
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ner's work if you accept his self-·definition as a C;C;story..teller:' an
orchestrator of voices, a master of shifting levels of diction and co..
herence.45 Charles Anderson has said that Faulkner was steeped in
the uCiceronian tradition of the Old South and the Senecan tradi ..
tion of Elizabethan England:' and surely this is Faulkner's rhetorical
heritage, whether or not it is his c;c;moral center" as Anderson con..
tends.46 A first confrontation with Absalom, Absalomrs prose is like
stepping into a senate chamber, where rhetoric rolls in echoing and
sonorous waves from wall to wall. The mesmerizing qualities of this
prose are a level of meaning in themselves; but what is that meaning
and how is it given to us?
Before answering this question, let me emphasize that there is
no one Faulknerian style. As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the
Fury are handbooks of style. They render everything from crude
dialect to symbolist imagery. Moving between the poles of inner..
and outer..directed language, Faulkner has kept well in mind the
important distinction between the language of the marketplace and
that of literature. He has excluded neither. Yet a case can be made
for considering the style of Absalom, Absalom!-a novel which
manages to let many voices sound without losing a sense that they
all echo in the same chamber-as a goal toward which the experi..
ments of Faulkner's most productive period (1929 .. 36) point.
The Sound and the Fury offers us four distinct narrative person..
alities, As I Lay Dying fifteen. But the styles are clearly less numer"
ous than the characters. There are gradations, but in Quentin's sec..
tion of Sound and the Fury, and in every section of As I Lay Dying,
we hear variations on three distinct styles. There is a public voice,
rendered in speech, Quentins dialect. Then there is a more private
voice, rendered in diction more formal than speech, the voice in
which Quentin consciously recollects. Finall}T, there is a voice that
is as close to consciousness itself as Faulkner can bring it-the vo..
cabulary is often not the character's at all, and the texture is remark..
ably uniform, from character to character. Quentin speaks in his
own dialect: uI reckon the police won't get me for wearing my new
suit one time" (SF, 63). He recounts memories consciously in a less
colloquial voice: c;c;If it had been cloudy I could have looked at the
windo~ thinking what he said about idle habits" (SF, 60). Most
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of what Quentin tells us, even in the italicized or unpunctuated
sections of his monologue, is rendered in one or the other of these
voices: the public one, or the voice of controlled thought.
Yet there are moments, scattered throughout the section, when
the control breaks up, and these moments are almost always those
that touch on the sensitive subject of Caddy's sexuality: (UNo:
Shreve said. running the beast with two backs and she blurred in the
winking oars running the swine of Euboeleus running coupled within
how many Caddy" (SF, 115). Anacoluthon, not italics, is the most
likely sign of Quentin's consciousness bubbling to the surface, and
Faulkner plays the game of showing us in what tension Quentin
constantly keeps himself as he tries to avoid the flow of conscious..
ness leading constantly back to the issue: "That Christ was not cru"
cified: he was worn away by a minute clicking of little wheels. That
had no sister" (SF, 60).
Neither Jason nor Benjy communicates to us on this level in The
Sound and the Fury. In As I Lay Dying, by contrast, every character
does. Here is an example of Vardaman's shifts in diction: (UDurn
him. I showed him. Durn him: I am not crying now. I am not
anything.... "Then hit want. Hit hadn't happened then .. : It is
dark. I can hear wood, silence; I know them. But not living sounds,
not even him. It is as though the dark were resolving him out of his
integrit)T, into an unrelated scattering of components-snuffings
and stampings ... " (ALD, 36). Here the fragmentariness of pure
memories and the grammatical fragmentariness of images that we
saw in Quentin's section have already begun to be amalgamated in
a peculiarly recognizable voice. Vardaman will never utter the words
"integrity" or "components" in his everyday speech, nor in his con"
scious thinking, which stays always at the level of "is": "It is dark
... " But as Faulkner takes us deeper into the psychological being,
the higher style we associate with Absalom, Absalom! comes more
into play: "It is as though the dark were resolving .... " Here we
have a foretaste of the endless subordination that is the hallmark of
the later novel.
Light in August and Sanctuary, both written entirely in the third
person, make further use of this particular voice whenever a char..
acter's inner life is opened to our gaze, and one sees Faulkner con"
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sistently adding to the repertoire, incorporating more and more
fragmentary perceptions and memories in a stream of thought roll..
ing on. After finding herself in Miss Reba's care, and suffering
through the doctor's examination, Temple Drake lies in bed, listen..
ing, as Quentin did in The Sound and the Fury, to the sound of
clocks striking the hour and half..hour. She watches the light fade:
HShe watched the final light condense into the clock face, and the
dial change from a round orifice in the darkness to a disc suspended
in nothingness, the original chaos, and change in turn to a crystal
ball holding in its still and cryptic depths the ordered chaos of the
intricate and shadowy world upon whose scarred flanks the old
wounds whirl onward at dizzy speed into darkness lurking with
new disasters. She was thinking about half"past..ten ..o'clock. The
hour for dressing for a dance" (S, 130). This passage poises its
poetry carefully between the consciousness of the narrator and that
of Temple. But by distinguishing carefully Temple's conscious
thought about the clock's ringing, the narrator more than implies
that what immediately precedes is a rendering-no doubt it would
be unrecognizable to Temple herself, but to us it must ring true-
of Temple's inner consciousness of the world's cCordered chaos:'
In Light in August Faulkner clearly makes the long..winded style
we associate with Absalom, Absalom! a tag for deeper psychic
states. As Lena waits for one of the many wagons that will carry her
along, she becomes absorbed in its slow progress toward her: H...
the sound of it seems to come slow and terrific and without mean"
ing, as though it were a ghost travelling a half mile ahead of its own
shape. cThat far within my hearing before my seeing: Lena thinks"
(LA,S). Lena intuits the wagon's arrival and departure in a single
cCperception:' We notice now that Faulkner is using not only the
same subordinator, but some of the same vocabulary repeatedl~ like
the word ccghost:' which underscores the insistent provisionality of
Has though:' When Hightower has his moment of vision toward the
end of the novel, HIt is as though they had merely waited ... to be
reaffirmed ... then they sweep into sight, borne now upon a cloud
of phantom dust" (LA, 366). His ancestors were merely waiting in
the wings of memor~ to be released into consciousness like a tide.
The high style of Absalom, Absalom! aims at attaining that al..
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most hypnotically suggestive prose with which Faulkner has exper..
imented continuously to that point, that mesmerizing language
which Bergson suggests must catch us up in the movement of a
mind, making our minds ccfall into step" (eM, 143, 102). Here
must be the first level of meaning in Faulkner's prose, the one we
arrive at before we have even begun to think, in which we uncon"
sciously merge with the artist: ccBefore intellection properly so"
called, there is the perception of structure and movement:' Bergson
notes . .r.rThere is on the page one reads punctuation and rhythm"
(eM, 102). When we turn to Absalom, Absalom!, we have already
got a pretty good idea of how Faulkner tries to achieve the effect:
He writes longer and longer sentences, uses lots of conjunctions,
especially subordinators, and prepares for us a virtual musical score
of lexical repetition. The finishing touch on this style he added in
Absalom: a forest of personal pronouns.
Even the longest sentences in The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay
Dying, Sanctuary, and Light in August would probably not prepare
the reader for what he finds in Absalom, Absalom! There is nothing
(except perhaps in Proust) like the first chapter of Absalom when it
comes to sheer length of sentences. Kucera and Francis found in
the million"word corpus of their Computational Analysis of Present..
Day American English only nine sentences exceeding 100 words in
length. Indeed, of the fifteen discourse types surveyed by them,
none, including journalism and fiction, had an average sentence
length greater than 25 words. In the whole corpus, only one sen"
tence exceeded 160 words.47 The first chapter of Absalom, which
is about 8,400 words long, has twenty..four sentences of 100 words
or more. Four of them exceed 200 words. The average sentence is
40 words long. Yet that is a little misleading. Almost a quarter of
the sentences in this chapter are 5 words or less. You can't easily
define a Faulkner sentence, since most of the long ones are probably
a series of shorter sentences connected by semicolons or commas
that ought to be periods. At the same time, there are instances of
four or five substantial sentence fragments in a ro\\', fragments
which would, if connected by commas, colons, dashes, or semi..
colons, make a grammatically complete sentence. The more one
looks at the interjections and ellipses, the less certain the bounda..
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ries of the sentences seem. The only certainty is that at moments a
breath is taken.
A major tool Faulkner uses to blur the boundaries between sen"
tences is the conjunction. In Absalom's first chapter he has em"
ployed an astonishing number of them at the beginnings of sen"
tences. Fully forty percent of his sentences begin with
conjunctions, and most are not the Hcontinuatives" we normally use
in speech, like Hwell:' "oh:' or Hsay:' Faulkner's continuatives are
those uttered by people talking to themselves: Hyes" and Hno" al..
most exclusivel~ The subordinators Has if" and Has though" are his
meat and potatoes; adversatives like Hyet" and Hbut:' and causal/
temporals like "then:' "because:' "since:' and HSO" account for some
eighty..three items in the first chapter, but "as if" and Has though"
occur forty times themselves, giving to the longer sentences that
characteristic feeling of twining, turning, never..settling; the sheer
frequency of this formula also creates an intentional effect of deja vu
for the reader.
Faulkner also uses semantic strings throughout the first chapter
of Absalom in order to move its prose nearer a poetical high style
with hypnotic power. In this one short chapter the possibilities for
lexical Hecho" seem huge, and a thorough, but not exhaustive listing
of lexically related items turns up at least four major strings: time..
related terms, words associated with death (like Hdust"), words di ..
rectly or indirectly related to c;c;voice:' and family.. role names. One
example of Faulkner's conscious patterning seems particularly in ..
structive. The item "now" appears occasionally throughout the
chapter, but occurs only seven times from page 7 to page 22. Then,
on pages 23 and 24, it occurs twelve times, and on pages 27 and
28 it turns up eleven times. The reader will recall that these pages
describe Judith and Henry's rides in the Sutpen carriage to church.
Proper names are also potentially very instructive in this first chap"
ter. The items HJudith:' HThomas:' HHenry:' and "Ellen" appear in ..
frequently until the last page of the chapter, when they occur with
a vengeance: twenty..six times.
The infrequency with which characters are actually named in the
early part of the chapter is, of course, intentional, a part of Faulk..
ner's attempt to mesmerize. The reader realizes soon after beginning
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the novel that he is participating in a kind of pronoun game, though
there are so many other games going on simultaneously that he may
not see immediately that this one has fairly simple rules. Faulkner
has followed four techniques here. First, he interjects references,
signalling that other references may not be so easy to figure out as
they appear. Second, he uses colloquialized pronouns wherever
possible, and sometimes even where they seem unlikely. Third, he
simply plays around with pronouns, the way grammar school kids
sometimes do C~you know I know you know I know"). Finall~ he
creates some moments of genuine ambiguit~ heightening them by
the use of demonstratives that signal a general sense of ~~what I just
said" or U everything just mentioned:'
While he doesn't supply many proper nouns early on, preferring
to use pronouns, Faulkner often adds a possible referent or referents
in parentheses: ~~ ... as if she (Miss Coldfield) had never seen .. :'
(AA, 14); Ult (the talking, the telling) seemed (to him, to Quentin)
.. :' (AA, 22). The overabundance of reference is almost as puz..
zling as lack of information would have been. The implication is,
too, that perhaps there are other reference items which need, but
have not received clarification; the use of colloquialized reference
helps to stir our fears here. Taking full advantage of his characters'
dialects, Faulkner has them substitute person"pronouns for things
and vice versa: u ••• it mused (mused, thought, seemed to possess
sentience) as if, though dispossessed of the peace-who was im..
pervious anyhow to fatigue-which she declined to give it .. :'
(AA, 13); uI saw that man-the evil's source and head which had
outlasted all its victims-who had created two children ... a man
that anyone could look at and see .. :' (AA, 18.. 19). Faulkner draws
attention to the tortured thought of Rosa Coldfield by rendering
alternative constructions in practically the same line: Ua man who
... a man that .. :' (AA, 19). In the example from page 13 of the
novel, we see the parenthetical qualifier piling on more information,
but switching from thing C~it") to person C~who") to thing again
C~it") in a process so rapid that one has to go back and read the
phrases again to convince oneself that the pronouns all refer to the
same man/thing: Thomas Sutpen. The example from pages 18 and
19 performs the same trick.
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Sometimes, Faulkner engages in exuberant childlike play with
permutations of pronouns-and Rosa is herself childlike in this:
~~our father knew who his father was in Tennessee and who his
grandfather had been in Virginia and our neighbors and the people
we lived among knew that we knew and we knew they knew we
knew and we knew that they would have believed us about whom
and where he came from even if we had lied .. :' (AA, 17). Note
the use of Habout whom"; in the next line, we get Habout who" (AA,
17). This game need not cause real confusion, if one is willing to
be patient, but there are moments in Absalom's first chapter when
it is very difficult to tell who is ~~whom:' Rosa calls Henry Hthe son
who had repudiated the very roof under which he had been born
and to which he would return ... and that as a murderer and frat~
ricide; and he, fiend, blackguard, devil .. :' (AA, 15). Here only
the triplet Hfiend, blackguard, devil" alerts the reader to the fact that
reference has switched from Hhe" (son) to cChe" (father). This simple
sleight of hand becomes more complex when Faulkner uses demon~
stratives: HEllen knew that ... that was not it. She accepted that-
not reconciled: accepted-as though there is a breathing~point in
outrage where you can accept it almost with gratitude since you can
say to yourself, thank God, this is all; at least I now know all of it-
thinking that, clinging to that .. :' (AA, 29). HThat" and Hit" go
through so many changes here that one can't be certain about the
references. The first cCthat" refers to Sutpen's proclivity for naked
wrestling with his negro slaves. The next Hthat" refers either to the
same thing or to Ellen's knowing of it. The third cCthat" probably
refers only to the fighting. Hyou can accept it" may refer us to the
thing that caused the outrage, or the outrage itself, and so on. A few
such ambiguities are not so hard to absorb, but when they are piled
on-and with a grammatically puzzling interjection ('cnot recon~
ciled: accepted")-the difficulty increases. Significantl~ we have
moved from third~ to second~ to first~person narrative, deeper into
the character.
Through blurring the boundaries of the sentence, employing
many conjunctions in sentence~initial position, establishing chains
of lexical Hecho;' and complicating pronoun references, Faulkner
creates a prose style in the first chapter of Absalom, Absalom! that
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imitates the flow of consciousness. That prose shifts the ground of
verbal truth from denotation and frozen (grammatically clear) rela ..
tionship to connotation, rhythm~ and emerging relationship. If that
is the case, then what is to rescue Faulkner from the arbitrariness of
any single word? No single word can be Uright" independent of its
context, and we have tried to show how that context began, for all
its profuseness and verbosity here, in the simple one of voice.
When words are isolated from the stream of that voice they seem
suddenly drained of meaning, and it would be well to pause for a
moment to look at what Faulkner's characters themselves have to
tell us about that experience of the isolated word which seems
somehow to rise up in hostility against the very stream that gave it
birth.
For Faulkner's characters, the word isolated is like a black hole
in space; the heart of creation, it seems entirely vacant. Reality is,
Bergson tells us, a reality which is making itself in a reality which
is unmaking itself (CE, 251), and to turn from the stream of can"
sciousness to the individual avatar of the word is to see things sud..
denly come to a standstill, the blood draining out of creation's face.
Every time we try to match our intuition and the word, we find
ourselves reduced to a visual form that rapidly slumps into conven"
tionality. The correspondence between word and thing is arbitrar~
and by itself hostile to meaning, for it tends to evoke stock re"
sponses. Jason epitomizes this mentality. When he is rescued from
the attack of the wasp..like little man he has offended in his vindic ..
tive pursuit of Caddy's daughter, Quentin, we find Faulkner's prose
neatly encapsulating his compartmentalized consciousness. The
rescuer leads cc ••• Jason on around the corner of the station, to the
empty platform where an express truck stood, where grass grew
rigidly in a plot bordered with rigid flowers and a sign in electric
lights: Keep your g~on Mattson, the gap filled by a human
eye with an electric~ pupil" (SF, 242). The environment re"
fleets Jason's personalit~ and the eye is an ironic comment on Ja"
son's blindness. But the brief rebus of the penciled eye is a further
comment on the nature of the word. For Jason, words are things:
An eye is merely a conventional sign. Like Jason's stock response,
it is as automated as electricity.
Faulkner's Uninterrupted Sentence 137
When Tull describes Cash's work on the coffin in As I Lay
Dying, he draws a similar picture for the reader:
Cash made it clock-shape like this ,-------, with every joint
and seam bevelled and scrubbed~ with the plane,
tight as a drum ... [ALD, 56 .. 57].
The innocent inclusion of this sketch takes on much deeper tone
when we reach the sole section awarded to Addie in the book.
Addie thinks about Anse's name, having realized at last that Anse
is Hdead:' a life..denier: l:1\nse. Why Anse. Why are you Anse. I
would think about his name until after a while I could see the word
as a shape, a vessel, and I would watch him liquefy and flow into it
like cold molasses ... until the jar stood full and motionless: a sig"
nificant shape profoundly without life like an empty door frame;
and then I would find that I had forgotten the name of the jar. I
would think: the shape of my body where I used to be a virgin is
in the shape of a and I couldn't think Anse .. :' (ALD, 116 ..
17). Here, no sketch provides the Hshape to fill a lack" (ALD, 116).
The pupil of the eye, the coffin in the shape of a clock (of course!)
are merely those shapes, vacant like doorways. Addie's sense of loss
comes to her only in the unmentioned shape of the uterine urn.
What has Anse done to earn her undying hatred? He has I:l:stopped"
her motion with his dead weight, and thereby he has drained Ian..
guage of meaning-one thinks of the phrase from Soldier's Pay:
HWomen know more about words than men ever will. And they
know how little they can ever possibly mean:'48 Here is the leverage
for Addie's revenge: By extracting from Anse his Hword" that he will
take her body to Jefferson for burial, Addie thinks to turn the tables
on him, to inflict damage for the emptiness his obtuse rigidity has
inflicted on her.
But, as the gap in the line before Hand I couldn't think Anse"
suggests, Addie cannot get words and reality together any more.
The words she sees going up Hin a thin line, quick and harmless;'
while 1:1:doing goes along the earth, clinging to it, so that after a while
the two lines are too far apart for the same person to straddle from
one to the other" (ALD, 117). Addie remembers that she had once
heard the dark land talking to her in a Hdark voicelessness in which
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the words are the deeds;' and she remembers having felt that she
had somehow a Hduty to the alive, to the terrible blood:' But finally
she feels isolated. For those around her, like Cora Tull, sin and sal..
vation are a matter of mere words (ALD, 119). Faulkner must have
shared Addie's rejection of bloodless verbiage. But her note of de..
spair is only one in his scale.
There may be an Himmitigable chasm between all life and all
print;' as Faulkner speculated in The Unvanquished, a book whose
stories seem obsessed with printed requisitions, letters, and mone~
and with their deceptions.49 In a 1931 review of Erich Maria Rem..
arque's The Road Back, Faulkner mused that the experience seems
sometimes to expire before it gets to the page: uPerhaps the word
kills it:' 50 But only perhaps. Dawson Fairchild makes a different
claim in Mosquitoes: While words have no Hlife in themselves;' still
uwords brought into a happy conjunction produce something that
lives:'51 The life of words is a matter, then, of the voice that brings
them into conjunction. One reflects here on the fact that so many
of Faulkner's characters who despair over language also despair over
the vacancy and isolation of the self. And the development of the
voice speaking to us in Absalom must be thought of as the devel ..
opment of a consciousness capable of maintaining contact with the
sinuosity of the real-for there is no other source that can give
meaning to words.
But how does that consciousness confront history without dis ..
integrating like Quentin's or despairing like Addie's? Bergson has
said that in order to maintain contact with the real, a consciousness
cChas to do violence to itself;' has to reverse the direction of the op"
eration by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or
rather to recast, all its categories. Kartiganer, like most, misinter..
prets this statement when he reads it as claiming that the mind must
CCengage in an act of self..destruction:'52 Bergson clearly means not
destruction but reconstruction. To realize this self"renewing process
of consciousness in print, the writer must coin new terms, create
new ideas, though this would, of course, uno longer be communi..
eating something, it would not be writing" by our old standards.
The artist remolds language, venturing out of the realm of cCexpres"
sion;' in which language is nothing more than a medium of ex"
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change, into the realm of Himpression" and intuition (TFW, 16).
In doing so, he reverses the usual flow of things, and the conversion
of the personality's flowing into public property becomes the con"
version of public property (readymade language) into mobile pri..
vate experience (TFW, 129).
As Francis Leaver has noted, Faulkner's prose pushes constantly
on this door, using an abundance of abstract nouns, coinages, and
intensives to try to dislocate everyday language back into experi..
ence.53 Faulkner, as no other American novelist, has Hrecast" the
common coin of speech for his purposes. Thou,gh one finds him
doing it everywhere, Pylon and Absalom, Absalom! are perhaps the
most dramatic examples of his power as a re ..molder. He turns ad..
jectives into verbs: Sutpen Habrupts" upon the scene in Absalom
(AA, 8). He piles on the adjectives mercilessl~ sometimes violating
our instinct for their proper order: Quentin thinks of Rosa's "female
old flesh" (AA, 8), then six pages later thinks of her Hold female
flesh" (AA, 14), leaving us to ponder the implications of the shift.
Rosa tosses off phrases like Hlooking out upon the whatever ogre..
world of that quiet village street" (AA, 21). And in Pylon the foun ..
tain flows even more freel~ giving us Hcurbchanneled spindrift of
tortured and draggled serpentine and trodden confetti pending the
dawn's whitewings-spent tinseldung of Momus' Nilebarge clat..
terfalque:' 54 Faulkner claimed he was a failed poet. But he also said,
HMy prose is really poetry" (LIG, 56). One sees here how seriously
he has sought the immediac~ compactness, and freshness of verse
in his novels. As seriously as he has pursued the continual elabo..
ration of novelt~ he has just as intently worked on the counterforces
that give a shape to the seeming chaos and anarchy.
The Life..Sentence and the Book
To read Bergson in conjunction with Faulkner is to realize that
Adams was right: The imagery of stasis, which would seem anti ..
thetical to the flowing of a voice, is actually its complement. It pro..
vides the necessary next step from the individual Hnotes" of lexical
repetition CCghost:' "demon:' "outrage:' and Hfurious") to the chords
of memory. Here is the tool that takes the endlessly elaborating
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voice toward an overall design, a Uface still forming:' in Eliot's words
(CPP, 141). Faulkner creates. the uninterrupted sentence that emu"
lates the flux of consciousness, and at the same time never lets us
forget the inexorable ticking of the clock. This profoundly Bergson..
ian tension gives shape and pathos to the narratives. It renders a
world in a Bergsonian conflict: These selves create themselves in a
medium that is continually unmaking itself. So, for the reader, the
story transpires not as a mere chain of events, but as a dawning in
the consciousness chained to those events.
Finally; consciousness is itself a tension: UIt (the talking, the tell ..
ing) seemed (to him, to Quentin) to partake of that logic" and
reason ..flouting quality of a dream which the sleeper knows must
have occurred, stillborn and complete, in a second, yet the very
quality upon which it must depend to move the dreamer (verisimil..
itude) to credulity-horror or pleasure or amazement-depends as
completely upon a formal recognition of and acceptance of elapsed
and yet..elapsing time as music or printed tale" (AA, 22). Here is
the Hcurious strain" Hugh Kenner notes lies at the heart of every
Faulkner reader's experience: One must take notes, keep track of
the clock and calendar, and yet simultaneously Hpretend that we
need do none of this, need only listen to a voice we ourselves sup"
ply."55 And here precisely is that grasp of the utwo..sided character
of things" that Bergson admired in Lucretius.56
In trying to explain what sort of utruth" Faulkner aims at, criti ..
cism has too often been driven to despair over this dual vision. Does
Faulkner believe in the concrete and not the abstract ... vice versa?
Does he use the frozen only to suggest the mobile, or elevate the
static above the chaos of experience's maelstrom? Does he believe
life is essentially free or determined? For both Bergson and Faulk..
ner, what the mind believes is largely a matter of predisposition,
and so competing views of experience do in a sense coexist. uMan's
free will;' says Faulkner, lrlrfunctions against a Greek background of
fate" (FLU, 38). The healthy consciousness moves between the
poles of this awareness.
If Faulkner seems to have delighted in the confusions about
dates and events in both his biography and his fiction, it is not really
a delight in chaos he expresses, but a delight in the process of cre..
Faulkner's Uninterrupted Sentence 141
ation. Each attempt to define a person, place, feeling, idea, or event
is a new approximation that must eventually be scrapped for a bet..
ter. Faulkner's is not a record of man's inability to comprehend, but
rather an evocation of consciousness's self.. renewing vocabular~ For
him, the characters in his novels seem to be ccstill in motion, still
talking, and still acting" (FlU, 197..98). And that is why he still
thinks he can get to know them better, can provide us with updated
information; he gives this explanation for the inconsistencies be..
tween The Sound and the Fury and the appendix he wrote for Cow"
ley's Indispensable Faulkner: ccThe inconsistencies in the appendix
prove that to me the book is still alive after fifteen years, and being
still alive, is still growing, changing so it is the book itself
which is inconsistent: not the appendix I was even wrong now
and then in the very conclusions I drew and the information in
which I once believed:'57 The experience of the novel is, likewise,
one of discovery and revaluation, vision and revision.
Faulkner's prose reifies this shifting perspective, between the
making and the unmaking of truth, the poles of intellect and intui..
tion, the concrete and the abstract, fatalism and freedom. It ap"
proaches the rendering of ccexperiential truth" through the bobbing
and weaving of consciousness. Taking seriously the charge that an
artist ought to cccreate his own language;' Faulkner's language glo..
ries not in arbitrariness or absurdit~ but in the superiority of in ..
tuited truth to the accidents of ccfact" (see LIG, 267). As we look at
the values that seem implicit in his narrative, we ought to keep in
mind that he sees, with Wallace Stevens, a choice ccnot between but
of;' and chooses to include those things lOlOwhich in each other are
included:' 58
SEVEN
Faulkner and the Bergsonian Self
There is only one road leading from action confined in a
circle to action developing in the freedom of space, from
repetition to creation . . .
-Henri Bergson, The Two Sources
of Morality and Religion
~ Faulkner populates his books with characters reacting against
change, refusing to accept histor~ as many have noted. l It has been
less noted, however, that this rejection of change is tantamount to a
rejection of self-that Faulkner, like Bergson, relates freedom di~
recdy to self~knowledge and self~acceptance. '1\lthough we are free
when we are willing to get back into ourselves:' writes Bergson, ((it
seldom happens that we are willing" (TFW, 240). Rather than ad~
mit self's bubbling, unpredictable stream into consciousness, we
repress it; and the tool of that repression is the spatializing intellect.
Thus, as Whitehead says, we tend more and more to disdain uin~
formation about the universe obtained through visceral feelings" in
order to concentrate on "visual feelings:' 2 If the process goes far
enough, we find ((our life unfolds in space rather than time; we live
for the external world rather than for ourselves. To act freely is to
recover possession of oneself' (TFW, 121; my italics).
Faulkner's implicit theory of self and memory parallels Bergson's
with remarkable exactness. Like Bergson, he sees life as endless
creation. And like Bergson he seems convinced that, when we have
healthy psyches, there is ((one realit~ at least, that we all seize from
within, by intuition. . . . It is our own personality in its flowing
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through time-our self which endures" (1M, 3). And for Faulkner,
as for Bergson, the free act which is characterized by an overflowing
of the fundamental self is ~~exceptional" (TFW, 167). It isn't eas}',
as Addie Bundren tells us, to accept the uterrible blood, the bitter
red flood" (ALD, 117). Addie, like many of Faulkner's characters,
suffers a dissociation of talking and doing that is directly related to
her stubborn resistance to the emotional world. Precisely because
they live divided against themselves, many of Faulkner's characters
are vulnerable to disorders of consciousness-that is to sa}', of re"
membering.
Faulkner's characters are often in profound trouble when it
comes to intuiting their inner lives. After he has been beaten by the
friends of Bobbie the waitress, Joe Christmas feels literally discon..
nected: uPerhaps he was conscious of somewhere within him the
two severed wireends of volition and sentience lying, not touching
no\\', waiting to touch, to knit ane\\', so he could move" (LA, 163).
And when Joe goes to kill Joanna Burden, he starts off believing
Uwith calm paradox that he was the volitionless servant of the fatal ..
ity in which he believed that he did not believe ... " (LA, 207).
Joe later finds his body seeming ~~to walk away from him" (LA,
209). Joanna herself is, of course, a ~~dual personality" (LA, 174),
and Gail Hightower, Doc Hines, and Simon McEachern all find at
key points that mind and body have gone savagely out of synchro"
nization.
The result is that characteristic Faulknerian polarization: For Joe
Christmas, perceptions hang like birds over the square in ustill ..
winged and tremulous suspension" while his emotional life throbs
with the ~~noise of his own blood" (LA, 85 ..86). Faulkner, like Eliot,
associates this humming of life's depths with a primordial creative
force, symbolized by the feminine. Faulkner's characters must deal
with this principle and its expression in a carnal life that is often the
stimulus of Uoutrage:' The Sound and the Fury establishes a pattern
for character that is developed in later novels: Confronted with the
unpredictability and the shock of creative life, most characters de ..
cide they would rather stop growing. So Faulkner writes of dam..
aged creativity. He conceives the world in profoundly Bergsonian
terms. For him, there are two very different sorts of memory and
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two very different patterns into which they organize our lives.
Those patterns determine our possibilities, for one is open, the
other fatefully closed.
Caddy: The Missing Center
The problem with the Compson famil~ Faulkner said in an inter..
vie~ is that they are Ustill living in the attitudes of 1859 or '60"
(FlU, 18). The key to their lack of growth is their inability to accept
Caddy. They try to escape, they act vindictivel~ they point the fin ..
ger of blame everywhere else. And Caddy is the missing center of
this novel, a female driven from her place.
Maxwell Geismar accuses Faulkner of having a Uhatred of life"
because so many of his characters revolt against it. More to the
point in this matter, Richard Chase says it is the men who revolt,
that Faulkner has created a Ugynecological demonology:' 3 Irving
Malin agrees here, telling us that intuitive, earthy women in Faulk..
ner's canon are never umotivated by the abstract notions which per"
plex the daily routines of men:' and that Faulkner's women are thus,
unfortunatel~ rather usuperficial" creations.4 There is, without a
doubt, something like a gynecological demonology in Faulkner's
novels. According to Gavin Stevens, women deal with men in per"
feet assurance of having their way because Uall they need is the in ..
stinct, the intuition before it became battered and dulled:' 5 But of
course the women in Faulkner's world are not all uso wise:' just
because Uthey have learned to live unconfused by reality."6
uWomen don't care whether they are facts or not:' Eula Varner
Snopes asserts in The Town, Ujust so they fit ... men don't care
whether they fit or not just so they are facts:'? If we take Eula to be
speaking for Faulkner, then men would certainly have to be the less
practical creatures. This is what Uncle Ephraim tells Chick Malli ..
son. Men don't know how to listen: UThey ain't got time. They're
too busy with facks.... If you ever needs to get anything done
outside the common run, don't waste yo time on the men..folks; get
the womens and the children to working at it:' Chick thinks over
his father's CCoutrage, his almost furious repudiations:' 8 The more
we think of it, the more we remember those males in Faulkner who
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refuse to accommodate to a changing world: Sutpen, Simon Mc..
Eachern, Quentin Compson, and Mr. Nightingale of The Mansion,
who alike 4:4:set [their] intractable and contemptuous force against
the juggernaut of history and science both:' and are ultimately de ..
stroyed by their own Hsimple inflexibility:' The men pursue a per"
manent sanctuary 4:4:fixed, forever safe from change and alteration:'9
But Geismar is wrong: These aren't Faulkner's values. The dy..
namic between masculine and feminine operates in one way at the
symbolic level-here there seems to be a division between intellect
and intuition, idealism and realism. But Faulkner is as interested in
how that symbolism operates within the lives of his characters as he
is in making anyone of his characters a symbol. Thus, Caddy is a
symbol to Quentin, to Jason, and even to the narrator-when she
is absent. But she is also a real person in whose mind the dynamic
of feminine and masculine responses to life is also played out. She
finds herself becoming warped in the heat of her brothers' passion"
ate demands, and is eventually driven by her own demons. Her
promiscuity stems from the same self..destructiveness infecting all
the Compsons: uThere was something terrible in me sometimes at
night I could see it grinning at me:' Quentin remembers Caddy
saying, Hgrinning at me through their faces ... I'm sick" (SF, 87).
The sickness does come, admittedl~ from those around her. Her
daughter speaks for her when she says, Ulf I'm bad it's because I
had to be. You made me" (SF, 201). Caddy has her own problems.
Caddy in the tree, peeking in at the windo~ sees the rituals of
mourning going on after Damuddy's death. The Sound and the
Fury moves from this scene out in many directions into the lives of
its speakers. But always there is the vacant spot created by Caddy's
absence-a vacancy symbolized by other losses, including Damud..
dy's death. Mrs. Compson is also a kind of zero, as Quentin implies
when he thinks, HIf I'd just had a mother" (SF, 134). But Caddy
remains the significant lack. She is the one around whom the debate
and passions swirl, the issue over which the family divides and self..
destructs.
We react most violently against those things that reflect are"
pressed part of our personality. According to Bergson, we also re"
gress to habits formed early in life when we are faced with true
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novelty-we fall back on stock responses rather than adjusting to
the new. All the Compsons react in extremely repressive ways to"
ward Cadd}T. Jason and Quentin, particularly; victimize Caddy out
of their own sense of victimization. But Benjy epitomizes the
Compson disease; he operates like an abstraction from the souls of
Quentin, Jason, and Mrs. Compson: the primitive child in each of
them. He lives in a tortured Now in which sensory stimuli auto"
matically evoke memories recorded in their exact order of occur"
renee and represented to consciousness with the intensity of present
objects. He cannot make voluntary connections, draw parallels, or
learn from experience-he still does not know, at thirty..three, that
the stove will burn his hand. He sees people as volitionless objects
that materialize and disappear.
Most important of all, Benjy cannot tolerate change. Like Jason
and Quentin, Benjy hates Caddy's metamorphosis from girl to
woman. Like them, too, Benjy is addicted to routine. In the final
scene of the book, he bellows his outrage at Luster's having turned
left instead of right around the public square. Once Jason has re"
stored the usual route to the program, Benjy subsides, holding his
broken narcissus, satisfied merely that each thing is once again ccin
its ordered place" (SF, 249). Benjy is, according to Faulkner, a pit..
iable ccanimal:' a device used in the telling that ccserves his purpose
and is gone" (LIG, 245 ..46). But we should note that Benjy's infan..
tilism is at least human enough that it is without animal instinct.
And he does have memories.
The workings of Benjy's memory are thoroughly Bergsonian.
There are two kinds of memory; according to Bergson, which
ideally function in tandem with a flexible organizing personality (or
consciousness). The scheme appears in a drawing from Matter and
Memory. Cone ABS is the whole of memory. At its base, AB, lies
pure memory; where images and sense..impressions are stored uin
the order in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place and
consequently marking its date" (MM, 195). Most of what is in this
area of memory is naturally not permitted to become conscious.
Instead, the brain selects the memories applicable to present situa..
tions and possible future states. If we let consciousness float, we
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Plane of Experience
A
s
B Pure Memory
Habit Memory
Body,Image ("place of passage")
may explore our pure memory by haphazard contact; that memory
is a complete cosmos, in which nothing of our past life has peen
lost. We clearly drag a heavier and heavier load with us through
time, and Hthe point of the cone is ever driven into the future by the
weight of the past" (MM, 324,25).
We need some protection against the access of pure memor~ and
the brain provides it; but we need further some means of acting
without getting lost in the dream of the past, and so we require
habitual memor~ which, Hfixed in the organism, is nothing but the
complete set of intelligently constructed mechanisms which ensure
the appropriate response to the various possible demands:' This
memory H acts our past experience, but does not call up its image"
(MM, 195). The image of the body is a correlative of the self, and
extends upward from the plane of immediate experience like an
axis, the one stable element in all memory. Here are the things
Benjy lacks: an active brain to select from pure memory's banquet
and a developing set of habitual responses to help him function in
the world. He is a being without self'consciousness: When he sees
himself in the mirror, he cries (SF, 56). His castration, too, is a
further damaging of "self:'
Benjy's is an infant's consciousness in an adult's bod~ a con'
sciousness of astounding immaturit~ whose images have been
translated by Faulkner into calculatedly transparent verbiage. He is
tossed randomly among the flotsam and jetsam of his past, unaware
of the "unreality" of those memories, unable to do anything with
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them as they are simply inflicted on him, helter skelter. The one
habitual response he makes-the moan or howl-is too undiffer..
entiated to be interpretable except by a patient Cadd~ who finally
discovers that her perfume has upset him (SF, 31 ..32).
Benjy doesn't want Caddy to change, and when he finds she no
longer smells like trees, he begins to cry. When he encounters
Charles and Caddy on the front porch swing, he keeps up the fuss
until she finally has to walk away with him: cUI wont: she said. cI
wont anymore, ever, Benj~ Benjy: Then she was crying, and I
cried, and we held each other. cHush: she said. cHush. I wont any"
more: So I hushed and Caddy got up and we went into the kitchen
and turned the light on and Caddy took the kitchen soap and
washed her mouth at the sink, hard. Caddy smelled like trees" (SF,
36). All Benjy cCknows" is that he's happy when Caddy smells the
way she always has. She must remain pure with the pureness that
is constantly associated with water and trees throughout Benjy's
section. Caddy is the creative center, as Faulkner's vocabulary em"
phasizes. Here's an image reminiscent of one from The "ffizste Land:
CCCaddy's head was on Father's shoulder. Her hair was like fire, and
little points of fire were in her eyes.... She smelled like trees. She
smelled like trees" (SF, 55).
Benjy's resistance grieves Cadd~ and so do the more sophisti"
cated childishnesses of Quentin and Jason. cCThere are too many
Jasons in the South who can be successful:' Faulkner remarked in
an intervie~ CCjust as there are too many Quentins in the South who
are too sensitive to face its reality" (FLU, 17). Jason's is a mean
response: cCYou think you're grown up, dont you. You think you're
better than anybody else, don't you. Prissy" (SF, 30). Quentin, on
the other hand, cannot CCget past" his sister's sexualit~ just as in
Absalom, Absalom! he cannot CCget past" the account of the moment
when Henry kills Bon. Indeed, the two books resonate beautifully
with each other. Miss Rosa tells Quentin that cCthere are some things
which happen to us which the intelligence and the senses refuse
just as the stomach sometimes refuses what the palate has accepted
... occurrences which stop us dead ... leaving us immobile, im ..
potent, helpless; fixed, until we die" (AA, 151 ..52).
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Like Benj}7, Quentin wants Caddy to exist only for him: uCan
you imagine the curtains leaning in on the twilight upon the odour
of the apple tree her head against the twilight her arms behind her
head kimono..winged the voice that breathed o'er eden clothes upon
the bed by the nose seen above the apple" (SF, 82). Pure and purely
tempting, Caddy must remain the immutable Eve of Quentin's
childhood. In this, and in this synesthetic consciousness C~by the
nose seen"), Quentin is different from Benjy only in degree, not
kind. Like Benj}7, he tries to get himself between Caddy and her
lovers. Though he comes off as an ineffectual figure in his confron"
tation with Dalton Ames, he still succeeds, like Benj}7, in fouling up
their meeting, and thus probably in ruining his sister's life, for there
is no evidence that Caddy ever sees Ames again after Quentin pre..
vents her from going back to apologize to him (SF, 127).
Like Benj}7, Quentin associates Caddy with tree smells; unlike
Benj}7, he is both attracted and repulsed by Caddy's fertility. In the
long flashback to the Dalton Ames fight, the smell of honeysuckle
keeps Ucoming up in damp waves" to overpower Quentin with the
sickening thought of Caddy's lovemaking (SF, 120). When Quen..
tin opens the gasoline to clean his vest in his room at Harvard, other
potent memories happen to him-that is, they are not so much
recalled as let through: UI found the gasoline in Shreve's room and
spread the vest on the table, where it would be flat, and opened the
gasoline. the first car in town a girl a Girl that's what Jason couldn't
bear smell of gasoline making him sick then got madder than ever
because a girl Girl had no sister but Benjamin . . :' (SF, 134). Such
memories, Bergson specifically notes, are not really ~~associationist:'
They are a deeper, fused state one ubreathes in with the very scent"
(TFW, 161, 164..65). Quentin's memories hover always in the same
territor}7, converting one story into a hundred variations. Trying to
scrub the spot from his vest, Quentin is demanding somehow that
Caddy the girl not become a Girl.
In fact, Quentin's response to the uperfume" of flowers is just
Benjy's with a more sophisticated consciousness, a visceral reaction,
or rather, a reaction against the visceral: ~~Because women so deli ..
cate so mysterious Father said. Delicate equilibrium of periodical
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filth between two moons balanced. Moons he said full and yellow
as harvest moons her hips thighs.... all that inside of them shapes
an outward suavity waiting for a touch to. Liquid putrefaction like
drowned things floating like pale rubber flabbily filled getting the
odour of honeysuckle all mixed up" (SF, 100). At one point, Quen..
tin thinks about the cedars he associates with his grandfather, trying
"not to think of the swing" that reminds him (just as it reminds
Benjy) of Cadd~ But then "all cedars came to have that vivid dead
smell of perfume Benjy hated so:' as though Caddy's despoilment
had spoiled nature: "Just by imagining the clump it seemed to me
that I could hear whispers secret surges smell the beating of hot
blood under wild unsecret flesh watching against red eyelids the
swine untethered in pairs rushing coupled into the sea" (SF, 137).
Quentin's revulsion is strongly associated with these whispers he
recalls from the porch swing, just as it is symbolized by mud on
Caddy's drawers.
But it is more strongly associated with blood. When Quentin
asks Caddy whether she loves Dalton, her answer is to place Quen.. ·
tin's hand against her throat and say UDalton Ames": uI felt the first
surge of blood there it surged in strong accelerating beats say it
again her face looked off into the trees where the sun slanted and
where the bird say it again Dalton Ames the blood surged steadily
beating and beating against my hand .. :' (SF, 128). Quentin re"
jects this, but finds, when he closes his eyes, the very redness of his
eyelids a testimony to what in her is also in him.
In Quentin's final monologue, stimuli bring into consciousness
whole sections of the past which reel off before our eyes. Yet Quen..
tin can do something with these memories, as Benjy could not. He
amalgamates them with other memories and impressions. But his
creative powers have been turned against the very stream of his own
life. Like Benj~ Quentin rejects the part of Caddy that is changing;
like Benj~ too, Quentin is dependent on order and routine. His
habit memory helps him avoid, through most of the day on which
he kills himself, thinking about what he is actually doing. To the
end, he goes through with a routine of dressing; his last thought is
that he had forgotten to brush his hat, but Shreve had a brush, so
he wouldn't uhave to open the bag any more" (SF, 139). Sealing up
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the past as best he can, so he won't have to deal with it, Quentin
exits through the one door left.
Quentin struggles with his fear of the ublood" by turning it into
a quest for permanence. Though Mr. Compson is obtuse about
Quentin's dilemma, he is at least right that Quentin seeks 4:4:an apoth ..
eosis in which a temporary state of mind will become symmetrical
above the flesh" (SF, 138). That is, Quentin seems to think he can
U arrange" life in some pattern that will last, and in an act of self..
immolation, blow the flame of life U cleanly out along the cool eternal
dark instead of lying there trying not to think of the swing" (SF,
137). Finall~ Quentin correctly identifies the source of flux and
carnality as his own consciousness, and eliminates it, just as in Ab..
salom, Absalom! he will project himself into two characters, Bon
and Henr~ one of whom kills the other to prevent his sleeping with
the sister, Judith.
The river, in which ccdrowned things" float, is Quentin's Little
Sister Death. Time the river is death and disease, yet life is Ucreated
by disease" (SF, 33). Clock time is the death of real time, yet Quen..
tin finds he can think of nothing else, though he has torn the hands
off his watch. As a child, he recalls, he tried to match the clicking
of the clock in the classroom by counting with his fingers, always
disappointed when he could not make his counting come out even
with the clock's (SF, 68..69). He knows his impulse to control is
killing, but cannot stop himself. Caddy is the incarnation of that
force he fears, the unpredictability he cannot accept, yet cannot re"
ject entirely (see SF, 138). The only way he can deal with his am"
bivalency is to turn Caddy into Little Sister Death so that he can
enter her at the very moment he dies. Yet he agonizes: uDid you
ever have a sister? Did you? Did you?" (SF, 61). Substitute tones
of disgust for those of despair, and the sentence could be Jason's.
Mr. Compson says that in trying to escape unpredictability men
will try any expedient, ufrom violence to petty chicanery" (SF,
138). Jason tries both. He is so busy saving time that he never has
an~ and so convinced that C4:time is money" that he has little cash,
either. Like Quentin, Jason wants control. He turns his repression
away from himself, however, and onto Caddy and her daughter,
Quentin.
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Jason does not see the absurdity of his routinized responses:
ccOnce a bitch, always a bitch, what I say:' he begins (SF, 140). He
is bigoted, claiming to have nothing "against the jews as an individ..
ual" without hearing the self..contradiction (SF, 149). He has no
respect for his mother. He just agrees with Mrs. Compson that his
father made a mistake in thinking his children CCdidn't need control..
ling": "I always told your father;' says Mrs. Compson, "that they
were allowed too much freedom:' Quentin, she adds, "could have
controlled Caddy" if he had tried-showing how unaware of Quen..
tin's relationship to Caddy she really is. Jason, agreeing that Quen..
tin could have controlled Caddy through her respect for him,
muses: "Too bad it wasn't me instead of him. You'd be a lot better
off" (SF, 202..3).
Jason's general response to people is to threaten them; he threat..
ens to beat Quentin with his belt (SF, 144). He is constantly warn"
ing her: ccYou do a thing like that again and I'll make you sorry you
ever drew breath" (SF, 146). To his girl friend, Lorraine, who lives
in Memphis, he claims he says, ccIf you ever try to call me up on
the telephone, Memphis won't hold you" (SF, 151). Faced with a
female, threatening is the only response Jason practices, the only
way he can find to CCmanage them": '1\lways keep them guessing. If
you can't think of any other way to surprise them, give them a bust
in the jaw" (SF, ISO). He encourages Mrs. Compson to bum the
checks Caddy sends for Quentin's welfare, just as he cut up the
paper dolls Caddy and Benjy made together.
Jason bullies everyone, but he is indeed a man ccso smart he cant
even keep up wid hisself" (SF, 194). He can't stand the thought
that he has become a fool who has "been robbed by Quentin, his
niece, a bitch" (SF, 240). He defines himself in the same terms he
does others, by social appearances and prejudices. Bergson notes
that there exists
below the self with well..defined states, a self in which succeeding each
other means melting into one another and forming an organic whole.
But we are generally content with the first, Le., with the shadow of the
self projected into homogeneous space. Consciousness, goaded by an
insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality; or
perceives the reality only through the symbol. As the self thus re"
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fracted, or broken into pieces, is much better adapted to the require ..
ments of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness
prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self. [TFW
128..29]
This social adaptation becomes ineffective when it loses contact
with the inner self, for uthe mechanism by which we only meant at
first to explain our conduct will end by also controlling it:' and U au"
tomatism will cover over freedom" (TFW, 237). Jason is out of con"
trol precisely because he obsessively seeks it.
Thus his wrath bounces right back at him. Stung by the loss of
the money-he thinks nothing, naturally; of the money he has sto"
len from Quentin herself-he thinks he pursues with ucunning";
actuall}', he ublunders on:' confronting an old man. Finding he has
released the old man's fur}', he can't extricate himself. Finall}', he has
to hit the man, knocking him down, but not out, with a uclums}',
hurried blow:' Having flubbed his chance to find out whether
Quentin is in the circus train area, he runs from the railroad car:
~~His breath made a hah hah hah sound and he stood there trying
to repress it" (SF, 241). This twisted vitality has its last laugh, how..
ever, The puny old man clubs Jason from behind with a hatchet.
~~Whatwere you trying to do?" asks the man who has rescued Jason
from the old man, uCommit suicide?" And Jason is, in a wa}', as
suicidal as Quentin. Inflexible and full of anger at life, he becomes
the victim of his own life..denying mentality. His last words are to
Luster: ulf you ever cross that gate with [Benjy] again, I'll kill you"
(SF, 249).
Corpses and Copers
The Bundrens of As I Lay Dying do not sense disaster any better
than the Compsons, though they too are confronted literally with a
corpse. They end up replacing it with a woman who has the dis ..
tinction of owning a graphophone. Like The Sound and the Fury,
the novel gives us a glimpse into the lives of three older brothers
who have no sympathy for their pregnant sister; and one of these is
a supersensitive young man with important affinities to his sister
and to his youngest brother. As I Lay Dying also lets individual
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voices speak to us of the conflict between the visceral and the vi..
sual, the blood and the patterning that seeks to become CCsymmet..
rical above the flesh:'
The monologue technique has expanded, however, to become a
virtuoso performance. There are fifty..nine short sections, delivered
by fifteen different narrators. The effect on the reader of visiting so
many separate cells is a great feeling of loneliness and isolation. The
character who most often speaks, Darl, symbolizes that feeling.
Darl ends in being shipped off to the mental hospital at Jackson,
estranged both from his family and himself. to Repeated acts of self..
ishness and insensitivity emphasize the agony of this isolation. The
novel's world is one of Udoing:' we seem to be told, which has in..
sulated itself from the creative imagination that alone has power to
make doing signify. Darrs mutable consciousness is unable to cope
with the world, which becomes the property of cCcopers:' who, like
Cash, cut things always on the bevel. Dewey Dell, a sort of halfway
point between Caddy and Lena Grove, hasn't much chance of sym..
pathetic treatment in this world of hard corners, but she is not, like
Cadd~ destroyed by her mistreatment; we are led to believe that her
refusal to give up in some way guarantees her survival.
Just as Quentin and Benjy exhibit varieties of the Compsons'
childish response to Caddy's growing up, so Vardaman and Darl
offer a crucial touchstone in the array of the Bundren family's re"
sponses to Addie's death. Of the fifty ..nine short monologues, Var"
daman delivers ten, Darl nineteen. The only other characters with
more than three sections are Tull (six) and Cash (five). Toward the
end of the book, Darl and Vardaman have a sequence of seven al ..
ternating sections, and, indeed, seven of Vardaman's ten sections
come directly before or after one of Darl's. Together, Darl and Var"
daman account for ten of the last sixteen sections of the book. To
Darl we constantly recur, and the conjunction of Darl and Varda..
man makes the novel's readers aware that the childish response is
playing itself out in most of the characters. Darl and Vardaman are
specifically placed side by side and made continuous in their last
sections of the book, when Darl carries on Vardaman's monologue,
using childish diction. First, Vardaman has been thinking about
Darl's being taken away: uHe had to get on the train to go to Jackson.
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I have not been on the train, but Darl has been on the train. Darl.
Darl is my brother. Darl. Darl (ALD, 175). Turning the page, we
read the title of the next section as though it were still Vardaman's
voice: "DARL:' And then Darl himself picks up the thread: "Darl
has gone to Jackson. They put him on the train laughing.... Darl
is our brother, our brother Darl" (ALD, 176..77).
Darl is ultimately brought to a child's level of functioning, utter"
ing a Benjy..like babble which he separates from himself as another's
voice. He "foams. Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes" (ALD, 177). We
recall that Jason would have sent Benjy to Jackson if he could (SF,
204). Indeed, Jason's very name lacks only a sound to become
"Jackson:' where brothers become zoo keepers.
Addie is a more problematic and enigmatic character than
Mrs. Compson; she has only one section to herself, quite late in the
book. But she is still more 'obviously the family's t:t:albatross:' Addie
is the author of this "journey" to Jefferson, and seems to have been
motivated by revenge (ALD, 116). She is, then, one of those who
tries to impose a pattern-though one should immediately admit
her loyalties are divided. The pattern she imposes does not, one
would think, work out quite as she had imagined. She misjudges
the invulnerability of Anse, who has "eyes like pieces of burnt..out
cinder" and shoes that "look as though they had been hacked with
a blunt axe out of pig..iron" (ALD, 20, 8). Addie, the precursor of
Joanna Burden, glories in her relationship with Tull, but ends in
seeing it as the fulfillment of a pattern her father had programmed
for her in childhood: "The reason for living is getting ready to stay
dead" (ALD, 114, 118).
Addie ends, then, not in sticking with her responsibility to the
living, but rather in trying to "shape and coerce the blood to the
forlorn echo of the dead word high in the air" (ALD, 118). Her
offspring have the same problems she does in getting thought and
action, feeling and doing, together. Like the Compsons, they are a
self..destructive lot; yet their problems are not holdovers from a pre..
vious age, but new ones symbolized by the town itself toward which
they wend. In Tull's words, they are going to town more out of an
instinctive selfishness than because they must fulfill the obligation
laid on them by Addie: "They would risk the fire and earth and the
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water and all just to eat a sack of bananas" (ALD, 92). That prim..
itive appetite is a big part of what appalled Addie during her life..
time.
Addie is presented as many quantities in As I Lay Dying. For
Cash, she is Hanimal magnetism in a wooden box" (ALD, 53). Var"
daman deals with her death by turning her into a fish-he cannot
otherwise come to grips with her carnality (not spirit, but meat).
Darl tells us that Jewers horse was his mother, implying that he has
no love for his real mother. To Anse, Addie is simply part of the
household furniture. He is married again within a couple of days of
the family's arrival in Jefferson. Vardaman, despite his anguish over
his mother's death, is already metamorphosing in the direction of
his father, is Halmost old enough now to be selfish and stonehearted
like the rest of them" (ALD, 14). He has a model train on his mind
the whole way to Jefferson. Only Dar!, as Cora Tull notes, has any
of the feminine qualities that one presumes experience hammered
out of Addie herself: HI always said he was the only one of them
that had his mother's nature, had any natural affection" (ALD, 13).
Cora may be mistaken in thinking Dar! the inheritor of a feminine
nature, just as she seems to have been mistaken in her evaluation of
Addie's character; but there can be no doubt that Darl represents
what Anse and his kin are driving awa~ just as Caddy was driven
from the Compson household.
Dar! goes mad in the end. Why? First, there is the gap between
the appearance of this journey and its reality. As the sacrilege deep"
ens, and Addie's body-like her memory-grows corrupt, Darl re"
volts. He sets fire to the barn in which the coffin lies. Vardaman
sees him do it. The furious Jewel rescues the corpse that has be..
come an excuse for a selfish journey. (The family tries to ignore the
stench that everyone else finds evidently appalling.) Anse takes
away Dewey's mone~ which she desperately needs for an abortion.
He and the others almost cause Cash to lose his broken leg when
they pour cement over it to hold it rigid-and here's another symbol
for the materialism of the Bundrens. The whole family turns on
Dar! in the end. Vardaman has told Dewey of Dad's arson, a crime
Cash admits he thought of committing himself. We know that
Dewey probably betrayed Dar! to Gillespie, the barn's owner, even
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after admonishing Vardaman to keep the secret. And when the men
come to take Darl awa~ she leaps on him furiousl~ and has to be
held back. Cash finds this puzzling, commenting that he had
thought Dewey and Darl ukind of knowed things betwixt them"
(ALD,163).
Here lies the second reasons for Darl's madness. He has an in..
tuition of Dewey's love. Darl and Dewey are psychically close. So
when Dewey makes love to Lafe, Darl knows all about it: uI saw
Darl and he knew. He said he knew without the words like he told
me that rna is going to die without words, and I knew he knew
because if he had said he knew with the words I would not have
believed that he had been there and saw us. But he said he did
know and I said i\re you going to tell pa are you going to kill him?'
without words I said it and he said ~Why?' without the words. And
that's why I can talk to him with knowing and hating because he
knows" (ALD, 16.. 17). Darl later confirms: uI knew about Dewey
Dell on that day" (ALD, 89). He seems to accept Dewey's making
love to Lafe-we cannot know exactly what he is thinking about
this, but he gives Dewey no sign that he will hold the knowledge
over her head as a threat or otherwise try to come between her and
her lover. Yet Dewey expects Darl not to like it: ~1\re you going to
kill him?" She hates him not for what he knows, but for what he
feels, and we find out later on that Darl has after all, like Quentin
and Benj~ come between his sister and her lover: uDarl came be..
tween me and Lafe:' Dewey Dell tells us, but does not elaborate
(ALD, 37). Dewey believes her brother has this incestuous love,
and senses his eyes as uswimming to pinpoints. They begin at my
feet and rise along my body to my face, and then my dress is gone"
(ALD,78).
When Darl is finally loaded on the train, he recurs to this inces..
tuous desire: uTwo men put him on the train ... the state's money
has a face to each backside and a backside to each face, and they
are riding on the state's money which is incest. A nickel has a
woman on one side and a buffalo on the other; two faces and no
back. I don't know what that is. Darl had a little spy..glass he got in
France at the war. On it it had a woman and a pig with two backs
and no face. I know what that is. Is that why you are laughing Darl?
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~Yes yes yes yes yes yes'" (ALD, 176). For Dar}, as for Quentin, the
beast with two backs is a terrible revelation. This inability to cope
with repressed sexual desires connects directly to a more general
inability to accept "the womb of time: the agony and the despair of
spreading bones, the hard girdle in which lie the outraged entrails
of events" (ALD, 78). Cash and Darllie at opposite ends of the
spectrum, symbols of a deeply divided self. Cash: "I made it on the
bevel. ... It makes a neater job:' Darl: "It is as though the space
between us were time: an irrevocable quality" (ALD, 53, 96).
John 1: Irwin has discussed Darl's ambivalency toward Dewey
Dell in Doubling and Incest (1975 ).11 He concentrates on the split
within Darl, however. I think we cannot see the profundity of the
division between inner and outer life with the sort of reading Irwin
proposes, nor can we easily explain the particular pathologies of
these characters. Faulkner announces himself, with As I Lay Dying
and the Jason section of The Sound and the Fury, as the transcriber
of automatism's black comedy: ~i\utomatism covers over freedom"
could be the motto here. Characters in subsequent novels tread ever
more bizarre territory.
In Sanctuary, for example, Popeye's cruelty and impotence seem
to electrify Temple Drake and turn her from a silly and unpredict..
able brat into a sexual robot. Twisted, malnourished, and impotent,
Popeye mutilates the world, cutting up birds and kitten with scis ..
sors as though they were pieces of paper (S, 244). Brought up in
Simon McEachern's closed system of life, Joe Christmas also devel ..
ops perverse allegiances: He learns to prefer the dead but predict..
able male world to the frighteningly unpredictable female-and he
associates the female world with the primitivism of the "niggers:'
After attacking the negro slut in the shed, Joe stops to think ((how
he and the man could always count upon one another, depend upon
one another; that it was woman alone who was unpredictable" (LA,
117). This war on unpredictability does have its comic side. (Berg..
son's theory of comedy seems as though it were written with Faulk..
ner in mind.) But finall~ the disjunctions and meanness of Jason,
the dimwittedness and literalness of Cash, however absurd, have
dark consequence.
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The Mechanisms of Memory
Joe and McEachern have strong sensations of inevitability because
their system excludes the unpredictable by fiat. Free choice cannot
whelm them with responsibilit~ for they live an authoritarian, me"
chanical, routinized, and objectified life centered on ritual and
dogma. They are cold to each other. The threat of pollution from
without, however, unites them against the feminine and the black.
For Joe, this is a life..struggle, for he finds he must kill the very part
of himself that might have been free. When McEachern is about to
punish him, Joe wishes Mrs. McEachern would not interfere: uShe
would try to get herself between him and the punishment which,
deserved or not, just or unjust, was impersonal, both the man and
the boy accepting it as natural and inescapable fact until she, getting
in the wa~ must give it an odor, an attenuation, and aftertaste" (LA,
123). Joe's violence to the slut is only understandable in terms of
his need for certainty; in her he fears he recognizes a part of himself
he cannot accept. Faulkner suggested this is Joe's tragedy: that he
cannot know who he is (FLU, 72). And Regina Fadiman discovered
that, in revising Light in August, Faulkner carefully uincreased the
ambiguity about Christmas's Negro blood:' not because he wanted
to confuse his readers, but because he wanted to focus attention on
Christmas's self..doubt, which overrode everything in his life and
ended in self..destruction. 12
Joe's self..destruction is directly involved in his rigidifying, spa..
tializing consciousness, the one that makes closed patterns, banish..
ing all indeterminacy in an apotheosis of framing. A closed system,
may be thought of as U action confined in a circle:' according to
Bergson (TS, 56). And Light in August carefully distinguishes be..
tween the entrapment of Joe and the linear journey of Lena, the
only character who seems to be getting somewhere. The circle is
not used in the book exclusively as a symbol for the closed self
refusing to gro~ nor as the only symbol of life ..denying closure.
Only when circles are considered as flat patterns-as, in other
words, geometric figures-do they play this role in the thought of
Joe, Doc Hines, McEachern, and other characters of madness and
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frustration. When Joe finally arrives at the moment U something" is
going to happen (he will kill Joanna Burden), he has a feeling that
events are profoundly out of his hands: U ••• the dark was filled
with the voices, myriad, out of all time he had known, as though
the past was a flat pattern. And going on: tomorrow night, all the
tomorrows, to be part of that flat pattern, going on. He thought of
that with quiet astonishment: going on, myriad, familiar, since all
that he had ever been was the same as all that was to be, since
tomorrow to..be and had..been would be the same. Then it was time"
(LA, 208). Here is the self..fulfilling nihilism of usound and fury:'
the never..ending pattern of tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow
in which Joe is caught. His is the sort of time that has given up its
birthright of freedom, the kind that Sartre described as U decapi ..
tated" because it removes the possibility for ufree choice and act:' 13
Joe resists unsuccessfully this view of time in which nothing can
be murdered or created and which builds a prison through spatial..
izing the ufeel" of reality. He senses it as a street which "ran for
thirty years.... It has made a circle and he is still inside it" (LA,
252). The undeviating corridor becomes a circle, for it leads back
on itself; it is a solipsistic universe-light bending and bending
until there is nothing visible outside the narrow scope of the eye's
beam. Joe is doomed to run the same loop of film through the pro..
jector; but he has chosen the film. Though it isn't completely his
fault, he must pay the price for never having "broken out of the ring
of what I have already done and can't even undo" (LA, 252).
Other characters experience something like Joe's madness with ..
out his awareness. Doc Hines and his wife are dramatic examples
of the "decapitation" Sartre reacts against. They respond completely
out of their habitual memories, reeling off preprogrammed behavior
without reference to the past. The healthy consciousness moves
flexibly between habit and memor~ but, as Bergson notes, not all
consciousnesses maintain good health: ~'A human being who
should dream his life instead of living it would no doubt keep be..
fore his eyes at each moment the infinite multitude of the details of
his past history. And, on the other hand, the man who should re"
pudiate this memory with all that it begets would continually act
his life instead of consciously representing it to himself: a conscious
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automaton, he would follow the lead of ... habits" (MM, 201).
Light in August seems filled with the latter type. Hines and his wife
have t;t;something puppetlike about them, as if they were operated
by clumsy springwork" (LA, 274). When Hines talks, his voice
starts up in full stride, then stops uexactly like a needle is lifted from
a phonograph by the hand of someone who is not listening to the
record" (LA, 276).
The key to this madness is its tunnel..vision. The dietitian who
thinks Joe may reveal she has had a man in her room is possessed
by this Bat..patterned mentalit~ which seems always to hinge on
bigot~ She finds her ulife seemed straight and simple as a corridor"
which leads her to another madman, the janitor, who steals Christ..
mas and tries to put him in an orphanage for blacks (LA, 93).
Joanna Burden, too, seems uto see her whole past life ... like a gray
tunnel at the far and irrevocable end of which ... her naked breast
of three short years ago ached in agon~ virgin and crucified" (LA,
196). Joanna is preparing for a foregone conclusion, the natural
outcome of her bigoted background. For McEachern, too, Ubigotry
and clairvoyance were practically one" (LA, 148). The utter convic..
tion of McEachern, like that of Hines, is self..fulfilling, absolving
him of the need for choice and assuring him of the same self..
crucifixion that prepares for Joe and Joanna. McEachern, who rides
straight to the dance..hall to find Joe, though he could never have
rationally deduced where Joe was, thinks of himself as suddenly
being called on stage to playa role he has rehearsed for years. He
is like ua martyr who has already been absolved" (LA, 151). He
takes satisfaction in this self..created hell, in which, to use Bergson's
phrase, uwe speak, rather than think; we care acted' rather than act
ourselves" (TFW, 231).
Joe's is a self"crucifixion, as well; the intellectual functions of this
mind have caged and pilloried the intuitive human functions. The
result is automatic behavior, as when he goes to see Bobbie Uwith ..
out plan or design, almost without volition, as if his feet ordered his
action and not his head" (LA, 130, 131). Cleanth Brooks interprets
Joe's mechanical uclairvoyance" as part of an intuitive conscious ..
ness, but Joe's foresight is not fundamentally different from Mc..
Eachern's or even Percy Grimm's.14 It is just that Joe provides the
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reader some access to the workings beneath the surface, to the
struggles of the real self resisting its shado~ the automatic network
of responses. For Joe, the only escape is directly through the pattern
of transgression and punishment that originated in the McEachern
household and in his mother's upbringing. In childhood, Joe had
learned to dissociate his mind from his body and to take pleasure
in his own unresponsiveness. When McEachern would beat him,
Joe felt like a piece of uwood or stone; a post or tower upon which
the sentient part of him mused like a hermit, contemplative and
remote with ecstasy and self.-crucifixion" (LA, 118). Hightower is
the witness to Joe's final U ecstasy" when the responsibility for
choice has finally been lifted completely: Joe finally achieves peace
when the ~~pent black blood" rushes out of him ulike a released
breath" (LA, 346).
Gail Hightower has also reacted against life. But rather than
seeking the escape of McEachern in mechanical responses, High..
tower lives udissociated from mechanical time" (LA, 262). His in ..
tuition dominates over his intellect, and he is like those Bergson
described as udreaming" their lives. Though he achieves a vision of
sorts, he has lived a life out of balance, dwelling on and in a past
that, as Bergson says, uhas not ceased to exist; it has only ceased to
be useful" (MM, 193). uUseless" memories occupy Hightower,
and he loses his wife and congregation because of his escapism.
Doc Hines lives in a purely unconscious state of motor responses;
Hightower hovers far above the plane of experience, musing, out of
touch with reality:
Faulkner suggested Hightower and Joe are opposites. Is In an
important sense, Joe's psychic position is opposite to Hightower's.
Joe cannot know where he came from; Hightower cannot forget.
Bergson compares the conscious mind's mediation between mem"
ory and present perception to a telephone switchboard, letting in
the appropriate associations from pure memor~ hooking up the
right responses to everyday stimuli from habitual memory-putting
the past and present in touch. The past hovers around us like Mat..
ter and Memory's cone, forcing UitseH upon [us] ... under one form
or another" (MM, 193). But how conscious of its presence, how
open to its becoming present are we?
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When Joe consciously seeks memor)T, the process is painfully
mechanical. In the dark of Joanna Burden's kitchen, Joe searches
his memory for the name of the food he eats, but cannot see. Joe is
in the darkness of Bergson's "pure present" here, with no visual
access to the visceral experience. He eats "from an invisible dish,
with invisible fingers: invisible food:' He asks, "What is that
taste?": "I have eaten it before, somewhere. In a minute I will mem"
ory clicking knowing I see I see I more than see hear I hear I see my
head bent I hear the monotonous voice which I believe will never
cease going on and on forever and peeping I see the indomitable
bullet head the clean blunt beard they too bent and I thinking How
can he be so nothungry and I smelling my mouth and tongue weep"
ing the hot salt of waiting my eyes tasting the hot steam from the dish
CIt's peas: he said aloud" (LA, 170.. 71). One can hardly wait for
Joe's switchboard-cCmemory clicking knowing"-finally to make
the connection. Joe is strangely a cCforeigner to the very immutable
laws which earth must obey" because he has learned to hold the
world so profoundly at ba)T, to spatialize, never to touch. He is like
cCthe unswimming sailor:' whose CCthought had been molded by [the
country's] compulsions without his learning anything about its ac"
tual shape and feel" (LA, 251).
Hightower has also given up free choice; but his path lies in the
opposite direction from Joe's. In a metaphor which reminds one
strongly of Bergson's cone of memor)T, Faulkner describes Hightow..
er's preaching-his monologue to himself-as a kind of dream:
cCnot a nightmare, but something which went faster than the words
in the Book; a sort of cyclone that did not even need to touch the
actual earth" (LA, 44). Christmas is locked in the visual cCflat pat..
tern" world CCwithout dimension:' which I have equated with Berg..
son's CCPlane of Experience:' where habit memory operates (LA,
279). Hightower, in contrast, never descends out of the cloud of
pure memory. There can be no doubt that Hightower's pure mem"
ory is Bergson's. It is at once detached from and yet completely
organized by clock and calendar time-a visionary's amalgam of
religion, personal experience, and a grandfather's fabled war ex"
ploits, but yet inherently ordered in time. "He lives dissociated from
mechanical time. Yet for that reason he has never lost it. It is as
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though out of his subconscious he produces without volition the
few crystallizations of stated instances by which his dead life in the
actual world has been governed and ordered once. Without re"
course to clock he could know immediately upon the thought just
where, in his old life, he would be and what doing" (LA, 272).
Hightower's perfectly ordered memories are anything but accu"
rate when they touch on present things. It is his old, dead life, with
which he no longer has contact, that supplies the order. When he
consciously seeks the past, it is as an escape. That escape is imper"
feet, as he discovers. Bergson has suggested that the man who seeks
release through escape into the udream" of pure memory finds that
uthe past to which he returns is fugitive, ever on the point of escap"
ing him, as though his backward turning memory were thwarted by
the other, more natural memory of which the forward movement
bears him on into action and to life" (MM, 94).
Light in August describes Hightower's attempted re ..entry into
life, a moment of intuition when Christmas dies that makes him
conscious of the futility of what he has called Uliving:' Hightower
comes to see his life was Ustillborn": uI had already died one night
twenty years before I saw light" (LA, 355). He must somehow re..
turn to contact with experience, bring the past down with him out
of the clouds. As Joe must struggle to escape mechanism, High..
tower must struggle to escape his dreams: uHe had grown up with
a ghost:' his grandfather (LA, 357). He tries to bring together the
two severed wireends of memory: uthe two instants about to touch"
which are first pure memory ('cthe sum of his life") and second habit
memor~ or that point at which the real body contacts real experi..
ence ('cthe suspended instant out of which the soon will presently
begin") (LA, 362).
Hightower knows that his sin is in a way worse than that of those
who have simply repressed their creative life. Hightower has failed
to engage. As he comes to grips with his own guilt and responsibil ..
it)', he sees a vision of life's forward push-the elan vital. 16 His face
and the faces of all those he has known become something like
Eliot's ucompound ghost:' both composite and recognizable; the
faces are a unit~ fixed on a wheel of life that finally breaks free of a
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backward..dragging force. Lena, her child, Byron, Christmas, even
Grimm, take their places in this pattern of the free"spinning wheel.
Hightower achieves this intuition only after having reached a
state of extreme detachment-again, the parallel with Bergson is
clear. His body seems Uempty and lighter than a forgotten leaf" (LA,
366; italics mine). He finally comes down out of the cloud, uso that
it can be now Now:' The lack of punctuation and the spacing
remind us of Addie's ugap:' and assert an indescribability about the
moment. Hightower then sees his own vision of the cavalry charge
return, transfigured: UThey sweep into sight, borne now upon a
cloud of phantom dust. They rush past, forwardleaning in the
saddles, with brandished arms, beneath whipping ribbons from
slanted and eager lances ... and the brandished arms of men like
the crater of the world in explosion" (LA, 367). At last Hightower
has seen his fantasies in their true relation to the world's volcanic
energy; futile and valiant, these riders move forward on the crest of
a huge wave of energ~ unified by self.. inflicted suffering and self..
denial, but never stopping.
Hightower's vision is patently Bergsonian. In Creative Evolution
Bergson writes: ~l\ll the living ... yield to the same tremendous
push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides ani ..
malit}', and the whole of humanit}', in space and time, is one im..
mense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in
an overwhelming charge" (CE, 271). This is Hightower's illumi..
nation, the intuition which fixes him in his room. However short a
time it lasts, it is emphatically not the denial of his previous maun"
derings; it is a realization he has about life's upush:' It is a stirring
in his consciousness of unconscious processes which will become
a ~~dream of history" evoked in rich detail by Absalom, Absalom!
Hightower has his moment in and out of time in the ulambent sus"
pension of August" (LA, 365..66). Remarkabl}T, he appears to read
its meaning correctly and to know what by this Ulight" he is re ..
quired to do: admit imperfection and rejoin the living.
EIGHT
Bergson and American Modernism
~ For consciously umodern" writers in America during the pe..
riod between the wars, technology and its muse, Science, seemed
on a path toward spiritual impoverishment and disaster. As the gap
between body and soul widened, that literature recorded the disso..
ciations-the dedoublement of the self--:"but it also held out hope
of a path back to wholeness. This, at its simplest level, is what Berg..
son personified to American artists like Faulkner, William Carlos
Williams, Frost, Wolfe, Henry Miller, and Gertrude Stein. They
responded equally or more strongly than the generation of British
artists considering the same sorts of problems: Joyce, Woolf, the
later Yeats. In the end, Bergson reasserted a traditional potency for
art, and his aesthetic stands in the Kantian tradition, drawing par..
allels between religious and aesthetic experience, explaining the
meaning of ritual and habit, offering a means to regenerate contin..
ually decaying creative impulses.
Bergson's meaning to American writers is not really separable
from the meaning to them of Eliot's career and the emergence of
such works as The Golden Bough and From Ritual to Romance. By
attempting to go back to the roots of culture and experience, Berg..
son helped American writers to define their reaction against the
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trend of the time. He offered the terms of an argument which critics
like Ransom picked up and used. And one finds the terms appear"
ing in the prose writings of poets whose criticism is less orthodox
and more strident than Ransom's or (even) Tate's-like William
Carlos Williams.
Williams published In the American Grain in 1925, and he
clearly had been affected by the same complex of issues affecting
other poets of the period:
Men are trained never to possess fully but just to SEE. This makes
scientists and it makes masochists.
Deanimated, that's the word: something the sound of Cmetronome: a
mechanical means; Yankee inventions. Machines were not so much to
save time as to save dignity that fears the animate touch.
Our life drives us apart and forces us on science and invention-away
from touch. l
Williams's dislike for science's visualizing and his assertion of art's
visceral character-especially that it gives a wholeness-is part of
the Bergsonian argument. Indeed, Williams expressed genuinely
anti .. intellectual, and more, genuinely anti .. rational convictions at
different stages of his career, in prose and verse. The position, as it
turns out, is inseparable from his view of time. For Williams,
"touch" restores past to present. In the American Grain might be
thought of as a kind of rescue operation. It wants to restore the past
in an imaginative act, in which living mind meets and melds with
the universe of its own cultural memor)T.
Williams's concept of history is doublesided: It looks from one
view like a dead end, always present. But history may be freedom,
as well as servitude. There are two very different patterns into
which "history" may be seen to organize our experience. One is
closed: "That's history:' says Williams. 'CIt is concerned only with
one thing: to say everything is dead:' But the other is not: "History
must stay open, it is all humanity:' Williams insists on the Bergson..
ian principle that the past exists, is as durable as anything else phys ..
ically present in our world. "That of the dead which exists in our
imaginations has as much fact as have we ourselves. The premise
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that serves to fix us fixes also that part of them which we remember"
(Grain, 188). To recognize ideas here paralleling roughly ideas in
Eliot's "Little Gidding" is to recognize the confluence of apparently
diverse writers. They are working on a similar problem, the origins
and resources of freedom, with similar tools. Williams finds those
resources accessible only through our getting back in touch with
ourselves (a very Bergsonian proposition): U[History] lives in us
practically day by day: . . . If it is, as it may be, tyranny over the
souls of the dead-and so the imaginations of the living-where
lies our greatest well of inspiration, our greatest hope of freedom
(since the future is totally blank, if not black) we should guard it
doubly against interlopers" (Grain, 189). Williams argues that his ..
tory must be reclaimed for freedom. In this, he joins other American
writers of the period who are convinced that life has been conceived
of as pattern rather than experience.
History as memory is not deadening. Rather, it is the vital ufoun"
tain" of life: "You mean tradition. Yes, nothing there is metaphysi..
cal. It is the better part of all of us. It is the fountain! But men, never
content in the malice with which they surround each living mo"
ment, must extend their illwill backward, jealous even of a freedom
in the past, to maim and destroy there too" (Grain, 189). Like
Faulkner, Miller, even like Anderson, Williams conceives of the liv..
ing present as surrounded by backward..dragging forces. And as
much as Absalom, Absalom!, In the American Grain has sought to
get tradition (history resartus) into its very language. Williams's
prose tries to get the vitalit~ immediacy of the past onto the page,
to contrast it sharply with the assassination performed by analysis,
chronolog~ and biography.
For Williams, history is not patterns-or if it is, they are patterns
of meanings. And meanings, as Eliot wrote in his doctoral disserta..
tion, cannot be "merely contemplated, but must be erlebt" (KE,
94). This erlebnis (experience) falls through the cracks of scientific
inquiry. American writers like Williams and Frost saw the oppor"
tunity this presented them: to develop a different sort of uknowing:'
one that might heal the divisions in modern life, mitigate the alien ..
ation of American culture from even the little past it could recover,
Bergson b' American Modernism 169
and restore some vitality to literary activity-put it back in the cuI..
tural mainstream. This, too, was the goal of Thomas Wolfe, who
often failed to establish controls over the stream of his own creative
force.
Wolfe's career has been judged a magnificent failure on all sorts
of grounds, but clearly the most important has been lack of struc"
ture in his narratives, a lack chiefly caused, a consensus argues, by
the overwhelming force of the egotistical musing that marks his
style so deeply. Wolfe's world, as it is revealed in Look Homeward,
Angel, is haunted by Hthe ghostly ticking of his life:' He is obsessed
with the Bergsonian polarity between flux and ~~cuttings":
And it was this that awed him-the weird combination of fixity and
change, the terrible moment of immobility stamped with eternity in
which, passing life at great speed, both the observer and the observed
seem frozen in time. There was one moment of timeless suspension in
which the land did not move, the train did not move, the slattern in the
doorway did not move, he did not move. It was as if God had lifted his
baton sharply above the endless orchestration of the seas, and the eter..
nal movement had stopped, suspended in the timeless architecture of
the absolute. Or like those motion"pictures that describe the move"
ments of a swimmer making a dive, or a horse taking a hedge-move..
ment is petrified suddenly in mid..air, the inexorable completion of an
act is arrested. Then, completing its parabola, the suspended body
plops down into the pool. Onl~ these images that burnt in him existed
without beginning or ending, without the essential structure of time.
Fixed in no..time, the slattern vanished, fixed, without a moment of
transition.2
As J.B. Priestley suggested, Wolfe's writing does not "go on and on
and on" so much as "hold a scene and go in and in and in:' 3
The longing, that is to sa~ is directly related to an intense and
sometimes even maniacal clutching for the Moment. Whether ex"
horting us, or word"painting, Wolfe stays on this polarity between
clock..time and experienced time, the ways in which we are
"robbed" of our own existence. That is not to minimize the impor..
tance of Wolfe's grappling with his own past, trying to come to
terms with it and incorporate it in his literary world. But his rhetoric
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aims constantl)T, as Maurice Natanson has said, at the "articulation
of reality through privileged moments;' an articulation whose chief
imperative seems to be "Look! See!"4 This re ..vision of American
experience is obsessed not merely with the Moment, but with the
sources for vitalit)T, the means to combat CCdeath..in..life;' as Wolfe
repeatedly names it.
Bergson has everything to do with the approach of Wolfe and
Williams, whether they read him deeply or not. Their careers
hardly make sense unless we recreate the context of American lit..
erary discussion in the twenties and thirties with Bergson in mind.
The number of those participating in the discussion was large.
Many were even directly influenced by their reading of Bergson in
translation: Stein, Frost, and Henry Miller, for example.
Stein, of course, was in Paris, and she attended Bergson's lec..
tures. 5 That she was a student of William James is well known, but
of her thoughts on and discussion of Bergson not a great deal has
been said. Wyndham Lewis clearly identified Stein as of the school
of "evolutionists"-James, Bergson, and Whitehead. And she
shares with all these thinkers what Allegra Stewart has called a "sa..
cramental view of human creativity:" 6 Stein's correspondence with
Sherwood Anderson and her creation of the hermetic writings of
her early career, like Tender Buttons, suggests that she was applying
Bergsonian ideas about the renewal of language through "indirec..
tion" and the pursuit of the unique. Her influence on Anderson's
career was profound, even if one sees it as a very diffuse sort of
influence, because she helped him phrase to himself the sort of job
an artist ought to be doing. And that job incorporates rather grand
cultural ambitions.
Indeed, every American writer touched by the debate coming
out of the Bergsonist phenomenon has such aspirations. The pe"
culiarly American brand of that reaction seems to have been to do
what Ransom, Stein, and Williams did: to take the issue as far as it
could be taken. Some would sa)T, for example, that in these writers,
and perhaps in Wolfe and Faulkner, too, what one gets is not so
much an encounter with the processes of the mind as an embrace
with chaos. But while Stein's major works still receive some atten"
tion from contemporary criticism interested in philosophical and
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perceptual issues, Wolfe's is not seen as part of the same American
literary impulse. They seem worlds apart. But they cannot be
viewed in this way if one traces the roots of each back to a Vitalist
trend of which Bergson is the logical symbol.
Many saw Bergson in just that way. Frost, for example, was af..
fected deeply by Creative Evolution, which he had read with great
excitement when the translation into English appeared in 1911.7 It
may be that Bergson helped Frost, as he had helped the Maritains
and others, to sort out a religious quandary.8 Bergson not only jus..
tified the idea of a hidden reality (in terms acceptable to Frost), but
also made possible some realignment of evolutionary thought and
the Bible. At least, Frost appears to have found in Creative Evolu..
tion an argument for the substantial value of a religious impulse, a
way of viewing religion as experience rather than empty ritual. And
Bergson offered new vitality to Frost as a poet, as well.
Frost's later view of freedom was clearly shaped in the period in
which he read Creative Evolution. He was impressed, particularl~
by Bergson's vision of the creatively evolving universe. The play
impulse of "Birches" and "Blueberries" is perhaps the earliest
expression in verse of Frost's clarity about the relative value of the
openended activities against which intellect (in Bergson's terms) re ..
volts. His poem l:1\ccidentally on Purpose" (published in his last
volume) records the lingering effect of Bergson's thinking. Here,
evolution is said to have been "coded" from the beginning to pro"
duce humanit~ Many poems of the twenties, like uThe Grind..
stone:' play upon the ugrinding discord" of deadly habit and dull
routine in opposition to the vital impulse toward freedom felt in the
brain of the speaker: uI was for leaving something to the whetter:'
And uWest"running Brook" explicitly says:
Our life runs down in sending up the clock.
The brook runs down in sending up our life.
The sun runs down in sending up the brook.
And there is something sending up the sun.
It is this backward motion toward the source,
Against the stream, that most we see ourselves in,
The tribute of the current to the source.
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The source for the theory behind these images has not been appar"
ent to everyone. But it can be no other than Bergson's vision of the
universe, a stream making itself across a stream unmaking itself.
Dorothy Judd Hall has said that Frost's whole career can be seen
as <cBergsonian:' a vision that <Cgrew organically by freedom of as"
sociation:'9 Whether we wish to go this far or not, certainly Frost
responded to the <Ctension" inherent in Bergson's vision, the dualism
in Bergson that it has been the purpose of this book to reintroduce
for discussion by criticism. Frost himself knew that his discovery of
Bergson in 1911 was an important moment for him as man and
artist. And Henry Miller had a similar experience.
Miller, who described his early career to Lawrence Durrell as
having been influenced <Cimponderably" by his reading of Creative
Evolution, shares a great deal more with Faulkner than has gener..
ally been recognized. 10 He connects, for example, language and the
womb to the sort of <Ctimelessness" we associate with Bergsonian
intuition. In Tropic of Capricorn (finally published in Paris in
1939) he writes: <CThe talk goes on, in that low throaty voice. No
beginning, no end. I'm aware not of time nor the passing of time,
but of timelessness. She's got the little womb in the throat hooked
up to the big womb in the pelvis:' Miller's whole oeuvre, with its
intentionally confrontive graphicness, might be read as an assertion
of the visceral over the visual, a search for the reality <Cin the blood
and not in the stars;' a reality in the voice-not seen through a
telescope. ll Like Faulkner, Miller sees human experience as a
choice between acceptance and outrage. If Miller is also anxious to
prove himself the picaresque hero of his own fiction, he is still, like
Faulkner, promoting a view of the world in which acceptance of the
self's creativity..in ..decay is everything: <CWe can know the truth and
accept it, or we can refuse knowledge of it and neither die nor be
born again. In this manner it is possible to live forever, a negative
life as solid and complete, or as dispersed and fragmentar~ as the
atom" (Capricorn, 334). Miller's anti .. materialism, then, is both so..
cial and psychological, physical and metaphysical. Again and again
he returns to the dialectic between feeling and seeing, grasping and
visualizing, rebirth and atomization.
It is not possible, reall~ to make sense of the fragmentary and
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disjointed narratives reeling from the brain of his persona without
reference to the Bergsonian aesthetic, one requiring the tension be..
tween two sorts of time, the purposeful disorientation of the reader's
attention by arrangement of diverse materials pointing toward (but
never naming) an ineffable experience.According to Miller's own
formula, «thought and action" become one, «because swimming
you are in it and of it, and it is everything you desire to be:' The
sensations one experiences reading Tropic of Capricorn are thus di..
vided at the heart, for «you are fixed in a reality which permits the
thought that nothing is fixed, that even the happiest and mightiest
rock will one day be utterly dissolved and fluid as the ocean from
which it was born" (Capricorn, 332).
In this book, Miller writes openly of the influence of Bergson
upon him as an artist. He says that Creative Evolution helps explain
both its thematic preoccupations and artistic strategy:
If [Creative Evolution] had not fallen into my hands at the precise
moment it did, perhaps I would have gone mad. It came at a moment
when another huge world was crumbling on my hands. If I had never
understood a thing which was written in this book, if I have preserved
only the memory of the word creative, it is quite sufficient. This word
was my talisman. With it I was able to defy the whole world, and
especially my friends.... The discovery of this book was equivalent
to the discovery of a weapon. . . . It gave me the courage to stand
alone, and it enabled me to appreciate loneliness. [Capricorn, 219]
What Miller had obviously found in Bergson's work was a clue to
his essential divergence from the culture's mainstream. The book
provided an argument from legitimate and open grounds for the
importance of art, of the open..ended experience. And thus it really
did serve Miller as a lrlrtalisman:' lrlrWith Creative Evolution under
my arm I board the elevated line at Brooklyn Bridge after work:' he
writes. To have this book is first of all to be accompanied on a lonely
quest: «My language, my world is under my arm. I am the guardian
of a great secret" (Capricorn, 222). The book served as a shibboleth
to divide initiates in this mystery from those who, like Eliot's riders
in the London tube, did not understand the nature of their own
loss.
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But Creative Evolution did after all provide the specific argu..
ments and explanations discussed in the second chapter of this
present book. And these Miller clearly absorbed. They led him, he
tells us with characteristically inflated rhetoric, back to vitalit~ to
life, to language. They offered a door that was better than just an
escape; it was a means of fighting back:
[Creative Evolution] itself disappears from sight. . .. It is chewed
alive, digested and incorporated into the system as flesh and blood
which in tum creates new spirit and reshapes the world. It was a great
communion feast which we shared in the reading of this book, and the
outstanding feature of it was the chapter on Disorder which, having
penetrated me through and through, has endowed me with such a mar"
vellous sense of order that if a comet suddenly struck the earth and
jarred everything out of place ... I could orient myself to the new order
in the twinkling of an eye. I have no fear or illusions about disorder
any more than I have of death. [Capricorn, 221]
Miller's great secret, then, was the idea of order-that the deck was
being constantly reshuffled, and that this itself was a principle of
order in apparent chaos. His grasping in Tropic of Capricorn for an
aesthetic device to render this constant reorientation of vision ne"
cessitated by experience depends upon ideas that are ubiquitous
among American writers in the thirties-it is his own trCdislocation
of language" into his meaning.
Miller's promethean pose, his exaggeration, his taking the argu..
ment to the limit-these elements also make him part of the rec"
ognizably American reaction to Bergson's writings. Bergson sum"
marizes thus (in the chapter to which Miller refers): trCWe must, by
a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather up our past which
is slipping awa~ in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, into
a present which it will create by entering" (GE, 200). Miller's recoil
of personality creates the vision of a mad prophet wending his way
deeper into the city's labyrinth of time; a saint of a different propor"
tion, he offers a trCcommunion" Eliot, among others, would almost
certainly den~ Nonetheless, it parallels the graphic communion im..
aged in Four Quartets: trClt was a great communion feast which we
shared:' Miller says.
Of course, one man's idea of what he shares with others is not
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sufficient to prove a case. Moreover, we must finally judge for our"
selves whether Faulkner was really influenced "by Bergson, ob..
viously:' But there is, as it turns out, a genuine consistency of ap"
proach, argumentation, and vocabulary among major American
writers between the wars; and that vocabulary emerges from a dia..
logue in which Bergson was the most important single voice. That
is why one can speak of such different writers as Miller, Eliot,
Faulkner, Williams, Frost, and Stein as sharing a Bergsonian im..
pulse, for they are writing about his issue-about the possibility of
reasserting freedom for the human spirit in opposition to the devo..
tees of "pattern:'
When Williams says "History must stay open:' he means we
must conceive of the world with Miller's talisman under our arms,
conceive of it as a world not created, but creative. Stein echoes this
view when she writes "if you can remember it, it may be histor~ but
it is not historicaI:' 12 The consciously"modern" American writer of
this century is compelled to present the results of his or her own
explorations in the labyrinth. This artist is also compelled to con"
front the claims of an aesthetic that requires a "pattern" of disorien ..
tation and reorientation outlined by Bergsonian philosophy. And
the consciously "modern" writer in America has a cause, a battle to
fight on two fronts: to assert the value of art, and simultaneously to
assert the value of the openended view of time and history. This is
what distinguishes Faulkner, to my mind, from the Naturalist tra"
dition to which Conder has so ably connected him; his world is
haunted by automatism, but it points to something far beyond.
Bergson, whose career began with the attempt to defend the pos..
sibility of freedom and the reality of intuition, provides the tags-
the aesthetic and poetic. To understand American literature of the
period, one must understand him and the non..historical mode of
knowing he balanced against "clock..time:' One must know of his
tremendous popularity and of the backlash against him among sig"
nificant reactionary thinkers of the teens and twenties. One must
understand as well the workings of the intuition philosophique: an
act of will by which consciousness thrusts itself outside itself, so that
it can confront again the enigma of its own memor~ too great to be
contained by the consciousness of which it is (supposedly) a part.
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The independent life of our memories is directly connected to the
Bergsonian idea of living histor~ and it places Bergson in the Au..
gustinian tradition: HYet is [memory] a power of mine, and belongs
unto my nature; nor do I myself comprehend all that I am" (Conies ..
sions, X, 15). Intuition must avoid, then, the narrow rationalism of
analysis to embrace data science dismisses as Hsubjective:' To the
rigor of science's laws, American Modernists opposed another rigor
discovered in the doing. Whether they were aware of it or not-
and many were not-their vocabulary lies in a direct descent from
Augustine through Kant and Bergson.
Bergson also helps us to understand the cult of artistic Himper"
sonality:' According to him, the artist crafts image"patterns that do
not express him, but call us to ourselves. The montage of Capricorn
or Absalom or The Wzste Land is aimed at this kind of impersonal
effect. It asks that the reader hold in suspension his reading of the
parts until the last syllable drops into place. The aesthetic effect
attempted in these works tries, as Bergson says, to absorb the
reader, to grab his hand and jerk him into a street dance. And yet it
never loses sight of its doubleness: It, too, is a reality making itself
in a materiality unmaking itself (CE, 251). The technique, like the
vision, reminds us that creative impulses move across the backward..
dragging Hillwill" of In the American Grain, the c;c;backward motion
toward the source" of Frost's brook. We are reminded also that we
are the Hboats against the current" of Fitzgerald's Gatsby.13 Our mo"
tion is of consequence, as Tate says, because it is a Hresisted mo"
tion:' Thus, the poem, like the human spirit itself, embodies a
struggle against being drawn unwillingly Hinto the vortex of things
by rigid natural laws:' 14 This tension, this dual consciousness, char..
acterizes the best of what we have come to call Hmodernist" writing.
And Bergson played a determining role in the development of such
a literature because he publicized, codified, and came personally to
symbolize the new Htime..awareness" of his age.
His aesthetics of intuition and tension, then, explain a great deal,
often the detail as well as the broad thrust of such works. His aes"
thetic need not lead to an art at war with its own artificiality; in ..
stead, it suggests a way that artificiality may conduce to a victor~
how art ma~ in a sense, keep itself open. By giving Houtward
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expression to something of that contradiction, that interpenetration
which is the very essence of the elements" of our psychic life, the
artist may perform a crucial role in culture. Bergson's contribution
to American literature between the wars is this key to the impor..
tance of artistic creation, as much as it is a vision of creative life
thrusting forward amid discouragements.
Bergson was essential to the development of American literary
Modernism. That movement, as I see it, seeks to make readers con"
scious of a truth of experience beyond similitudes; it actively makes
us aware of the problematic nature of the text. It escapes skepticism,
however, by laying emphasis upon the process by which we read,
penetrating to and reincarnating meaning-renewing ourselves.
That renewal seemed of such importance to Modernist writers that
it became the subject as well as the object of their work. In tech..
nique and theme, then, modern American literature is profoundly
entangled with Bergson.
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